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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis provides an overview of the social and entrepreneurial careers and strategies of 
merchants during the first modern “commercial” era, 1830-75. It examines merchants as 
migratory entrepreneurs during the integration of peripheral regions into the transatlantic 
economy via commerce, technology transfer, and ideology. Merchants organized, operated and 
expanded overseas commerce, importing textiles and exporting pastoral products. They used a 
variety of strategies and firm structures to discover and exploit niches in a competitive, developing 
market. They also influenced the process of economic development and state building as 
capitalists and risk-bearers, financing both production and politics. Based on archival material 
from diverse collections in both the United Kingdom and South America, the research offers a 
qualitative account of the entrepreneurial activities of the British merchant elite in Uruguay. It 
uses case studies of British immigrant entrepreneurs, whose privileged access to capital and 
technology allowed them to expand the market for imported products and to exploit upstream 
opportunities in modernizing export production. Uruguay’s distinctive institutional and 
geographical characteristics allowed merchants to access markets, maximize their social and 
political connections, and to hedge political and market risks. British merchants used Montevideo 
as an alternative regional port to Buenos Aires, and the implications of this opportunity have been 
underexplored in the literature. In establishing and expanding their operations in Uruguay, 
merchants gained region-specific capital in the form of geographically fixed upstream investments, 
market knowledge, and positions in elite networks. The social connections of Anglo-Uruguayan 
merchants were essential in providing resources and influence for their entrepreneurial activities, 
but were also their point of entry into the contest over the economy and polity of the River Plate 
region. British merchants’ incentives changed towards engagement in the political and ideological 
struggles of the Uruguayan civil war, the guerra grande of 1839-51, as they contested political 
outcomes by acting as suppliers, financiers, and lobbyists. This involvement created an Anglo-
Uruguayan subset of River Plate merchants, who went on in subsequent decades to reshape the 
economy through investment and entrepreneurship. 
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Glossary 
Arroyo Grande, Battle of: Fought Dec. 6, 1842. A decisive victory for the Blancos. Led directly to 
the siege of Montevideo. 
 
Banda Oriental: A term for the east bank of the Río Uruguay; a geographical reference roughly 
identical with the state of Uruguay. 
 
Barraca: A warehouse, typically owned by wholesalers of export produce. 
 
Blanco: Uruguayan political party, originally referring to the followers of Oribe during the guerra 
grande. Seen to be more conservative, rural, and aligned with Argentine Federalism than the 
Colorados. 
 
Caudillo: A local political or military strongman who attracts a popular following through 
charismatic and clientelistic leadership. 
 
Cisplatine: The name for the Banda Oriental during the period of Portuguese and Brazilian rule, 
1820-28. 
 
Cisplatine War: The 1825-28 conflict between Brazil and the United Provinces that led to the 
creation of Uruguay as a separate state. 
 
Colonos: Colonists, in most cases immigrants procured by colonization schemes in Europe. The title 
was used in the 1830s as a cover for the continuance of slavery. 
 
Colorado: Uruguayan political party, originally referring to the followers of Rivera during the 
guerra grande. More urban, and politically oriented towards Brazil, Europe, and Argentine 
Unitarians. 
 
Comercio de tránsito: The transit trade via Montevideo along the tributaries of the River Plate, 
notably with Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and the interior of Brazil. 
 
Cursista: Those who supported inconvertible paper currency (“curso forzoso”) during the debates 
of the 1860s and 1870s; opposed to the oristas, who supported a gold standard. 
 
Doctores: The urban, intellectual elite faction of the political parties. Originally associated mostly 
with the Colorados, and opposed to caudillos and caudillismo. 
 
Ejido: State-owned lands. 
 
Entrepôt: A port specializing in re-exports. Montevideo is this for much of the River Plate basin.  
 
Entre Ríos: The Argentine province adjacent to the Banda Oriental. Dominated politically by the 
caudillo Justo José de Urquiza from 1842-70. 
 
Estancia/Estanciero: A rural estate/estate owner. 
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Federales (Federalists): Argentine political faction, favouring decentralization of power to the 
provinces. Frequently allied with the Uruguayan Blancos. 
 
Fusión: The 1850s political faction that attempted to transcend the Blanco/Colorado party divide. 
Associated with Andres Lamas and Bernardo Berro. 
 
Guerra grande: A regional and international conflict lasting from 1839-51, centring on an 
Uruguayan civil war between Oribe’s Blancos and Rivera’s Colorados. Notable for Argentine, 
Brazilian, British and French intervention, the extended siege of Montevideo, 1843-51, and leading 
into the battle of Caseros and the overthrow of Rosas. 
 
India Muerta, Battle of: Took place March 27, 1845, leading to a decisive rout of Rivera’s forces 
and marking the end of combat in the interior during the guerra grande. 
 
Littoral: The areas along the Atlantic coast and the River Plate, accessible by water. 
 
Nueva clase alta rural: The new group of landowners who purchased rural estates during the price 
collapse following the guerra grande. Largely composed of immigrant merchant-estancieros.  
 
Oriental/Orientales: Inhabitants of the Banda Oriental; roughly synonymous with 
Uruguayan/Uruguayans. 
 
Orista: Supporter of a gold standard during the currency debates of the 1860s-70s. Opposed to the 
cursistas, who supported inconvertible paper money. 
 
Particulares: Contracts, usually loans, arranged with individual actors or firms. 
 
Patacón: A unit of account, corresponding roughly to 1/16th of an ounce of gold, or an ounce of 
silver. 
 
Patria Vieja: The independent Uruguayan state during the time of Artigas’ government, 1815-20. 
 
Patriciado: The traditional elite class of Uruguay, established by the early inhabitants during the 
late Spanish colonial period, as described by historian Carlos Real de Azúa. 
 
Peso fuerte: See patacón. 
 
Principista: An urban ideologue, governing according to liberal principles rather than political 
pragmatism. 
 
Revolution of the Lances: A rural rebellion from 1870-72, led by Blanco leader Timoteo Aparicio. It 
failed to overthrow the government, but wartime losses led to the law and order coalition behind 
the 1876 takeover of Lorenzo Latorre. 
 
Río Grande do Sul: The southernmost province of Brazil. Similar economically to Uruguay, with 
substantial cross-ownership and migration across the border. 
 
Saladero: A plant for salting and drying meat into tasajo or charque. Originally requiring very little 
capital and crude technology, they became larger more sophisticated during the 1840-60s. 
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Salto grande: A waterfall on the Río Uruguay, preventing direct navigation of the river, though 
portage trade did allow access to Brazil. The town of Salto is located next to the waterfall. 
 
Tasajo: Dried beef jerky, produced in a saladero, and sold to feed slaves in Brazil and Cuba. Also 
known as charque. 
 
Treinta y tres: The thirty-three Orientales who began the 1825 insurgency that led to the 
independence of the Banda Oriental from Brazil. Led by Juan Lavalleja, with Manuel Oribe as 
second in command. 
 
Unitario (Unitarian): Argentine political faction, favouring centralization of power under a national 
government in Buenos Aires. Frequently allied with the Uruguayan Colorados. 
 
Vuelta de Obligado, Battle of: Confrontation between the Anglo-French fleet and the Argentine 
Confederation on the Paraná River during the guerra grande, November 20, 1845. A minor victory 
for the British and French, it temporarily opened the river, but did not accomplish any larger 
strategic objectives. 
 
Map of Uruguay, 1875 
 
Source: David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, www.davidrumsey.com  
11 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the 19th century, merchants were the vanguard of international entrepreneurship. Highly 
mobile, socially connected, well-informed and bold about taking risks, they transformed the 
organization of trade from the corporate, state-dominated 18th century, to the post-Napoleonic 
era of small, flexible, private partnerships. They sought out opportunities in the interstices of the 
global economy, finding the places where a profit could be turned by someone with the right 
product, the right information, or the right strategy. In doing so, they changed the shape of the 
world economy, increasing trade, exploiting comparative advantage, and generating economic 
growth. This thesis examines one small group of merchants, the British community in Uruguay, 
during the mid-19th century. It follows the history of two interrelated processes: the development 
of the Uruguayan economy and the integration of British merchants into the fabric of that 
economy, from 1830, at the dawn of Uruguayan independence, until 1875, the beginning of the 
era of large-scale foreign investment. 
The social networks of British merchants were the primary method by which they 
obtained the credit, information and trust necessary to perform entrepreneurial functions. This 
was because the undeveloped situation of the Uruguayan economy posed substantial problems 
for entrepreneurship generally, as a young state with weak judicial and enforcement powers made 
both markets and formal institutions unreliable. This forced merchants to adopt substantial 
hedging and risk mitigation strategies, as well as to rely on social networks. However, low levels of 
development were also an indicator of capital scarcity, relative to the abundance of land and 
unimproved livestock. This scarcity of capital was not only an opportunity for high rates of return, 
but also to shape a potentially prosperous locale at a time before economic patterns had been 
fixed. Those entrepreneurs with the capabilities and resources necessary to overcome these 
obstacles were well-positioned to seize the opportunities of this high-risk situation. Merchants had 
to manage the barriers of distance, culture, and an uncertain business environment. But the 
potential rewards were large. Entrepreneurs with pre-existing networks, and those who could 
forge trust-generating social links, were the best able to adapt to local instability, acquire region-
specific expertise, and manage their business interests across long distances. The British 
merchants of Uruguay were at the forefront not only in the development of international trade, 
but also in the production of new commodities, the increasing intensification of capital, the 
development of public infrastructure, and the emergence of a formal financial sector.  
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Motivation 
In business history, Uruguay has been largely neglected as a case study, both during the 
initial phase of enthusiasm for business history in the 1970s, and in the more recent resurgence. 
This is understandable, since Uruguay is a small country, and therefore lacks the potential of its 
larger neighbours to sustain research projects. Its source base is small, and its relevance to the 
larger questions of business history is not obvious. However, there are good reasons to push back 
against this marginalization. First, Uruguay is, and has always been, an outlier among Latin 
American countries in terms of relative development. Gross domestic product per capita was 
higher than any country in Latin America in the 19th century, and remains among the highest 
today. The comparative income figures of Angus Maddison1, which are for Uruguay based on the 
work of Bértola et al.2, must be taken as little more than a ballpark estimate for this period, given 
the paucity and quality of the macroeconomic data available. Nevertheless, they show Uruguay as 
the highest income country in the region up until the Barings crisis of 1890, when the faster 
recovery of Argentina from the crisis causes it to overtake Uruguay for the first time. This suggests 
that Uruguay was a regional leader in development, especially prior to the export-led boom of the 
first globalization. This headline figure is reinforced by estimates of energy consumption per 
capita,3 the spread of companies,4 literacy and schooling5, and a host of other metrics showing 
Uruguay as the most advanced country in the region.  
Uruguay’s developmental precocity and subsequent relative decline are studied elsewhere 
in the economic history literature.6 However, if we are to ask what was distinctive about the 
country during the mid-19th century period when its relative advantage over its neighbours was 
most  prominent, one feature that may have some explanatory power is the prevalence of British 
merchants, who were integrated into the economy more deeply than elsewhere in Latin America.  
                                                          
1 Angus Maddison, Maddison Project Database, available online at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm.  
2 Luis Bértola et al., El PIB de Uruguay. (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1998). 
3 Reto Bertoni et al.,“El desarrollo energético de España y Uruguay en perspectiva comparada, 1860-2000,” 
Revista de Historia Industrial, no. 41 (2009), and Mar Rubio et al., “Energy as an indicator of modernization 
in Latin America, 1890–1925,” Economic History Review, vol. 63, no. 3 (Aug. 2010), 769–804. 
4 Leslie Hannah, “A Global Census of Corporations in 1910,” CIRJE Discussion Paper (February 2013), 
available online at http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf878.pdf. 
5 Elena Mariscal and Kenneth Sokoloff, “Schooling, Suffrage and Inequality in the Americas, 1800-1945,” in 
Stephen Haber, ed., Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America: Essays in Policy, History, 
and Political Economy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000).  
6 Henry Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (London: Macmillan, 1981), Luis Bértola, “An 
Overview of the Economic History of Uruguay since the 1870s,” accessed online at 
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/bertola-uruguay-final/. 
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Peter Winn, who has written the most insightful and extensive work on the topic based on 
theories of informal empire, casts Uruguay as being drawn into the British economic sphere over 
the course of the 19th century.7 Winn describes this as being a slow and halting process prior to the 
1880s, mediated through immigrant merchants during the 1840s, and through Brazilian 
dominance in the 1850s and 1860s, before finally coming fully into British economic orbit during 
the late 19th century. However, as Winn is careful to emphasize, it is not at all clear that even the 
informal influence of Britain was dominant, at least prior to the age of steam. While Britain was 
always a major trading partner, and in most years the largest, it was far from the only one. The 
country traded with a diversified group of European countries, including France, Spain, Belgium, 
and the Italian and German states. The local merchant elite reflected this diversity of trading 
partners. British merchants were among the wealthiest and most influential in the city, but they 
were only one group in a cosmopolitan mixture of ethnicities and origins.   
Merchants are, by definition, connecting agents, links between people and places. In the 
case of British merchants in Uruguay, their primary connection was the transatlantic one, between 
the River Plate and Britain. Within Britain, the merchants of Montevideo tended to come from the 
north of England, or from Scotland. The home ports of their partners, their family firm, or their 
agents, tended to be either Liverpool or Glasgow, with connections to Belfast, and the 
manufacturing areas of Manchester and the Scottish lowlands. It was less common for merchants 
to deal directly with London, and rare to have firms from the rest of the country.  It was from 
these regions that merchants came to Montevideo, typically at first as commercial apprentices or 
as representatives of established houses. 
As is widely recognized in the literature, the entrepreneurship of British merchants across 
multiple sectors of the Uruguayan economy was important in its early development, and may help 
explain its high per capita income relative to other Latin American countries. British merchants 
were among those persistently responsible for the introduction of new methods, products, 
markets, and organizational forms over the course of the 19th century.8  Small, flexible commercial 
houses made the markets of the River Plate trade, peddling a variety of manufactured goods, and 
                                                          
7 Peter Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpúrea: a la Búsqueda del Imperio Económico (1806-1880) 
(Montevideo: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 1997) and “British Informal Empire in 
Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century,” Past and Present, No. 73 (November 1976). 
8 For the classic texts which highlight the importance of merchants in the economy, see: José Pedro Barrán 
and Benjamín Nahum, Historia rural del Uruguay moderno: 1851-1914 (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda 
Oriental, 1967-78), Luciá Sala de Touron, Rosa Alonso Eloy and Julio C Rodriǵuez, El Uruguay comercial 
pastoril y caudillesco (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1983-1991). For the role of the British 
specifically, see: Peter Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpúrea, (1806-1880). 
14 
 
 
purchasing the hides and wool produced in the interior. As Raúl Jacob notes, the boundaries of the 
political entity of Uruguay were much more limited than the economic space accessible from 
Montevideo.9 It was the entrepôt of choice not only for the Uruguayan hinterland, but also much 
of the Argentine littoral, as well as parts of the Brazilian interior. As will be seen in chapter four, 
intermediation was especially pronounced during times of conflict, as Montevideo made an ideal 
alternative port to Buenos Aires in the River Plate trade. But even in peacetime, merchants relied 
on the comercio de tránsito, the transit trade with the interior beyond the borders of the country. 
The predominance of merchants and the predominant role of trade in this economy had 
consequences for the political economy of the region, and David Rock suggests that these 
differences are critical to unravelling the differences between Uruguay and Argentina in state 
development.10 Understanding the interaction between the economic, social, and political role of 
British merchants during this transitional period is the primary aim of this thesis.  
Periodization 
The period covered in this thesis spans from 1830 until 1875. The beginning of the period 
is justified by the final emergence of Uruguay as an independent state, having been liberated from 
Brazilian rule in 1828 with the end of the Cisplatine War through mediation of the British diplomat, 
Lord Ponsonby. In 1830 the first Uruguayan constitution was signed, creating an Uruguayan state 
in legal and institutional terms. This marks a change not only in the sovereign status of Uruguay, 
but also in the political and military structure of the region, with the retreat of Brazil from Platine 
affairs, and the end of the early liberal experiment in Argentina. Much of what is distinct about 
British merchants in Uruguay particularly stems from how they positioned themselves relative to 
this new regional order. Those that saw trade and investment opportunities in the newly-
independent Uruguayan state, or who opposed the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas as governor of 
Buenos Aires and de facto leader of the Argentine Confederation, migrated early in the 1830s to 
Montevideo. This is not to suggest that such merchants severed their ties with Buenos Aires, 
which was certainly not the case, but rather that they took advantage of the opportunity to 
diversify their activities, either because they saw Montevideo as a potentially prosperous region, 
or simply to hedge against problems in Buenos Aires. The firms established in Uruguay were not 
always subsidiary or branches of the main Buenos Aires houses. In many of the cases examined in 
this thesis, it was the junior partners and younger siblings who were left in or sent to Buenos 
                                                          
9 Raúl Jacob, Más allá de Montevideo: Los caminos del dinero (Montevideo: Arpoador, 1996), 27. 
10 David Rock, “State-Building and Political Systems in Nineteenth-Century Argentina and Uruguay,” Past and 
Present, No. 167, Vol. 1 (2000). 
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Aires.11 1830 stands as a convenient break date in the political, military and commercial 
environment, and it is with that break that this thesis begins. 
The end of this period is also marked by a change in the political and economic 
environment. There are several key events during or near to 1875, all symptomatic of a change in 
the nature of Uruguay’s economy, both domestically and in international context.  Uruguay’s 1871 
flotation of a sovereign bond on European markets was the dawn of the overseas investment age, 
where foreign bondholders financed state, rail, and infrastructure. Uruguay had not participated in 
the earlier 1820s investment boom, since it was neither independent nor politically stable during 
the period, and so the 1870s represents the first major direct infusion of foreign capital into 
Uruguay.12 This change in financial relations gradually reduced the role of the old merchants to 
consultation and intermediation, rather than entrepreneurship or management. Steam shipping 
and telegraph communications improved direct communications. The global commercial crisis of 
1873 caused widespread bankruptcies among merchant firms, and marked the twilight of the 
merchant house as the dominant economic force.  
The turbulence and economic disruptions led Colonel Lorenzo Latorre to mount a military 
coup against the civilian government, establishing a military government that would rule for 
fifteen years, and oversee a major expansion of state power. The development of a 
professionalized military eroded the personalist, negotiated process of military, political, and 
financial influence of the caudillo era. 13 In seizing power, Latorre was supported by the 
landowning and investing class of Montevideo, comprised in large part of foreign merchants who 
had diversified their holdings into upstream sectors. In the process of expansion, their interests 
changed from being largely insulated from rural unrest, to being profoundly interested in the 
establishment of law and order in the countryside.14 With this political and institutional shock, a 
coherent Uruguayan state began to form, and the country entered into a new, more globalized, 
era. Merchants thus acted as a bridge between the era of commercialization at the end of the 18th 
century, and the first globalization of the late 19th century. They filled a need for the functions of 
                                                          
11 This was the case for both the Lafone and Tomkinson famiies, as will be examined in chapter five. 
12 An earlier attempt by Baron Mauá in 1864 to float a bond on London markets met with little success. See 
Benjamín Nahum, La Deuda Externa Uruguaya: 1864-1930. (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 
1994), 13-17. 
13 Fernando López-Alves, Between the Economy and the Polity in the River Plate: Uruguay, 1811-1890 
(London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1993). 
14 José Pedro Barrán, Apogeo y crisis del Uruguay pastoril y caudillesco, 1839-1875 (Montevideo: Ediciones 
de la Banda Oriental, 1977). 
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overseas trade, connecting local production to international markets, and situating the country in 
the goods and capital flows of the international economy. 
Methodology 
 The theoretical approach of this thesis combines four closely related streams of thought. 
The questions are both business history questions, about how merchants acted in, and reacted to, 
Uruguay during its integration into the Atlantic economy in the mid-19th century, and also broader 
economic history questions about the role played by merchants in the process of state building, 
institutional change, and economic development. The first theoretical topic is entrepreneurship. 
Agents contribute to the process of economic change by making choices and exercising 
judgement, and this process is necessary to understanding merchant behaviour in a rapidly 
evolving market. The second is a theory of firm structure, pertaining to how institutional and 
market conditions determine the organization of economic activity. The question of diversification 
and upstream investment is given particular attention, as it is these processes that transform 
merchants’ economic and social role, transforming both the scope of their operations and the 
nature of their interests. Third is an understanding of how individual merchants and firms 
interrelate, forming networks, which themselves have structures shaped by social and economic 
forces, both in their home communities in the industrializing north of Britain, and in the River 
Plate. Last, there is an open question of how the economic environment as a whole moulded the 
behaviour of merchants through institutions, the rules that governed the interaction among the 
agents in the economic system. While these questions are large and daunting, and the argument 
presented here will not attempt to provide a final synthesis of these ideas, it will draw insights 
from prominent authors in these literatures in order to apply them to the specific case of the 
British merchants of Uruguay. 
In order to tackle these questions, this thesis examines specific conjunctures in history, 
combining thematic case studies with a loosely chronological analytic structure. The main chapters 
concern major developments in how British merchants invested and organized their resources, as 
they became more deeply integrated into the economy. Most of the information and nearly all of 
the analysis is qualitative in nature. Data about particular agents and events is brought together 
from a variety of contemporary sources, forming an historical narrative. This narrative is then 
subjected to analysis in terms of entrepreneurial agency, asking what opportunities or pressures 
merchants were responding to, what resources and capabilities they were accumulating, and what 
strategies they may have been pursuing.  The objective is to describe and explain the 
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entrepreneurship of particular merchants and of the merchant community more generally, and 
how this co-evolved with the Uruguayan economy. Plausible hypotheses are described and 
evaluated in context, if not formally tested.  
The choice of largely qualitative methods of narrative construction and analysis is due 
largely to two constraints: a relatively thin base of secondary literature, and a lack of consistent 
data series. The latter are largely restricted to the statistical sources available only after the 
publications of Adolfo Vaillant in the 1870s.15 Retrospective figures from these and other statistical 
sources have been used where possible, but strong doubts remain about their consistency and 
reliability. Individual chapters go beyond constructing narratives and begin to more carefully 
analyse hypotheses explaining the strategic choices of the merchant community for plausibility. 
While it is not possible in most cases to identify the motivations, capabilities and behaviours of 
merchant firms, the sources suggest areas where inferences can be tentatively made on the basis 
of the preponderance of evidence collated from a variety of sources.  
Sources 
Finding archival sources for examining the business history of merchants in Uruguay is 
challenging. In order to approach the topic from a variety of angles, this thesis examines a wider 
range of sources than only merchant documents. Due to the overall paucity of data, the chapters 
are organized in order to make use of the available information from those sources which do 
present information about particular times, places, and themes. Sources from both sides of the 
Atlantic have been selected to give breadth to the analysis, combining both private and 
government sources. These include: merchant letter books, United Kingdom consular records, 
Uruguayan government archives, family correspondence collections, genealogical data, press 
accounts, almanacs and pamphlets. 
 Merchant papers in the form of letter books and account books are the obvious source 
for material information about the operation of merchant houses during the period.  There has, 
however, been little effort to preserve these documents. Family archives do not appear to have 
survived to any great extent. Despite some substantial help from the family and descendants of 
                                                          
15 Adolfo Vaillant, La República Oriental del Uruguay (América del Sud) En la Exposición de Viena 
(Montevideo: La Tribuna, 1873). 
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the merchants in this study,16 a single complete archive remains elusive.17 The letter book of 
Anderson MacFarlane is found in the National Archives at Kew gardens, and is drawn upon in 
chapter five. However, this source covers only a small period (1845-50) of intense conflict and 
naval blockades. While it provides insight into merchant behaviour, it hardly represents the 
ordinary experience of a merchant house during more normal conditions. Evidence drawn from 
analyses based on Argentine houses from the same period can assist in drawing plausible 
generalizations, but these will not help us find the distinctive experience of Montevidean 
merchant houses. It may confuse Buenos Aires-specific factors with general conclusions about the 
whole River Plate, blurring whatever distinctions exist through source bias. 
Government archives from Uruguay offer another potential avenue for investigation. 
There exists fragmented but substantial documentation from the Uruguayan state chronicling its 
interactions with the merchants who wereits key financiers, and contractors for projects such as 
infrastructure, colonization, and military provision. Notarial archives also contain volumes of legal 
documentation. These provide insight into those elements of merchant life that cross into the 
formal legal system, including protested bills, powers of attorney, and land sales. There is more 
information available to be gleaned from notarial sources than has been examined in this thesis. 
However, they are severely limited in that they do not provide access to the day-to-day operations 
of the firm, and give a highly selective picture of firm activity. 
 Consular archives from the United Kingdom have been previously examined by other 
scholars to study British involvement in Uruguay.18 Nevertheless, this thesis draws upon reports 
and correspondence contained within these records in order to illuminate certain topics, such as 
the land and livestock holdings of British nationals in Uruguay, and the damages claimed to the 
Anglo-French commission in the wake of the guerra grande. These records also provide evidence 
of the ways in which merchants used their influence with the consuls in order to lobby the British 
government, obtain privileges and protections, and voice their protests both against the 
Uruguayan government, and against British foreign policy decisions that harmed their interests.  
                                                          
16 The assistance of the Hughes family especially has been invaluable, but while some documentation has 
been preserved, there appears to be no remaining archive of the merchant house, rural estate, or collection 
of correspondence. 
17 One notable exception to this is the Catalan merchant Jaime Cibils, whose family archives have been 
extensively examined in Alba Mariani, Los extranjeros y el alto comercio: un estudio de caso, Jaime Cibils i 
Puig (1831-1888) (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 2004). 
18 David McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836-1853 
(London: British Academic Press, 1995), Peter Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpúrea (1806-1880). 
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 Pamphlets and press accounts have been used in this thesis to understand the discourses 
surrounding the role of Britain and Uruguay. Merchants (and their proxies among pamphleteers) 
declared their positions, justifying them with appeals to facts, common sense, and high-minded 
ideals, while casting those of contrary opinions as perfidious and self-interested. This back-and-
forth sketched out the positions held by various groups of merchants, at least as they presented 
themselves publicly. The relationship between public posturing and private contract-making is 
especially interesting during wartime. The British community in the River Plate was split into 
factions, along the grounds of ideology, family and social affiliations, and material interests. 
Disentangling these factors is difficult, as they interacted with each other; merchants who were 
ideologically inclined tended to side with one elite faction against another, extending loans and 
becoming socially interconnected, which may have in turn reinforced and reshaped their 
ideological commitments. It is through the use of these published, polemical sources that we can 
examine these interconnections, through comparison with other primary materials. 
Contribution 
 The primary contribution of this thesis is to provide an overview of British merchant 
entrepreneurship in Uruguay in the mid-19th century. In this, it follows a longer tradition of 
literature about the merchants of the River Plate trade, beginning with Ferns19 and Platt,20 and 
continued by Reber,21 Jones,22 Lewis,23 and most recently by Llorca-Jaña.24 It also speaks to a 
broader story about how initially trade-focused merchant houses evolved in response to threats 
and opportunities. Merchants made use of the lower cost of capital afforded by their access to 
trade credit to extend loans to local elites, firms, and governments. The information accumulated 
through trade allowed merchants to mitigate the risks of lending in an underdeveloped, but 
rapidly expanding, market. They also diversified into complimentary activities to trade, or even left 
the merchant trade entirely to pursue other opportunities. Some diversified into finance, 
insurance, shipping and other services. Others, seeking to capitalize on economies of scope, or 
                                                          
19 Henry Stanley Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). 
20 D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1972). 
21 Vera Blinn Reber, British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, 1810-1880 (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1979). 
22 Charles Jones, International Business in the Nineteenth Century: the Rise and Fall of a Cosmopolitan 
Bourgeoisie (Brighton: Whitesheaf, 1987). 
23 Colin Lewis, “British Business in Argentina,” London School of Economics Working Papers in Economic 
History Working Paper 26/95 (1995). 
24 Manuel Llorca-Jaña, The British Textile Trade in South America in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2012). 
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regional specific knowledge, diversified into primary and secondary production.25 In this, it follows 
the work of Rippy on British investment in Uruguay,26 as well as Crossley and Greenhill on 
investment in the beef industry.27  
These studies, however, have typically treated Uruguay and Montevideo as a footnote in 
the discussion of the larger River Plate community, centred in Buenos Aires. While it is fair to 
consider the two communities as interconnected and fluid parts of a larger whole, there are 
nevertheless distinctive (and often opposite) opportunities and threats on the two sides of the 
River Plate, due to the ever-shifting conditions of local political and military conflict. There are also 
critical differences in the scope and capabilities of the state in the two areas, which means that the 
interactions between British merchants and the state cannot be presumed as identical. Lastly, as 
two sovereign states, they each have distinctive policies, creating opportunities for tariff arbitrage 
and trade competition. There is thus a similar, but nonetheless distinct, narrative to be told about 
how British merchants developed in Uruguay, which will both compliment and contrast our 
existing understanding of merchant behaviour more generally.  
The major exceptions to the dearth of English-language publications on the economic 
history of Uruguay are Peter Winn and Henry Finch. Winn focuses mostly on later periods, and 
through the theoretical lens of informal empire.28 As such, this thesis provides both context and 
narrative for interpreting the role of the British in Uruguay. It engages with older literatures 
concerned with British informal empire in the region, but focuses primarily on the changing role of 
merchants as entrepreneurs and investors, rather than as agents of British power. Finch’s 
magisterial political economy of Uruguay begins only in 1870. The influence of merchants in this 
analysis is as background to the investment age, rather than as the primary objects of study.29 
While the economy had been shaped up until that point by merchant influence, the role of British 
merchants in this later period is less, as the influence of the Uruguayan state, of large landowners 
(some the descendants of earlier merchants) and foreign investment eclipsed their formerly 
predominant role. 
                                                          
25 Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 291. 
26 J. Fred Rippy, “British Economic Activities in Uruguay: An Example of Profitable Foreign Investment,” 
The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, vol. 25, no. 2 (April 1952), 124-129. 
27 Colin Crossley and Robert Greenhill, “The River Plate beef trade,” Business Imperialism, 1840-1930 : an 
Inquiry based on British Experience in Latin America ed. D.C.M. Platt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). 
28 Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay.” 
29 Henry Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (London: Macmillan, 1981). 
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Alongside its contributions, it is worth delineating the limits of this study. Sources about 
the topic are limited, and fewer than anticipated at the beginning of my research into the topic. 
There is a great deal about the British merchants of Uruguay that is left unexplored, and could be 
picked up in future work. The chronological focus of the thesis is very much on the years 1830-64. 
The span of 1865-75 included to allow for consideration of the later stages of the careers of a 
particular generation of merchants born in the 1800s and 1810s, rather than to give a full analysis 
extending into the 1870s. There is only cursory analysis of the role of merchants as 
entrepreneurial midwives for the transition from an economic landscape dominated by trade-
oriented merchants, either in individual proprietorships or small partnerships, to one dominated 
by joint stock companies investing in large infrastructural projects, multinational banks, and 
industrial production.  
This thesis also focuses on a relatively narrow group of merchants, either those for whom 
the sources were more plentiful, or who left substantial footprints in non-archival sources, despite 
the lack of records. Merchants and firms with operations too small or transient, or which kept only 
to trade and left little in the way of sources, are given short shrift. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, George Drabble, the merchant-banker-investor who had been a merchant as early as 
the 1840s, but is primarily known for his role in directing the large-scale banking and railroad 
investments of the 1870s and 1880s, is not examined in depth, nor is the firm he headed, the 
London and River Plate Bank.30 His career has received substantial treatments in the context of 
those later contributions, and transcends the Uruguayan context in any case. The remaining 
merchants discussed as cases are not necessarily representative of merchants in general in 
Uruguay. The analysis therefore must be understood as examining the entrepreneurial careers and 
social networks of the merchants with the largest impact on the economy as a whole, and whose 
influence extended the furthest into non-trade sectors.  
Overview 
 The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one introduces and outlines the thesis. 
The following three chapters provide the foundation, theoretical basis, and historical background 
for interpreting British merchants in Uruguay. Chapter two presents a literature survey and the 
theoretical framework that informs the analysis. This is divided into several sections, covering the 
theory of social networks as pertaining to trade and entrepreneurship, the business history of 
                                                          
30 Part of the reason for this omission is that, unlike other parts of this period, it is well-covered elsewhere. 
See:  David Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
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Latin America, and existing analyses of British merchant activity in the River Plate region. Chapter 
three offers a brief chronological narration to provide the necessary historical context for 
interpreting later chapters. It is drawn largely from secondary literature on Uruguayan history to 
show the flow of political, military and economic events that provided obstacles and opportunities 
for merchant entrepreneurship. Chapter four explores the county-specific context of Uruguay in 
the mid-19th century. It provides a qualitative and partly quantitative analysis of the institutional, 
geographic, demographic, monetary, and economic factors that shaped the strategic business 
environment. 
Chapters five, six and seven represent the core of the research. Chapter five is constructed 
around several case studies of British merchants and merchant firms, examining the ways in which 
they used networks for entrepreneurial purposes. It shows the ways in which merchants were 
integrated into networks:  inter-firm merchant networks for facilitating the transatlantic trade; 
and local elite networks, where family ties linked them both to their merchant peers, and to the 
Uruguayan political and economic elite. Securing trusted counterparties was only one use for 
networks, which served a variety of entrepreneurial functions, from access to credit, information, 
skilled labour, and markets, to secure joint investment projects among merchant families. A 
variety of primary sources are brought to bear here, including letter books, collections of family 
papers, material from bank archives, newspapers, notarial records, and government documents. 
These chapters also draw extensively from genealogical research conducted by both Uruguayan 
and British scholars to map out the complex interrelations forged through family ties. The 
connections between the British and River Plate trade networks is not well developed in the 
existing literature, which tends to focus either on the intermarriage between merchants and River 
Plate elites, or on the networks of merchants, producers, and financiers in the industrializing 
regions of Britain. This thesis attempts, notably with the case of the Lafone and Jackson families, 
to bridge that gap. 
Chapter six shows how merchants interacted with the state as financiers, speculators, and 
lobbyists during a critical juncture, the Uruguayan civil war (guerra grande) of 1839-51. This 
chapter draws largely on contracts between merchants and the Colorado government in 
Montevideo during the siege of the 1840s, exploring the evolution over time of the loans, projects, 
purchases and negotiations. Particular attention is given to the Sociedad Compradora de los 
Derechos de Aduana, a joint-stock company founded as a tax farming enterprise to manage the 
collection of customs revenue, in exchange for a 50% share of incoming funds. This chapter also 
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examines the social composition of the directorship of the Sociedad, showing the links with the 
mercantile network of Samuel Lafone. This group was critical for their efforts to convince the 
British government to intervene on behalf of the government in Montevideo, as well as for their 
role in funding the continued struggle against the Blanco party, and its allies, the Argentine 
Federalists under Rosas. British merchants thus played a critical role in shaping one of the defining 
conflicts of both Uruguayan and regional state formation. Their intervention offered benefits for 
insiders, but was controversial with the larger River Plate merchant community, suggesting that 
the determinants of merchants’ interests was not a simple matter of shared class or ethnic goals, 
but also ideological affiliation, and of pre-existing social ties. These mapped onto partisan and 
clientelistic networks that were in conflict with one another, creating a level of commitment to 
local political causes and leading both to rifts within the community of British merchants, and to 
lucrative-but-risky opportunities for insider dealing. 
Chapter seven explores the upstream investments of merchants into the rural economy, 
transitioning from port-centric traders, to rural industrialists investing in the meat salting 
(saladero) industry, and increasingly, becoming key members of the landowning class. The post-
independence economy of the River Plate was an emerging economy built on the extensive 
expansion of hide production. As the growth possibilities of extensive cattle ranching were slowly 
exhausted, new capital-intensive methods were necessary to secure further growth in the rural 
economy. The innovations of British merchant-estancieros at the high value-added margin of 
landownership included the introduction of improved breeds of sheep and cattle, wire fencing, 
and machinery for meat processing, and attempts to introduce commercialized agriculture. 
Alongside other progressive landowners, they sold not only hides to markets in the United 
Kingdom, but wool to continental Europe, and jerked beef to Cuba, and Brazil, and explored the 
possibility of expanding markets for Uruguayan beef to Europe.  This change in products, 
production methods, and markets slowly transformed the Uruguayan economy from an entirely 
hides-driven economy of cattle ranches to a diversified pastoral producer, hosting Latin America’s 
first industrialized meat processing firm, Liebig’s Extract of Meat Co. Chapter eight concludes the 
thesis, drawing together insights from the earlier chapters and synthesizing an overall evaluation 
of the role of British merchants in Uruguay in the mid-19th century.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Survey 
This chapter provides an overview of the literatures which this thesis draws upon, in order to 
establish the scholarly precedents behind the work, and to contextualize the ways in which it 
makes contributions to existing strands of research. The survey will provide different perspectives 
on the topic of British merchants in Uruguay in the mid-19th century. It will begin with the 
theoretical considerations behind the analysis of merchant behaviour, which will be subdivided 
into four parts: institutions, firm structure, social networks, and entrepreneurship, moving from 
the broad, social setting to the individual merchant. It will then proceed to examine historical 
works dealing first with merchant trade in 19th century Latin America, the literature on the role of 
merchants in the processes of institutional development, and the role of British merchants in the 
Uruguayan economy, and finally, on the overall role of Britain and the British in the region. The 
implications of these previous bodies of literature will then be briefly synthesized, providing 
motivation for the larger thesis.  
Entrepreneurship 
Popular conceptions of the entrepreneur involve a heroic figure, starting from nothing and 
rising to wealth and fame through innovation, hard work, and a deft hand in sculpting the raw 
material of luck into a profitable product. This tale serves at least two important functions: to 
encourage the idea that anyone can become successful, and to exalt the reputation of existing 
successful entrepreneurs by framing their story as rags-to-riches. Heroic, “swashbuckling” 
personal characteristics are emphasized; the entrepreneur shares little in common with the 
cautious, calculating homo economicus.31  This model of the entrepreneur was most strongly 
endorsed by Schumpeter, who emphasized the dynamic, pattern-breaking role of the 
entrepreneur, who interrupts the steady drift towards equilibrium by introducing something new: 
an idea, a process, a market, a product.32 The entrepreneur thus stands at the heart of the process 
of economic development, fulfilling a function critical to long-run growth by preventing the 
horizon of possibilities from converging on a steady state. 
Caution is warranted when interpreting the entrepreneur in a heroic light. 
Entrepreneurship is an economic function, and critical to growth, but it does not always succeed. 
                                                          
31 This description is taken from the introduction to Mark Casson, The Entrepreneur: an Economic Theory 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982) 1-6. 
32 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, 
Interest, and the Business Cycle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934). 
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Two issues arise with the individualistic, visionary model of the entrepreneur. First, it fails to 
account for the “graveyard” of failures, in the language of Nicholas Nassim Taleb.33 For every 
successful entrepreneur, there are no doubt dozens of failures, whose talent was insufficient, 
whose timing was wrong, or whose luck simply did not hold out. Having not made a substantial 
impact on the economic landscape, they have necessarily fallen beyond the sight of the economic 
historian. Second, its emphasis on the progress from poverty to wealth obscures any initial 
advantages that the entrepreneur already possesses. The heroism of the entrepreneurial tale 
would be substantially diminished by the implication that the entrepreneur does not necessarily fit 
the Carnegie-like tale of personal achievement. 
The clearest modern articulation of a theory of entrepreneurship comes from the work of 
Mark Casson.34 In his book The Entrepreneur, he considers the void in the theory of 
entrepreneurship.35 Neoclassical theory, in the strictest terms, has no role for the individual 
entrepreneur. As a precondition of the necessary mathematics, it deals only in frictionless, 
abstract aggregates. Fundamentally, the value of the entrepreneur is in perceiving and chancing 
previously obscure economic opportunities. The accumulation, processing, and judicious use of 
limited information are fundamental to the entrepreneurial role. A theory which assumes perfect 
information   assumes the entrepreneur out of existence. When everyone is flawlessly rational and 
possesses equal foresight and information, the entrepreneur is both everyone, and no one. This 
explains the difference in emphasis between common portrayals of the entrepreneur, and the 
predicted behaviour of the economically rational individual, as they inhabit different worlds. 
For Casson, the defining feature of the entrepreneur is judgement. Opportunities exist in 
any given historical economic situation, but they are characterised by uncertainty. It is the 
management of this uncertainty that distinguishes the entrepreneur from the economically 
rational individual. This is distinct from Schumpeter’s conception in that it does not necessarily 
involve pattern-breaking. Judgement can just as correctly be exercised in the replication of existing 
models. In Casson’s model, entrepreneurial opportunities come in two kinds: arbitrage, and 
innovation. The merchant is a kind of arbitrageur, buying and selling commodities produced and 
                                                          
33 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
34 To give a few examples from an extensive bibliography by Mark Casson and collaborators on the topic: 
Mark Casson, The Entrepreneur: an Economic Theory (Oxford: Martin Robinson and Company, 1982), Mark 
Casson, “Entrepreneurship and Business Culture,” in Entrepreneurship, Networks and Modern Business, 
edited by Jonathan Brown and Mary B. Rose (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), and most 
recently, Mark Casson and Catherine Casson, The Entrepreneur in History: From Medieval Merchant to 
Modern Business Leader (Palgrave Macmillan: 2013). 
35 Casson, The Entrepreneur, 9. 
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organized by others to make a profit. In this role, merchants were intermediaries, functioning as 
bridges between groups, places, or even times. The innovator, by contrast, is directly involved with 
the management of resources.36 Entrepreneurs are interested in exploiting opportunities using the 
skills and resources at their disposal, and can move from one type of opportunity to another, or 
combine various kinds of entrepreneurship in order to make their profits. They may remain at the 
level of arbitrage, functioning as linkages between other agents, or they may integrate production, 
services and other activities into their business.   
In this thesis, merchants are seen as both arbitrageurs and innovators, exercising both the 
equilibrium-seeking and equilibrium-breaking modes of entrepreneurship. It was not at all the 
case that the River Plate trade was a simple, well-understood commodity-for-manufacture trade, 
requiring only knowledge of price differentials in order to profit. Success in this market required 
extensive exploration of both supply and demand, and organization in terms of auxiliary services 
like finance, shipping, packing, and insurance. Learning how to manage these functions and 
adapting appropriately was important to driving down costs.37 These functions involve managing 
scarce resources of information and credit in an innovative way, in addition to the pure arbitrage 
component of exploiting market price differentials. 
Under the interpretations in the theoretical literature, the entrepreneur is not an inventor. 
What may appear to be novel, the “innovation” of the entrepreneur is the application of a known 
superior method to existing economic problems and situations. The creation of such methods is a 
different function. While the innovator of a given improvement may also be its inventor, this is not 
essential to the idea of the entrepreneur. Their task is to insert themselves into existing processes 
and modify them to increase their efficiency. The entrepreneur profits by claiming a portion of the 
gains from the superior allocation of resources. International differences in endowments, thought 
of in the broadest terms, create opportunities for this kind of entrepreneurial arbitrage. In the 
simplest model, factors and goods flow amongst countries with differing endowments in order to 
equalize either the prices of those factors, or the prices of the goods produced with them. 
However, endowments need not be thought of only in terms of natural resources, or elementary 
factors of production. Institutions, culture, and information can be factors, amenable to 
entrepreneurial change. Even entrepreneurship itself can act as a factor. As Casson writes, “If two 
                                                          
36 Casson, “Entrepreneurship and Business Culture,” 36. 
37 These underappreciated issues of region-, commodity- and product-specific learning are explored in great 
detail in Manuel Llorca-Jaña, “Knowing the shape of demand: Britain’s exports of ponchos to the Southern 
Cone, c. 1810s – 70s,” Business History, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2009): 602-621, and Llorca-Jaña, British Textile Trade.  
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countries differ in their endowments of entrepreneurship then there will be a tendency for 
improvements to originate in the country with the most abundant endowment of entrepreneurs. 
A corollary of this is that where indigenous entrepreneurs are scarce, it will be left to foreign 
entrepreneurs from the economically successful country to enter the backward country and 
improve the allocation of resources.”38 The merchants that are the subject of this thesis are the 
agents in this process of entrepreneurial migration, from Britain, where opportunities had largely 
been exploited, to Uruguay, where they were relatively abundant. 
There is an enduring association, going back at least to Max Weber’s “entrepreneurial 
spirit” embodied in Calvinist thought, that entrepreneurship is not equally shared by all societies, 
nor by all members of a society, but is concentrated in certain minority groups. While the original 
Weberian theory was explicitly a religious one, others have extended the concept to include ethnic 
minorities, or other distinct social groups. One common way of looking at this phenomenon is 
from the axiom that restrictions breed creativity, that is to say, that being a minority is itself a 
potential source of “entrepreneurial spirit.” This idea is picked up by Casson: “One of the most 
interesting features of successful entrepreneurs is that they are frequently drawn from minority 
groups in society-groups that find alternative avenues of social advancement closed to them.”39 
However, in developing his theory of entrepreneurship, he does not offer any particular reasoning 
as to why this is the case. As with most economic theories, it is difficult to explain or model why an 
apparent disadvantage could actually be an advantage. Path-dependence could offer an 
explanation, with most potential entrepreneurs from higher-status social groups entering into 
other, more immediately beneficial career paths, thus preventing them from becoming 
entrepreneurs. However, this seems at odds with the diversity of historical entrepreneurs: while it 
may be conspicuous how many entrepreneurs have minority origins, it is far from universal.  
The implications for the case of European merchants in Latin America in general, and the 
British in Uruguay in particular, are clear. They were the product of an expansionary, 
entrepreneurial culture of trade and production, migrating outwards from the industrial and 
commercial regions in the north of England and the south of Scotland. They were the standard 
bearers for the industrial revolution’s influence in the world periphery, equipped both 
economically and culturally to bring new products and new ideas to developing regions. It is 
possible to interpret the British community in Uruguay in a Weberian sense, as a community of 
                                                          
38 Casson, “Entrepreneurship and Business Culture, 11. 
39 Ibid, 12. 
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protestant outsiders, bearers of the capitalist ethic of production.40 They were never a large settler 
group, and British migrants only ever represented a small minority of the population. While 
population figures are not very reliable about the origins of foreigners, it seems safe to say that 
the British population in Uruguay never amounted to more than 1% of the total.41 They were the 
type of minority who might be expected to engage in entrepreneurship: small but endowed with 
the necessary resources.  
Where the theory does not offer an adequate explanation is in connecting minority status 
with restricted social advancement. The British in Uruguay were not an oppressed minority, but a 
favoured one, with ample opportunity for intermarriage and assimilation. The daughters of elite 
families regularly married British merchants, and their children in turn intermarried with other 
influential figures in the local mercantile and political communities. European contacts, access to 
credit, diplomatic influence, and sheer wealth were all resources that British merchants could 
offer in exchange for local Uruguayan social influence. These advantages far overwhelmed any 
latent xenophobia in the local elite. This was in any case only a small factor in cosmopolitan 
Uruguay, where most inhabitants were less than a few generations removed from European 
colonists. The existing elite was less entrenched than in the older colonies of Spanish America, 
even less than other areas of new settlement, such as Argentina.  
Typically for a region of very recent development, society in early 19th century Uruguay 
was of a less fixed character than elsewhere in the world. Populations were small and of recent 
immigration, and institutions were therefore not well established. As a colony, Uruguay had been 
little more than a border region, an undeveloped area at the murky frontier between the Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial empires. Montevideo had been primarily a military outpost, whose 
purpose was to provide a harbour and a natural point of resistance against Portuguese 
encroachment and smuggling. The elites of the old viceroyalties and of the Catholic Church were 
not strongly entrenched, even by comparison with its neighbour Buenos Aires, and still less with 
                                                          
40 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1930), accessed online from the University of Virginia, 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/WEBER/header.html. Interestingly, Weber himself writes that “Even in 
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the old colonial centres in Lima or Mexico City.42 As such, when independence began, Uruguay’s 
status was, if anything, more turbulent than other regions of the former Spanish empire. Patterns 
of power and order did not have deep roots. This could be exploited by the various groups who 
attempted to seize power, often successfully, though seldom with lasting effect. The remnants of 
the Spanish forces, the British, the French, the Argentines, the Brazilians, and a host of local 
caudillos vied for both formal and informal control over Montevideo during the first half of the 
19th century. 
This ongoing political instability was crippling for growth. The enforceable property rights 
and secure markets in goods and services that the New Institutional Economics has identified as 
key factors in development were conspicuously absent. Caudillos looking to feed armies, to reward 
followers, and to make alliances were notoriously mercurial about legal obligations. Pragmatic, on-
the-ground factors ruled the day, rather than any formal system of legal, political and economic 
rights.  Investments with long time horizons and low-but-secure payoffs had little chance of 
success, whereas short-term, opportunistic, risky behaviour could yield tremendous gains – or 
ruinous losses. This chaotic environment provided a wealth of opportunities for the risk-seeking 
entrepreneur. The twists and turns of the political and military situation could be exploited. 
Caudillos and revolutionary governments required funds, which could be advanced at extremely 
high interest rates, though inseparable from the accompanying risk. Land stripped of its value by 
war or expropriation could be bought at bargain prices.  
Overall, the image of Uruguay in the mid-19th century should not be one of a static society, 
requiring foreign entrepreneurship to break out of a centuries-old colonial stagnation. It was a 
new society, constantly changing, having yet to settle on a solid form. The malleable topography of 
the political, social and economic landscapes could all be shaped by the revolutionary, the 
ideologue, the caudillo, or the entrepreneur. Alliances and enmities between individuals from 
these groups could launch a new direction for the country, or shatter an existing one. The fight to 
control the attribution of all kinds of resources, both economic and otherwise, was heated and 
constant, with no obvious winning side until the end of the 19th century. 
In this chaotic situation, the ends of profit maximization may have been clear enough, but 
the potential means were diverse. Charles Jones develops the argument that the merchants of the 
River Plate, along with their counterparts across the increasingly interlinked world of trade, 
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formed an international merchant bourgeoisie, a class shaped by the early 19th century explosion 
in commerce. Their values were Cobdenite, cosmopolitan, individualistic and pacifist; their utopia 
was a world of free trade, without borders, and without wars. Jones gives several cases of 
international ports where this new class was formed.43 Buenos Aires is among his examples, but 
Montevideo could fit the pattern just as easily, if not more so. However, any analysis of the 
merchants in Uruguay that relies onsocial class as determining actions based on shared interest or 
ideology will fall short in explaining the diversity of strategies pursued. There was certainly no 
consensus at the time was about how best to pursue class interests. Many merchants preferred a 
strategy of neutrality, hoping that diplomatic influence would protect their property rights, 
whereas direct interference would expose them to risk.  Others, as examined in chapter six, took a 
much more direct interest in local affairs, taking sides and wielding their influence to create a 
political situation more amenable to their interests. Despite broadly shared goals, there were 
ample disagreements about the means to be exercised in order to achieve them. 
Firm Structure and Transaction Costs 
Organizational forms are a type of technology, which must be invented and adopted like 
any other technology. An organizational form might have potentially reduced transaction costs for 
a given firm, but have been unknown and therefore unusable at the time. However, the early 
modern period is replete with examples of different organizational forms: guilds, corporations, 
commendas, partnerships, clans, cooperatives, nascent state enterprises, and so on down an 
enormous list of potential organizational forms. Far from being without alternatives, there was an 
embarrassment of riches of known organizational forms theoretically available to merchants by 
the beginning of the 19th century.  Nevertheless, small, family-oriented partnerships with flexible, 
negotiated governance structures dominated the business landscape in the mid-19th century. 
What forces shaped firm structure in this period? What were the advantages of smaller firms?  
The cases of the 18th and 19th centuries carry potential lessons for the understanding of firm 
organization which offer a different perspective on the optimal organization of business, an 
adaptive rather than teleological model. 
The general trend in the analysis of firm structure has been away from a teleological 
“Whig history” narrative. The focus of Alfred Chandler, long dominant in business history 
narratives, was on examining the past in terms of how the fragmented, family-oriented structures 
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of the 19th century were replaced by their more efficient modern counterparts, characterized by 
vertical integration and hierarchical, professional management. More recent work moves towards 
a theory based on the adaptations of firms to specific conditions determined by their region, their 
point in history, and by their previously chosen paths. Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin critique the 
Chandlerian model heavily on these grounds, calling for a reinvigoration of business history by 
incorporating an explicitly evolutionary approach to examining firm structure based on transaction 
costs, not seen as a phenomenon generalized to all places, but particular to specific situations, and 
suggesting different solutions. 44  Langlois has also contributed a similar, but slightly adapted thesis 
to this debate that the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen the undoing of the type of 
vertically integrated firm that Chandler proposed as superior for modern production.45 As market 
integration increases and firms no longer rely as much on coordination through vertical 
integration, the advantages of scale and scope diminish, and the advantages of flexibility reassert 
themselves. If the Chandlerian firm is no longer necessarily seen as an endpoint, but rather as the 
correct adaptation for a particular time and place, then it necessarily raises questions about the 
era that preceded it, as much as the one that follows.  
Research into the evolution of merchant firms has progressed by synthesizing business 
history with the New Institutional Economics. This combination has provided new theoretical tools 
for tackling the problems of business organization and behaviour which were not adequately 
answered by neoclassical economic theory. The institutionalist view is grounded in the ideas of 
Ronald Coase, who opened this line of thought with the 1937 essay “The Nature of the Firm,” set 
out the puzzle of firm structure with some deceptively simple questions: Why do firms exist at all, 
instead of collections of free contracting individuals? If prices structure markets, why are some 
transactions and not others carried out within, rather than between, firms? Coase claimed that the 
boundaries of a firm are determined by the activities that can be performed at lower cost within a 
firm than through the outside market. 46 Firms can internalize certain functions, notably 
coordination and information gathering, bypassing the market and potentially improving 
efficiency, thus justifying their existence in an economic sense.  
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As for what firm structures will emerge from this process, the broad principle at work here 
is adaptive. Successful firms will be those with the right organization matched to the right 
situation. Those with unsuccessful organization will fail to meet the costs of capital, and be driven 
out of operation. The broad umbrella term of “transaction costs” stands in for many different 
kinds of costs faced by firms, but these can also be broken down into informational costs, co-
ordination costs, contracting costs, expropriation risk, and so on. Various innovations and 
adaptations can reduce these inherent costs. The theory therefore predicts a kind of selection: 
firms whose strategies and structures are best able to mitigate costs of operating in a given 
location or trade will have a relative advantage over their competitors. At a micro level, this 
suggests an analysis of both the firm structure and the strategies adopted by merchant firms in 
order to minimize these costs. 
A classic 1950 article by Armen Alchian47 suggests examining changes in business 
behaviour by analogy to biological evolution. Rather than a self-conscious motive of profit 
maximization determining firm strategy at some mathematically predetermined optimum, Alchian 
suggests that firms, like organisms, either flourish or fail in a given environment. It is those that 
survive the rigors of the competitive process that establish the standard firm strategies and 
structures. Even absent any planning or foresight, economic agents will adopt strategies suited to 
their environments; those that do not behave in a manner which generates “realized positive 
profits” will be outcompeted and eliminated, leaving only firms whose behaviour and structure 
matches the environment. According to Alchian, even for the best informed agent, a strategy only 
leads to a distribution of potential outcomes.48  Some strategies may be fatal to the firm due to 
high variance in outcomes – firms cannot hedge against all risks, and riskier strategies may be 
more likely to result in bankruptcy, even if they have higher average returns. Others may simply 
fail to produce the necessary profits to survive, and be outcompeted by others in the same 
market. The cost of capital keeps all firms under threat of failure, and acts as the economic 
equivalent of selective pressures.   
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The work of Oliver Williamson in particular has explored the various issues surrounding 
firm structure: integration and disintegration, internal and external markets, agency and 
ownership.49 For Williamson, transaction costs are the “friction” in the economic system that 
organization is supposed to minimize. Contracting, in all its various forms, is the tool by which this 
is accomplished. His analysis encompasses both the ex ante costs of contracting, that is to say, the 
costs of making contracts, and, perhaps more importantly, the ex post costs of contract 
enforcement, from failure due to non-compliance, or through the costs of legal redress.50 The 
forms of organization that will prevail in a given system are determined by how well they 
negotiate the various commitments and threats that determine the incentives of the negotiating 
parties. The limits of cooperation, competition and integration are largely determined by the costs 
of auditing and managing, for which there is some optimal size of firm, below which there are 
gains from increasing scale, and above which, losses from bureaucratic costs. Williamson’s work 
has inspired entire literatures of analysis on transaction costs and institutions, and their role in 
economic growth. 
These questions have generated a wealth of discussion about alternate forms of business 
organization. If we cannot assume individual, indivisible economic agents, then who makes 
economic decisions for the complex entities that result? Why are those decisions transmitted and 
carried out, modified, or ignored? What is the glue that holds individuals together into firms, and 
together into an economy? For large-scale cases, involving groups, organizations, countries and 
multi-national trades, these questions are generally approached from the level of institutions. The 
questions then become: what are the institutions that foster trust, either through enforcing 
contracts or other, less formal means, which allow for the development of economic decision 
making? In answering these questions, historians, sociologists, anthropologists and economists 
have looked to historical examples of informal networks, operating at the level of social linkages 
rather than formal contracts, which can be stable absent a reliable system of legal enforcement. 
 From the individual perspective, this is a subset of the theory of entrepreneurship. How, 
having reached the limits of a business controlled directly and completely by one person, do 
entrepreneurs extend their “private kingdom”?51 Under what circumstances do individuals come 
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to trust one another sufficiently to overcome the “fundamental problem of exchange,”52 to take 
the steps from self-sufficiency through to exchange, and finally to delegation and agency? There 
are two keys to this problem. First is situational contingency: each period in history, legal system, 
institutional heritage, social composition, and economic structure will imply different potential 
solutions to the problem, based on the options available to the entrepreneur, and their 
desirability. Certain forms of organization may be suited or unsuited to a given situation, based on 
the transaction costs incurred by their use. 
The implications of transaction costs and firm structure literature on business history 
have, in the main, focused on Chandler’s epochal hypothesis: That by the late 19th century, large, 
vertically integrated firms were able to use ‘the visible hand’ of hierarchical, professionalized 
management to take full advantage of the emerging economies of ‘scale and scope’.53 This change 
was made possible by technological advancement and the emergence of consumer markets, but 
was, at heart, a change in outlook towards management and organization. This new type of firm, 
centred on mass production, product standardization, and marketing outreach, outcompeted its 
rivals, and represented a new, American institutional model of business. Chandler emphasizes the 
“general failure” of British business to adopt this new model, which had dire implications for their 
international competitiveness.54   This he blames on the family firm model, claiming that the 
demands of family income restricted growth in the long term, and prevented firms from making 
the necessary investment in the organizational apparatus that would have enabled international 
competition.55    
Chandler’s epochal hypothesis has come under considerable scrutiny. Though enormously 
influential and almost certainly correct for the case of the late 19th and early 20th century United 
States, many have questioned the applicability of the Chandlerian hypothesis to other times and 
places. In the Latin American context, during the mid-19th century, a very different firm structure 
from the American-style vertically integrated firm prevailed. This structure was one of diversified 
merchant-entrepreneurs, operating in groups reinforced not by formal business structures, but by 
informal alliances among and within groups of families.  Such family-oriented firms are identified 
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by Chandler as outdated and inefficient for the 20th century European and North American 
context. However, there has been a developing literature on how such looser structures can not 
only succeed on their own terms in particular environments, but about how they are adapted to 
solve different business problems, and therefore may be better adapted to conditions in other 
regions. 
Following on conceptually from trade networks, some relatively recent literature has 
focused on business groups as an evolution of merchant networks, and an alternative type of 
(inter-)firm organization. It has been suggested for many different merchant groups across a 
variety of times and places that networked (rather than atomized or internalized) organization 
yields advantages for trade, especially in underdeveloped institutional contexts. This idea has been 
developed by Geoffrey Jones and Judith Hale examining British companies involved in foreign 
direct investment abroad. 56  They draw on the earlier work of Mira Wilkins on free-standing 
companies, and Stanley Chapman on British investment groups, showing the importance of 
merchants’ direct investment abroad during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.57  Jones and 
Hale point to the needs of British merchants abroad to develop upstream businesses as a response 
to underdevelopment in their host economies. Seeing opportunities in developing infrastructure 
to facilitate trade, and primary production in the form of estates, mines and plantations, to 
balance their import operations, these merchants diversified their investments. These investments 
deflected the focus of merchants away from trade, and into a more generalized function as 
broadly-based investors. Rather than showing entrepreneurial decline, in this framework, British 
entrepreneurs adapted flexibly to increased competition and a changing economic situation to 
best use their regional expertise. Their organizational structure thus reflected their needs for 
flexibility, rather than to maximize returns to scale. 
We need to consider the risks of firm survival, rather than merely the expected average 
outcome; being “optimal” in the abstract case does not bring a company back from the dead, nor 
does it attract imitators. Information as to what strategies or structures will maximize profits is not 
something known ex ante. Nor do firms operate in an abstract market, but rather one embedded 
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in the social structures of a particular historical context. They face a limited number of 
competitors, each pursuing their own strategic choices, imitating and reacting to one another. 
Adaptation to the economic environment must be seen as behaviour under incomplete 
information, in competition with other firms doing the same. These behaviours then not only 
determined the success and failure of the individual enterprise, but collectively make up the 
business environment. In adapting to their economic environment, firms also alter it in ways which 
have important effects, in terms of competition, development, and path dependence. Given that 
both risk and the cost of capital were high in Uruguay in this period, we should expect either 
substantial adaptation, firm attrition, or both, and that this process should have a shaping effect 
on the overall economic environment.  
Business History: The Latin American Context 
In recent years, a small but growing body of business history literature has emerged both 
for and from Latin America, merging country-specific studies with the larger ideas about the 
historical development of firm structure. Two literature review articles have been published in 
recent years, summarizing these contributions, one by Carlos Dávila,58 and the other by María Inés 
Barbero.59 Both of these analyses stress the distinctive features of the business environment in 
Latin America, and on the consequent distinctive features of firm organization and strategy. Dávila 
highlights eleven distinctive features of Latin American business and entrepreneurship: its 
interface with globalization, the key role of real estate in capital investment, elite 
entrepreneurship, the role of the state as entrepreneur, the politicization of markets, an unstable 
social and political context, diversification of investment, the predominance of foreign capital, 
family capitalism, business groups, and immigrant entrepreneurs.60 These themes all have deep 
roots in the region, and all (with the possible exception of the role of the state as investor) are 
clear even as far back as the mid-19th century in Uruguay.  
There have also been several collections of essays published on the topic. Rory Miller and 
Carlos Dávila edited a volume engaging with seven country cases for business history in Latin 
America.61 Barbero has also published, in collaboration with Raúl Jacob, a series of regional and 
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national essays on the development of business history in Latin America.62 These works highlight 
the contributions of several key authors to business topics, such as Barbero for Argentina, Carlos 
Dávila for Colombia, Carlos Marichal and Mario Cerruti for Mexico. For Uruguay, the key scholars 
are Raúl Jacob, who has done extensive work on the impact of merchants on credit and 
development outside of Montevideo,63 and Alcides Beretta Curi, whose focus has largely been on 
the role of Italian immigrant entrepreneurs in the later part of the 19th century.64 These works 
have highlighted for Uruguay the general themes that pervade the general business history of 
Latin America: the importance of social and family groups, the key role of immigrants in fostering 
entrepreneurship, and the criticality of access to credit in shaping the strategy of businesses.  
 Much of the discussion about the distinctive features of Latin American business history 
has centred on the role of grupos financieros, multi-family alliances that act to organize 
entrepreneurship and finance projects across a variety of sectors, but linked together by kinship. 
These studies show the persistence of non-contractual and informal linkages in organizing 
business in the region. This suggests that, at least potentially, the Chandlerian hypothesis of the 
increasing suitability of large scale, vertically integrated, professionally managed firms does not 
apply to the case of Latin America, where other considerations such as political influence or 
market structure make other organizational forms more suitable. The analysis of the importance 
of business groups for trading companies goes back to the 1970s, with a few key contributions.  
Nathaniel Leff examines the role of entrepreneurship and firm structure for developing 
countries. He proposed that these groups (from the Latin American grupos) are, for countries at a 
low level of development, a substitute for functioning markets for factors and information, 
although not necessarily an efficient one.65 By organizing many enterprises together under the 
management of one family or social group, they serve the same kinds of internalizing, integrative 
functions that the Chandlerian firm does. They also focus entrepreneurial resources, by allowing 
economic decision-makers access to a sufficient pool of capital, information and coordinating 
capacity to make economic changes. A small number of entrepreneurs can organize production 
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across a variety of different enterprises simultaneously, without requiring additional inputs of 
information or requiring the more complex decision making associated with inter-firm 
transactions.  
Reinhard Liehr and Colin Lewis offer a historiographically-focused analysis of grupos, 
descended from merchant networks as applied to the case of Latin America.66 These grupos in turn 
emerged out of more traditional merchant houses. In adapting to the changing conditions of the 
late 19th century, they reorganized themselves as broader organizations, operating a series of 
diversified enterprises under the management of one group. For Liehr and Lewis, this 
diversification was mostly a matter of being “squeezed out” of their traditional role as regional 
specialists by increasing market integration with Britain, which allowed direct connections 
between producers and retailers, as well as market penetration by specialized and branded 
products. This reduced the need for the generalist trading companies, which were therefore 
pushed into other areas of the economy, which were less under strain from increasing 
competition. While the relative importance of the “push” factors of competition and changing 
market structure, versus the pull factors of perceived opportunities in moving British merchants 
out of trade and into diversification can be debated, the basic pattern is clear: British merchant 
firms began the 19th century as port-focused importers, but became increasingly integrated into 
exports, into the production economy, and into associated services like insurance, shipping and 
banking. 
Charles Jones takes a somewhat different approach to a similar topic in his International 
Business in the Nineteenth Century. Jones presents a unique reading of the Leninist theory of 
imperialism through the work of Frederick Lane, positing the existence of an international class, a 
‘cosmopolitan bourgeoisie,’ whose values, interests, and culture reflect the liberal ideology of the 
free trade movement.67 Where he diverges from the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ account of Cain and 
Hopkins is in seeing the increasing integration of this bourgeoisie with the aristocracy as a betrayal 
of their earlier, Cobdenite mission, in favour of late Victorian imperialism. The middle of the 19th 
century was, for Jones, a time of enthusiasm for liberalism and free trade on their own terms. The 
cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, both spreading out from Britain to the rest of the world, and 
converging from abroad on London, were not merely owners and traders. They were evangelists 
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of a political cause and a way of life. As we will see later, this liberal evangelism did not go 
unnoticed in the periphery. It had a powerful if not formative influence on many of the most 
important Uruguayan political actors. Jones, Cain and Hopkins all emphasize that the cities of 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and other centers of trade and manufacturing were 
increasingly left out of this process, as London came to dominate the ‘gentlemanly’ world of 
finance. During the early and mid-19th century, however, merchants originating from the trade and 
manufacturing centers in the north of England and in Scotland were still influential both 
domestically and abroad. 
Charles Jones makes Argentina one of his case studies, and although he does not discuss 
Uruguay except in passing, his analysis of the interconnections between local elites and British 
merchants is suggestive. He examines the alliance between the liberal Unitario faction in Buenos 
Aires, and some of the more politically sympathetic members of the British merchant community 
there. Relations of all kinds, economic and social, began to form between the two groups, 
eventually leading to “complex networks of cousins”68 that helped integrate the landowning and 
mercantile classes. Joint ventures flourished between the two groups, facilitated by their 
intermarriages, their shared political sympathies, and their complimentary resources. This 
merchant community was a key source of capital for the new nation. This capital was raised in 
foreign trade, by foreign merchants, but accumulated locally, and by a group which was 
integrating, if not already integrated, into the local society and economy. It occupies a middle 
ground between purely local capital resources and the foreign direct investment of the later 19th 
century, and acts as a kind of transitional phase between the two. Evidence for this kind of activity 
in Uruguay will be examined later in this chapter. The idea of a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie 
originating in Britain, but integrating with local Latin American elites, creating a new hybrid class 
imbued with a particular set of mid-19th century liberal values is one which has substantial 
explanatory power for use in my analysis of social networks. 
There are several examples of a business-oriented approach to the topic of British 
merchants in the River Plate during the mid-19th century. These focus mainly on Buenos Aires, but 
also offer some evidence on Uruguay. The first business-oriented exploration of the topic of British 
Merchants in Latin America was by D.C.M. Platt.69 Another notable contribution was Vera Blinn 
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Reber, British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, 1810-1880.70 Reber’s analysis is rich in detail, and 
chronicles the business and social aspects of merchants, their firms, and their trade. In this regard, 
the book is similar in content to Platt’s more general work on British trade in Latin America. Reber 
highlights not only the successes of the period, but also the fragility of merchant houses. Profitable 
firms, especially partnerships, could be sunk by mistrust, misinformation, and strategic error. 
These risks likely constituted a major cost to doing business in the region, and Reber’s analysis of 
these factors offers a starting point for my own. More recently Manuel Llorca-Jaña has 
reinvigorated the historiography by revisiting the classic sources of Platt and Reber with a series of 
detailed studies.71 This work also offers a window into the parallel development of the British 
merchant community in Argentina during this period. As such, it is a source for comparisons with 
Buenos Aires that may reveal more about the Uruguayan case. Of particular note as a potential 
difference is the difference between the alliance between merchants and landowners that 
predominated in Argentina, contrasted with the integration of merchants into the landowning 
class through land purchases in Uruguay during the 1850s. 
From a comparative perspective, we should not be surprised to see tightly grouped 
networks of families operating in conjunction with one another to operate businesses, and 
especially to provide credit for mutual enterprises. The work of Naomi Lamoreaux illustrates two 
concepts important for this chapter: first, the role played by kinship networks in entrepreneurship 
and development.72 Her case deals with club-like commercial banks in the North-eastern United 
States, but the pattern can be generalized; it appears similar to the one prevailing in much of Latin 
America, as well-documented in numerous studies by Joslin,73 Platt,74 and Miller.75 Second, she 
highlights some of the potential factors behind the choice of firm structure, emphasizing the 
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preference for partnerships, especially loose networks of interlocking partnerships, rather than 
limited liability partnerships or corporations.76 
The thrust of Lamoreaux’s observations on the reasoning behind partnerships was 
anticipated by John Mayo, who found a concurring opinion from Williamson Balfour, an Anglo-
Chilean merchant firm from the mid-19th century: “To perform the position of a merchant 
properly, one has (to) have a much more direct interest in the risks run than a set of Directors can 
have.”77 A later generation would refer to this as the principal-agent problem, to which 
appropriate firm structure and strong contract laws were supposed to be a partial remedy.  But, 
given the inherent risks in long-distance trade, there was no satisfying institutional or structural 
solution to this problem until the spread of the telegraph in the 1860s. The increased speed of 
communication and transit in the late 19th century offered the possibility of new organizational 
forms, some involving agents sent out directly from buyers in Europe to Latin America, and others 
managed from Europe, as in the free-standing company. Prior to this point, lacking the ability to 
communicate between sides of the Atlantic faster than the speed of a mail packet (about six 
weeks), each partner had to trust the others to take decisions on their own. 
Naomi Lamoreaux has published several articles which address various aspects of the 
problem of firm structure and entrepreneurship in the 19th century for the North American case. 
She argues that the partnership structure of firms, wherein liability was unlimited and complete 
authority of decision-making was given equally to all partners, gave firms a flexibility that was 
advantageous given their business environment.78 She argues that different degrees of “firmness,” 
that is, the extent to which a firm was governed by internal hierarchy and rules, and therefore able 
to act as a coherent entity, suited different economic environments. Partnerships had several 
advantages over companies with shareholders: decision making was more decentralized, or 
rather, centralized in each partner; unlimited liability was a method of commitment, since 
partners were fully liable for debts. Partnership was also a method of preserving the ability of 
individual partners to credibly threaten one another with holdup, which may have been a more 
important factor for the individuals involved. Organizations that required individuals to give up 
this particular right may never have been formed, perhaps due to distrust between potential 
actors, and that therefore only partnerships which preserved it were stable in this environment. 
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Social Networks and Merchant Trade 
Given the innate uncertainty in dealing with foreign cultures in distant areas, there is a 
natural bias towards domestic rather than foreign trade and investment, a point made long ago by 
Adam Smith.79 Geoffrey Jones, in his book Merchants to Multinationals, explains how foreign 
direct investment emerged naturally from international merchant trade.80 Merchants may have 
begun exclusively as traders of goods, but often expanded their activities into services, such as 
banking, information services, and shipping. This in turn created incentives to vertically integrate 
their trading activities with the production of goods, moving up the production stream to exploit 
profitable opportunities. But an international merchant was not only an investor, managing 
opportunities for profit. They also functioned as bridges between cultures, managing the 
differences between distinct environments, from culture, language and religion to property rights, 
legal institutions and political systems. As such, they were well positioned to exploit the 
investment opportunities resulting from the development of New World countries. 
 Merchants who had already developed the contacts, regional knowledge, and expertise in 
a particular product or service could make use of those knowledge assets to expand into new 
areas of business, where other investors would have faced a disadvantage of lacking regional 
knowledge. Those merchants who had already sunk their time and capital into distant areas would 
have a comparative advantage as entrepreneurs in those parts of the world. The development of a 
community of British merchants in a peripheral country like Uruguay, then, represents an 
opportunity for both themselves and for the host economy. For the merchant, it would have been 
an opportunity to take advantage of economic niches which could be filled best by firms with both 
local and international knowledge. For the host economy, it would have gained access to trading 
opportunities and developmental advantages that it would otherwise have been denied for lack of 
entrepreneurs with the correct types of expertise.  
We should not expect one type of relations or network structure to explain the variety of 
social networks found among merchants. Different cultures, different ethnic groups, and different 
economic circumstances determine the organization of networks, leading to structures that 
appear quite distinct, and function in different ways. However, the kinds of resources required for 
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entrepreneurship differ in particular historical contexts, based on the scarcity of various factors. 
Environments with high information asymmetry encourage the use of networks to channel 
information flows. Poorly developed local markets for human capital incentivize networked 
methods for obtaining necessary skills and skilled workers.  Areas with low enforcement of 
property rights and protections against fraud, suggest the mutual monitoring and punishment 
mechanisms as the primary use of networks. Regardless of their origins, all networks can, to some 
extent, serve the basic functions of trade networks: the creation of trust, the linking of agents in 
different areas, and the acquisition of entrepreneurial resources, notably information. 
There has been much recent work on the role of business networks in creating trust, 
smoothing economic relationships, and overcoming informational problems. Social networks have 
been widely invoked to help explain the pattern and prevalence of trade in times and places 
where neither institutions nor firm structure seem adequate to cover the risks of contracting. 
These theories rely either on the innate trust created by in-group  social bonds, as in the work of 
Janet Tai Landa, or on informal enforcement mechanisms maintained through reputational effects, 
as suggested by Avner Greif. Merchants, or even small partnerships or merchant firms, would 
potentially have been unable to overcome the costs of trading and investing overseas, if they were 
restricted to their own resources. One of the key factors, discussed extensively in chapter five, is 
their place within their social network. This is usually a pre-existing ethnic or religious community, 
a group which shares some level of mutual trust and acts as a channel for information, but can be 
something as simple as a family, or a group of acquaintances. The group sustains some degree of 
mutual trust for reasons originally unrelated to business, but which is repurposed by the 
entrepreneur to serve functions important to the growth of new enterprises.  
Case studies abound, examining the function and structure of trade networks in a wide 
range of locations and among various ethnic groups.81 Special attention has been paid to the role 
of diasporic ethnic groups, who, while forming a small minority of their host populations, are 
effective at conducting long-distance trade on the basis of shared trust. The work of Janet Tai 
Landa focuses on the role of ethnically homogeneous middleman groups in establishing trade in 
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environments with poor institutional quality along ethnic lines. 82 Her theory portrays trust as a 
club good, shared among agents with similar background. Economic agents are socially embedded, 
that is to say, they are imbued with beliefs and norms based on their social context. These norms 
facilitate in-group cooperation, and discourage out-group defection. Successive tiers of 
relationships, from the closest to the most distant, can in her model be thought of as von Thünen 
rings, representing the degree of in-group trust. The trader sits at the centre, representing 
maximum trust, the trust in oneself. The rings, moving outwards, begin with the agent’s 
immediate family, proceeding through more distant family and ethnic relations, and to 
increasingly alien “outsider” groups, who are trusted least. As the network expands, it brings more 
potential trading partners, but also an increase in transaction costs. The benefits of defecting 
increase, which makes it more expensive to maintain group coherence, and therefore, trust. This is 
consistent with a club good interpretation of trust within an ethnic group. 
 One way to divide the literature is to distinguish those who see network trust mechanisms 
as essentially about punishment relationships, and those who see them as an extension of trust via 
in-group norms. For the first group, the network functions as a kind of justice game, distributing 
punishment to those who violate group trust. This deters others from making similar violations, 
and preserving the trust relationship within the group. Shared information and mutual gains from 
the solidity of the trust network among group members makes this punishment mechanism 
credible. This allows members to act as agents for one another without formal institutional 
enforcement, overcoming the fundamental problem of exchange, to use Greif’s phrase. The 
second group focuses more on the norm-based solidarity inherent in ethnic and religious groups, 
which provide innate incentives to trust group members over outsiders, creating a social zone in 
which transaction costs are lower. 
 However, one can also divide the literature in terms of the function of networks, between 
those who see a network as providing a positive function mostly by avoiding the transaction costs 
associated with low trust environments, and those who see it as a positive resource in and of 
itself. Networks can be a mechanism for collaboration, recruitment, and information gathering. 
Viewing the economic landscape from the perspective of the entrepreneur searching for 
exploitable opportunity in a world where knowledge is far from universal, a social network is a 
potential tool for business expansion into new enterprises, rather than a method of overcoming 
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barriers to existing ones. Rather, with an embedded, historical understanding of how firms acted, 
we can see networks in a way that shares more with Alchian’s evolutionary analysis, as analogous 
to organisms surviving or not surviving in a particular environment. Networks were a strategy for 
increasing profits and, as the markets become more competitive, avoiding ruin. 
Landa postulates a sudden decrease in trust as an agent moves from trading within the 
network, to trading with “outsiders,” with whom an agent does not share an exogenous (ethnic or 
family) trust relationship. If the resultant costs are sufficient to overcome the opportunity costs of 
refusing to trust outsiders, then out-group trade will be restricted to low-trust trades. This means 
dealing in cash, or otherwise limiting potential transactions to minimize the amount of trust 
required. In an environment like mid-19th century Uruguay, where cash was at a premium, this 
would have meant incurring a substantial cost, or foregoing a large volume of transactions. It is an 
empirical rather than theoretical question whether British merchants actually advanced and 
accepted credit, rather than dealing directly in cash. However, the model at least illustrates a 
strong theoretical reason to expect a preference for trust relationships in diminishing liquidity 
requirements in a cash-scarce environment.83 
Avner Greif has developed his famous argument about minority networks along similar 
lines, although from a game theoretic perspective that grounds trust in repeated game strategy 
rather than personal preferences and social norms.84 For Greif, it is the threat of collective 
punishment that can enable trade, absent formal institutional mechanisms. Socially coherent 
groups like the Magrhibi traders can form private networks of principals and agents. They develop 
a history of dealing with one another, and share information regularly among group members. 
This reputational mechanism discourages defection, which in turn encourages trust, enabling long-
distance agency relationships. Regardless of the theoretical approach, there is general agreement 
that ethnic bonds are of value in maintaining the trust necessary to overcome transaction costs, 
absent a developed institutional framework. 
 The narratives of both Landa and of Greif seek to explain networks as creating systems of 
trust, which overcome the uncertainty of long-distance exchange, a critical transaction cost in 
regions without developed formal institutions. While this is no doubt a large part of the 
functioning of many trade networks, especially before the modern period, it is not their exclusive 
role. In a situation where information about entrepreneurial opportunities is lacking, social 
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networks can function as a method of transmitting information. For entrepreneurs in the market 
for regional expertise or other specific business functions, it can serve as a recruitment tool to 
enable the formation of mutually beneficial relationships. The network can thus serve a positive 
function as well as a preventative one, increasing the opportunities of network members to the 
benefit of those connected.   
 The networks created by ethnic diasporas have also been examined in this context, as 
potential bearers of non-hierarchical, non-market relationships that assist international trade.  
Philip Curtin85 examines a wide variety of historical examples of inter-ethnic trade carried out by 
merchants, following trade networks from ancient times until the industrial revolution. For Curtin, 
trade diasporas were an essentially pre-modern, non-western system, to be replaced by “western” 
forms of trade organization in the industrial age, with its connecting technologies and systems of 
management. However, this does not appear to apply to the case of Uruguay, or to Latin America 
generally, where “western” merchants, from a wide swathe of European countries, were the 
commercial entrepreneurs that drove trade until the coming of the telegraph, railroad, insurance 
company, and so on. Moreover, the merchants themselves were themselves instrumental in this 
transformation, which was not from non-western to western, but rather, from one mode of 
western commerce to another. Other scholars have argued for the relevance of trade diasporas 
even in the industrial age. Ioanna Pepelasis, in a series of single and co-authored papers, has 
examined the entrepreneurship of Greek merchant networks during the Greek diaspora in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries.86 She finds a substantial role for informal, market-embedded clans, 
broader than family alliances, but smaller than an entire ethnic or religious in-group. The members 
of these clans often competed with one another but also came together in joint enterprises.   
The role of social networks has been given primacy in sociological theories of 
entrepreneurship, largely developed in the wake of Granovetter’s 1985 article on the 
embeddedness of economic activity.87 The challenge of this work is to see economic relations 
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neither as “undersocialized,” that is, stripped of meaningful social position and relations entirely, 
nor “oversocialized,” where social relations entirely determine activity with no regard for 
economic logic. Instead, Granovetter claims that economic actions taken by agents are inextricably 
embedded in their social context. The specific links available to the agent are relevant to the 
analysis, in contrast to an abstract set of general relationships, wherein agents or groups of agents 
are stripped of their specific historical and social context, and analysed in a purely structural 
manner. This school uses a socially contextualized notion of the entrepreneur as an agent who 
uses their available social as well as economic links to obtain resources. Put simply, one must 
consider the specific social circumstances faced by the individual entrepreneur, in order to 
understand the resources, and the opportunities, that shaped their behaviour. Social context does 
not determine economic behaviour,88 but that it does exert a powerful influence. 
Casson and Cox have developed an analysis of the various types of networks which can be 
used to overcome the problem of trust. They rightly emphasize that there are many ways in which 
links can be formed between agents, and many groups that can serve to make such contacts. 
These range from strictly economic organizations, through to political parties, militaries, schools, 
churches, and social clubs. They point out that, for the ‘networked’ entrepreneur, “’playing hard’ 
may be just as strategically important as working hard,” and that a wide range of relatively shallow 
contacts can be parlayed into business links.89 In this way, group integration was a component of 
successful entrepreneurship. They also emphasize the role of intermediation, where individuals 
connected to different types of networks acted as links between those networks, helping 
overcome both the problems of trust and information, but only for those who are, in the literal 
sense of network theory, well-connected. 
The particular social structures into which British merchants were embedded were 
examined in Cain and Hopkins’ famous work on ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in 19th century Britain.90 
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They argued that the most influential economic group in the country was the service sector. 
Bankers and traders became the well-connected guiding forces of empire. Prior to 1850, old style 
capitalist landowners invested in businesses, but disdained manufacturing for the more 
‘gentlemanly’ sectors of finance and trade. By 1850, and after, the financial elite had taken over 
the role of the older landowning generations as the upper class of business. However, they 
maintained the social structure of London capitalism, with its clubs, style, and gentlemanly codes 
of honour. Social connections within this group were seen as more prestigious than with 
industrialists, and thus, the bankers and merchants mixed with the aristocracy, gaining the ear of 
political power. This matched both London’s increasing role as the world’s capital supplier, and 
Britain’s relatively declining role as a manufacturer. The establishment of free trade, balanced 
budgets, and adherence to the gold standard were all policies that defined the era, and bear the 
stamp of the ‘moneyed interests’ in the City. This was, in the view of Cain and Hopkins, because of 
the shared ‘gentlemanly’ culture of both the political decision-makers and the service sectors.  
Any collective theory of the firm must, at some point, incorporate an individualistic theory 
of entrepreneurship, as a firm is a collection of individuals, contracting together to achieve their 
own goals in a larger framework. If merchant firms of the mid-19th century in Latin America 
operated predominantly as individuals operating on their own and small partnerships of perhaps 
two to four merchants operating together, then any explanation of this structure must, at some 
point, explain why larger groups did not form, and why partnerships did not dissolve into some 
even more atomized structure. The second question appears to be solved with Oliver Williamson’s 
framework of bounded rationality; the informational problems of trading commodities between 
Liverpool and Montevideo, or transhipping from Montevideo to Buenos Aires, meant that having 
trusted agents in each location was critical to business. Judgement was necessary to gauge the 
state of the market, power of attorney was necessary to remedy potential legal troubles, and 
authorization was needed to sign the drafts and accept the bills that kept trade flowing. A more 
atomized structure would have required communication at a rate not possible at least until the 
spread of the telegraph, a legal framework for enforcing contracts across often-contested borders, 
or a social network capable of generating sufficient trust to overcome the transaction costs. In a 
world of slow communications via mail packets, firms had strong incentive to extend the reach of 
their business through partnerships in the form of increased flexibility to respond to new 
information and deal with emerging problems.  
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Informal Empire and Business History 
 Cain and Hopkins list Uruguay as one of the countries where the influence of London in 
trade and finance was dominant to the point of economic imperialism. Pliant local elites allied with 
British capitalists to bring the settler economies into the British fold, and Uruguay was no 
exception. For this, they cite Peter Winn, who examines the Uruguayan case in his 1976 article for 
Past and Present, “British Informal Empire in the Nineteenth Century.”91 His conclusions are 
directly in line with the ideas of Robinson and Gallagher on the ‘imperialism of free trade,’92 and 
offer substantial support to a dependency theory interpretation of the relationship between 
Britain and Uruguay. For Winn, British economic imperialism reaches Uruguay early in the 19th 
century, with roots going back even further to colonial-era smuggling. The capture of Montevideo 
by the British in 1807, the Ponsonby mission that negotiated Uruguay’s independence in 1828, and 
the Anglo-French naval intervention in the 1840s were all results of the British desire to force open 
the Uruguayan markets to the low-cost manufactures of British industry.  
This economic imperialism was initially motivated by a mistaken belief about the size and 
wealth of the Uruguayan, and especially Paraguayan, economy. Unaware of the overall poverty in 
the interior, there was a widespread presumption among British politicians that a large market 
was to be found there, and that the River Plate was the key to accessing it. However, by the latter 
half of the 19th century, a more realistic view of the economic potential of Uruguay had emerged, 
not as a potential market for goods as much as a destination for investment capital. In Winn’s 
view, the dominance of Britain over the economic fate of Uruguay is quite clear, writing that the 
“strategic decisions governing the direction and rate of growth of the ‘informal colony’ were made 
by the imperial power and governed by its own interests.”93  From this perspective, the 
independent Uruguay was the “quintessence” of informal empire. 94 
Cain and Hopkins’ view of Palmerston’s free trade imperialist policies as applied to Latin 
America, and Winn’s view of Uruguay, have been challenged by David McLean.95 His diplomatic 
history of the Anglo-French intervention in Uruguay during the 1840s shows convincingly that the 
Foreign Office, and Palmerston in particular, was wary of committing to any obligations in the 
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River Plate.  He sought to withdraw the fleet and establish a new status quo, even if it would end 
up being less than ideal for British trade. Uruguay may have been part of the ‘informal empire,’ 
but when challenged, it became clear that Palmerston was more interested in informality than 
empire in this region. The costs of defending a distant quasi-colony, especially against a tenacious 
opponent like the Argentine dictator Rosas, appeared to outweigh the benefits. The British 
merchants in Montevideo, far from dictating imperial policy, found their influence with London 
insufficient to overcome the wariness of the Foreign Office, or the influence of their counterparts 
in Buenos Aires, who largely supported Rosas. This does not necessarily refute the concept of 
economic imperialism, but it does at least colour the concept differently; economic interests in a 
small country like Uruguay could only go so far in setting policy. This account only applies to 
diplomatic and military action, however. The extension of the British ‘gentlemanly’ club of 
merchants and bankers into Uruguay remains an important topic, which I will examine in depth in 
later chapters. 
 The nature of trade between the core and periphery has been a controversial topic in the 
historiography, coloured by ideological interpretations of the historical record. British merchants, 
the most visible direct agents of this trade, must therefore be considered in light of these broad 
narratives if we want to find an interpretation that will supersede previous ones. This especially in 
the case of Latin America, where dependency theory interpretations have often been applied, but 
also widely criticized. One of the most wide-ranging and influential of these interpretations is The 
Colonial Heritage of Latin America, a series of overview essays developed by Barbara and Stanley 
Stein in 1970.96 This study draws from a range of descriptive primary accounts to sketch a bleak 
overall picture of a region which moved seamlessly from the inefficient, economically backwards 
colonial domination of the Iberian nations, to the efficient, exploitative economic domination of 
the British Empire. Their analysis presents a bold indictment of colonial dominance as the source 
of Latin American underdevelopment, a thesis which resonates with Douglass North’s damning 
opinion of Iberian institutions as hopelessly inefficient and incapable of fostering modern growth. 
The application of this theory to Uruguay, however, is more problematic. The Steins’ chapter on 
Argentina, the closest comparison, is short to the point of vanishing, and generally goes against 
their underdevelopment thesis. The Uruguayan case is similar in most respects, although they do 
not discuss it. Also given Uruguay’s status as one of the youngest and least populated Spanish 
colonies, the depth of its ‘colonial heritage’ is open to question. 
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Their analysis is less convincing for the 19th century, and it is here that their primary 
antagonist in the dependency debates of the 1970s, D.C.M. Platt, criticizes their view both in his 
1972 book, Latin America and the British Trade, 1806-1914, and in the book he edited on the topic 
of business imperialism, containing chapters from Jones, Greenhill, Crossley, Lewis, and Miller.97 
Platt takes aim at the thesis of continuity of colonialism, pointing to low demand, disintegrated 
markets, and the ravages of the independence wars as leaving Latin American markets as 
surprisingly unaffected by the coming of British trade until the late 19th century. Individual goods 
and regions experienced periods of high interest, but overall, the pattern is one of disconnection 
and withdrawal.98 His argument incorporates internal as well as international geography. Platt 
argues that Latin America was not a major source of trade for Britain in the 19th century because, 
while ports could do considerable business, the interior, along with the majority of the population, 
was isolated. The incorporation of these hinterland areas into the national, and therefore global, 
economy was a difficult and unrewarding task that took the better part of the century to 
complete. British trade with Latin America should therefore be seen as relatively modest, with 
entrepreneurs prospering in specific places and trades, notably in the provision of commercial 
services such as banking, but never a major component of British trade. However, he also singles 
out the River Plate as being somewhat of an exception to this rule. Uruguay, alongside Argentina, 
was generally more integrated with British goods, services, and capital, both during the period of 
disillusionment in the mid-century, and during the investment boom of the last decades. Thus, 
even if we accept Platt’s critique of the Steins’ dependency-inspired ideas for Latin America as a 
whole, it is not so clear that Uruguay was not a part of a British ‘informal empire’ of economic 
influence. 
The interests of merchants in the various forms of ‘imperialism’ also changed over time. 
Charles Jones suggested that, in the Argentine case, it was the slow reorientation of merchants 
away from trade due to increased competition that pushed Argentine political economy away 
from commercial capitalism and towards the ‘belligerent’ nationaist and protectionist policies of 
the early 20th century.99 Jones argues that the economic interests of the old Anglo-Argentine 
commercial class were increasingly divided as foreign investment increased in scale. Infrastructural 
firms owned and managed from London as free-standing companies had an interest in maintaining 
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control over banking and foreign exchange in the private sector. Others, more closely integrated 
with the Argentine government and the landowning class, favoured the protection of their 
domestic interests against competition by using state power directly to compensate for the 
diminution of their advantages in local knowledge and connections.  What was once a coherent 
merchant class, unified by common interests, fragmented into quite separate sub-groups by the 
late 19th century. The particular social and entrepreneurial trajectories taken by merchants can not 
only lead to different individual outcomes, but also to the eventual division of the community 
through divergent economic interests. 
British merchants were not only purveyors of manufactures from the industrial core. In 
Uruguay, they were dynamic entrepreneurs who served a series of functions, including commerce, 
banking, transport, landownership, and industrial innovation. The role of merchants in any 
structural scheme for understanding economic development cannot just be limited to transport 
and arbitrage. The role of the British merchant community in investment is more complex than 
simply bringing European capital to the New World. Much of the investment by the British 
merchant community was self-financed, at least in the years before 1870. This meant they were 
reinvesting profits from trade, rather than just channeling Foreign Direct Investment from Britain. 
Before revisiting the larger narratives about structuralism and development, there needs to be a 
more specific analysis of the economic activities of the British in Uruguay, and their change over 
time. There is space for a business history of the British in Uruguay, written neither from the 
perspective of overarching frameworks of imperialism and subjection, nor from a national 
standpoint, but as an examination of entrepreneurs and their businesses from a detailed, ground-
up perspective. 
Uruguay and the New Institutional Narratives  
In the last decade, new large-scale narratives of development and underdevelopment 
have come forward, generated by institutional economics combined with regression analyses. 
Douglass North’s overarching theory that ‘institutions matter’ guides the research, although his 
particular conclusion, that the relative efficiency of British institutions compared with Spanish 
ones explains New World divergence, has come under fire.100 One of the most influential works in 
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this school of thought is Engerman and Sokoloff’s famous paper on institutions and resource 
endowments.101 In their story, the basis for divergence amongst New World states is the different 
institutions that evolved in response to different endowments of resources and indigenous 
populations at the time of colonization. According to this model, exploitative systems of forced 
labour were imposed by colonists on areas where there were resources to be exploited, such as 
tropical products in Brazil, or silver in Peru or Mexico. Slavery, mita labour, and other oppressive 
systems led to the stratification of society into a closed, exploitative elite, and an exploited lower 
class. Even after the abolition of forced labour, the systems of exploitation continued, since the 
ruling elite had no reason to respond to the welfare needs of the people, nor to grant them access 
to political power. In general, British North America was free from this kind of labour, whereas 
Spanish and Portuguese South America were not. 
 Applying this model to Uruguay, it seems that it fits somewhere in the middle. It was never 
a particularly large slave economy, nor did it have large indigenous populations, although the 
Guaraní from the northern River Plate did have a substantial role in the early history of the region. 
At the time of independence, there was a ruling landowner class, but the overall 
underdevelopment of the state and the ‘frontier’ nature of the country meant that its power was 
relatively limited by comparison with other Latin American states. Uruguay was not an entirely 
uninhabited wilderness, but it was sparsely populated, and colonial institutions were not well 
consolidated. Thus, there was perhaps more freedom in the Banda Oriental to escape what the 
Steins called the ‘colonial heritage,’ relative to other regions. Uruguay fits into the Engerman and 
Sokoloff story, but perhaps not entirely comfortably. 
 Another major narrative, both challenging and supporting the Engerman and Sokoloff 
thesis in various ways, is the ‘Reversal of Fortune’ paper of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson.102 
Their basic finding, from running regressions on nearly the entire globe over a 500 year span, is 
that non-European countries which were relatively inhabited in 1500 were overall poorer by the 
end of the 20th century. Conversely, countries which had low urbanization and sparse population, 
of which Uruguay is a nearly flawless example, became relatively prosperous. They attribute this 
result to the institutional heritage of colonialism: countries which developed early were by and 
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large targeted for colonial exploitation, whereas relatively empty countries were settled by 
migrants looking to work for themselves as settlers. In this model, Uruguay has a place among the 
‘settler societies’, endowed with superior institutions by European settlers, rather than imperial 
overlords.  19th century Uruguay thus serves as a kind of test case for these various ideas about 
institutional development: if North is correct, Uruguay should have performed poorly, since it is of 
Spanish colonial heritage. If it performed well, then that would be strong evidence for the 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson thesis, since Uruguay was relatively empty.  
 One other issue that must be considered, however, is the dynamic nature of institutions. 
What causes institutions to change? And to what extend are the institutions of a society, both 
formal and informal, a restraint on the actors within it? These questions are somewhat lost in the 
larger narratives, since they are concerned primarily with the connection between initial 
conditions and outcomes. Avner Greif, discussing adaptive merchant behaviour and institutional 
change for a much earlier period, emphasizes that rules are only relevant to the extent that they 
are followed, and what is really needed to understand behaviour is an analysis of restrictions: who 
can break a rule, and what are the consequences for doing so?103 In the case of Uruguay, this is far 
from a trivial issue. The state was small, fractured into political factions, and perpetually short of 
funds. In terms of infrastructure, Uruguay beyond Montevideo was little more than pure 
hinterland throughout most of the 19th century. There was no road system, no effective courts, 
and little policing. Local warlords, known as caudillos, enforced the rules, or did not, at their 
discretion. Within their areas of influence, the nominal laws of the land were casually enforced at 
best, or completely ignored at worst. From the standpoint of explaining merchant behaviour as a 
rational response to the institutional environment, we should expect to find that informal 
networks played some kind of part in overcoming the substantial barriers to trade, since formal 
institutions were feeble. 
Economic geography also plays a role in determining how British merchants branched out 
from trade into local investment. Jan Kleinpenning’s Peopling the Purple Land gives a detailed 
overview of the geographical aspects of Uruguayan development in the 19th century.104 It 
emphasizes that when British migrants became landowners, they tended towards capital-intensive 
uses of smaller, enclosed plots of land. This included sheep raising, which involved a more 
intensive use of land than traditional cattle raising. Crossbreeding, which increased the value of 
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livestock, was also much more common among British than Uruguayan landowners. They were 
also much more likely to experiment in the use of labour-saving, land-conserving technologies, 
although the scope for such innovation was somewhat limited by the nature of livestock 
production. In changing the usage of land from extensive to intensive use, they became 
innovators, at the forefront of the slow transformation of the Uruguayan countryside away from 
the disorganized, wasteful cattle estancias of the colonial period.  
British merchants, when they did invest in land, did not do so equally in all areas. They 
concentrated their purchases in areas where transportation costs were low, around Montevideo 
and along the littoral, towards Argentina. This seems to imply that they were making use of their 
existing connections and information, which were naturally focused on the port and the coast. It is 
also likely that in many cases, this was a matter of vertical integration through backwards linkages. 
Kleinpenning gives a few suggestive examples. Samuel Lafone, one of the most successful 
merchants of the period, also set up his meat salting plant (saladero), called La Teja, in a bay at 
Buceo near Montevideo. This allowed for easy access to the sea, as well as convenient waste 
disposal. Expanding into the refining of beef was a natural step for Lafone, since his previous trade 
had been in hides.105 His plant was also one of the first major attempts to put machinery to use in 
the production of beef and beef by-products such as tallow and soap. He was also involved in the 
founding of the first commercial bank and the first Anglican church, directed some early European 
colonization and immigration projects, and was a major contributor to the Colorado cause during 
the Uruguayan civil war.106 Other merchants expanded into different areas of production, notably 
the expansion of sheep farming, but many displayed a similar pattern of expansion out of trade, 
into production and services. 
Political Economy 
 There is universal consensus that the Uruguayan state was weak in the 19th century. 
However, the process through which a modern state, capable of governing the territory of the 
Republic and enforcing its laws, emerged by the beginning of the 20th century is debated.  One 
interpretation is that given by Fernando López-Alves in his short study Between the Economy and 
the Polity in the River Plate: Uruguay, 1811-1890.107 In this work, he examines the thesis of 
Uruguayan exceptionality, that somehow, a distinctive set of political institutions emerged 
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sometime during the 19th century which set Uruguay on a more democratic course than other 
countries in the region. In the end, he rejects both the idea that Uruguayan exceptionalism comes 
from either the independence era, or from the influx of European migration over the course of the 
century. Instead, he claims, the fundamental shift was the consolidation of liberal values with 
strong military government (militarismo), begun by Lorenzo Latorre in the 1870s, and completed 
by Máximo Tajes in the late 1880s. He interprets foreign landowners as “aloof” and “outside party 
structures,” and therefore as being only indirectly influential in the changing structure of political 
institutions.108  
However, one could challenge this interpretation. It is clear that not all foreign landowners 
were apolitical in this period. Many, including Samuel Lafone, played a direct role as financiers in 
the Uruguayan civil war of the 1840s, the guerra grande. They were also highly influential as 
bearers of European ideology. Mere non-participation in the official political parties does not 
preclude substantial political influence. He does admit that they provided some impetus for 
institutional change through the development of economic pressure groups such as the Asociación 
Rural. It would have been surprising if, given the weak state of Uruguayan economic institutions in 
the mid-19th century, British merchants were not pressuring the state for better enforcement, at 
least of laws that favoured their interests. It is clear that they did so; López-Alves underestimates 
their role in the process of institutional change. 
 The issue of the friction between British landowners and the Uruguayan state over the 
issue of property rights is explored by Lauren Benton in a 2001 article.109 She analyzes several 
important aspects of the status of foreigners in Uruguay in the period this thesis. For Benton, the 
issue is not so much of persistent lawlessness in the hinterland, as the plurality of claims to law. 
Caudillos, foreign consuls, and the Uruguayan state all had different interpretations of what the 
law was, and more importantly, whose task it was to enforce it. British landowners, often because 
of their connections with (or identity as) merchants in Montevideo, could appeal to their 
government to apply pressure to enforce their legal titles and gain other advantages. This lobbying 
led to institutions like the Comisión Mixta, designed to arbitrate cases of property damage 
sustained by British and French landowners during the guerra grande. The implication here is that 
there was a network forged among the British in Uruguay, from landowners large and small, 
through merchants in the port, to diplomats, and finally back to Britain itself, which could be relied 
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upon to provide legal clout which was otherwise unobtainable in the chaotic Uruguayan 
hinterland. Extraterritoriality, the claim that foreigners were bound by laws other than those of 
Uruguay, and therefore deserved special legal consideration, was regularly invoked. The 
fundamentally troubling issue from the perspective of Britain was the general absence of law or 
justice.110  
The pressure put on the government of Uruguay by the British to improve their system of 
justice clearly had some effect on the development of property rights institutions in Uruguay. 
Benton calls attention to the attempts at legal reform by Uruguayan liberals from the 1850s 
through the 1870s. She shows the perceived urgency of improving the ability of the state to 
enforce a consistent set of laws throughout the whole of its territory, and especially to define the 
rights of foreigners without conceding national sovereignty.111 In this way, then, the British 
community in Montevideo is tied into the story of Uruguayan institutional development. Much of 
the most valuable property with the highest levels of capital intensity and requiring the best-
defined property rights was in their hands, and their interests were therefore aligned with 
improving its protection. 
Regional Historiography 
The literature on merchants in the River Plate during the early to middle 19th century is 
not extensively developed, especially for the Uruguayan case. The classic study for British 
merchants in Buenos Aires remains Reber, a study from over three decades ago. Lewis remains 
one of the few to offer a broad analysis of the role of British business in Argentina that stretches 
back to the era of the merchant house.112  The nearest equivalent for the Uruguayan case is Winn’s 
study of British economic influence.113 In terms of trade strategy, Manuel Llorca explores the 
poncho as a case of adaptation by British merchants to the Southern Cone market and an analysis 
of textile exports from Britain to the region.114  Alejandra Irigoin explains overall merchant 
behaviour in terms of monetary factors, arguing that diversification into landholding was a 
reaction to volatility, including inflation risks.115  For the case of Uruguay, Alba Mariani has written 
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an essay on Samuel Fisher Lafone,116  and edited a collection of writings on various subjects 
pertaining to British merchants in Uruguay.117 More recently, Stephen Bell presented a brief paper 
on the role of British merchant networks in the diffusion of technology and the development of 
the meat industry in Uruguay.118 However, in general, the literature remains sparse, with few case 
studies and no overarching analysis of the entire community, neither in terms of its characteristics, 
nor its impact. 
 More promising in general has been the historiography of the last two decades on the 
dissolution of the former colonial economy of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, and its 
reconstitution as an Atlantic-focused primary production economy in the early 19th century. This 
literature has been spearheaded by several authors, writing predominantly about Argentina, 
though often with a regional focus. Building on foundational works of Argentine economic history 
such as Burgin, Halperín, Lynch and Ferns, they have deepened and in some cases overturned the 
view of economic development in the 19th century. Alejandra Irigoin has focusing on the 
deleterious effect of  monetary disintegration in the region;119 Roberto Schmit, who has 
reappraised the economic recovery and reorientation of the Argentine province of Entre Rios in 
the post-colonial period;120 Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge Gelman, who have written several 
books and papers reassessing aspects of rural development in the region,121 as well as a 
historiographical survey;122 Samuel Amaral, who has re-examined the estancia as a business 
enterprise managed according to capitalist, rather than traditional, principles;123 and Ricardo 
Salvatore, revisiting the topic of the rural poor from a subaltern studies perspective, with 
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substantial implications for labour markets and capitalist development.124 This list is certainly not 
exhaustive, and new research by these and other authors is on-going. 
These new results have forced some measure of re-evaluation of the picture the of post-
independence River Plate economies. The collapse of the colonial system, with its attendant 
monetary system, trade routes, and social order attached to crown privileges and bureaucracy, 
forced a major reorientation of the regional economy. The locus of economic activity moved away 
from the silver economy of Bolivia and Peru, and towards the littoral regions, not only of Buenos 
Aires, but also Entre Rios and Uruguay. These regions specialized in hides production for export 
markets even before the collapse of the Spanish empire, a process which was greatly accelerated 
in its wake.  Those regions with transport links with Europe were well-positioned for economic 
growth in this new situation; the interior, by contrast, stagnated. 
Both labour markets and entrepreneurs appear, in light of recent studies, to have been 
much more economically rational than previously portrayed, as anarchistic gauchos and 
paternalistic landowners. Instead, labour markets, though badly underdeveloped, were the result 
of pluriactive peasants who switched back and forth between subsistence on small landholdings 
and market labour as seasonal demands rose and fell.125 Landowners, meanwhile, pursued 
business rather than exclusively social interests, investing in or divesting from land as market 
signals changed, and managed their estates along efficient, capital-saving lines to maximize 
revenue.126 It is into this environment, of an economy adapting to a dramatic reorientation in 
global trade flows in the post-Napoleonic world, that we must position the British merchants of 
Uruguay. While we must be careful to remember that what is true for Buenos Aires or other 
provinces of Argentina may not be the case for Uruguay, it must also be remembered that the two 
communities were tightly connected, and that any interpretation of either country must take the 
influence of the other into account. 
 In the Historia de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1830-1930), Pivel Devoto and Ranieri 
de Pivel Devoto (hereafter, Pivel and Ranieri) provide a general historical framework, from the 
context of state and national development, for the institutional environment prevailing at the 
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time.127 Specifically, the overwhelming weakness of the state, the lack of development in its 
institutions, and the extent to which the political or military situation was secure given the 
domestic and regional turbulence. This would, in theory, have made Uruguay a difficult place to do 
business. And yet, foreign merchants also appear in the text as a kind of shadowy background 
force, motivating and ‘seducing’ the doctores of Montevideo, especially those of the Colorado 
allegiance, with foreign ideologies, backed by their capital and their powerful home governments. 
This is a rather different institutional perspective from what one might suspect if one were to look 
at the political situation described by Pivel and Ranieri, and imagined what kind of relationship 
foreign merchants would have with such a turbulent country. Transaction costs would be high, 
risks would be extreme, property would be woefully insecure, and the literature amply confirms 
these as major obstacles to economic activity. It is therefore plausible to consider the influence of 
foreign merchants with government decisions not from the nationalist perspective of foreign 
greed against local ‘oriental’ interests, but rather as a response by profit maximizing merchants 
and investors to what was, as the authors themselves emphasize, a highly unstable institutional 
environment. The idea that foreign merchants acted as a destabilizing influence on local politics, a 
thesis as old as the guerra grande itself, deserves further analysis from a more modern standpoint 
of institutions and agents. 
The types of arguments found in Pivel and Ranieri are picked up by José Pedro Barrán and 
Benjamín Nahum in their classic tome, the Historia rural del Uruguay moderno,128 and by Barrán in 
Apogeo y crisis del Uruguay pastoril y caudillesco.129 The remarkable value of the seminal Historia 
Rural lies in its empiricism; it contains an abundance of evidence on the Uruguayan pastoral 
economy, which, for the 19th century, is essentially the whole economy. For this thesis, it is also a 
helpful source for names of major British economic actors; Samuel Lafone, Thomas Tomkinson, 
Richard Hughes, William Young Stirling, John Jackson and many others are key figures in the 
narrative constructed by Barrán and Nahum. British entrepreneurs are analysed mostly from the 
perspective of their role as landowners, where they made their mark as progressive investors, 
developing patterns of land exploitation through the introduction of sheep, and later of new 
breeds of cattle. They also were among the first and most relevant of the rural industrializers, 
bringing rudimentary machinery and industrial organization to bear on the problems of wastage 
inherent in the traditional hides-based export industry. While hides continued to dominate the 
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economy, the saladero, or meat salting plant, could, if managed efficiently and provided with 
rudimentary technology and organization, diversify the products of beef from merely dried hides 
to salted hides, dried beef (tasajo), and fats. This had benefits for the investors, who increased 
their wealth through investment, integrated production of pastoral products with their existing 
import and export businesses, and provided them with a greater degree of influence over the local 
Uruguayan elite.  It also diversified the economy as a whole away from complete dependence on 
markets for hides. 
According to Barrán and Nahum, while the rural influence of foreign merchants moving 
into landownership and production could be felt prior to the guerra grande, it was the 
impoverishment of the Uruguayan elite during the war which opened the doors to an entirely new 
level of foreign integration in the economy. Beginning in 1851 there arose a new class, the nueva 
clase alta rural, the new rural upper class. They were foreign landowners with strong ties to 
Montevideo and to Europe, access to capital, interest in diversification (sheep and saladeros, for 
the 1851-1870 period) and a general desire for orderly, if not necessarily democratic, government. 
Neither the speed of the rise of this class nor its remarkable penetration into the rural economy 
would have been possible but for the fact of widespread impoverishment prevailing in the wake of 
the guerra grande. The traditional elite was financially devastated, having either picked a side in 
the war and supported it to the point of financial ruin, or having had their livelihood stripped from 
them by hungry armies, political enemies, marauding bandits, Brazilian “californias” (raids), or 
simply the unenforceability of weak property rights in the confusing aftermath of the war. Carlos 
Real de Azúa, in his monograph El Patriciado Uruguayo, also marks this as a turning point, both for 
the Uruguayan elite, the beginning of the end of the patriciado, and for the incorporation of 
Uruguay into British economic orbit.130 “There could not fail to be a certain symbolism in the fact 
that, by 1854, the great quantity of saladeros that operated in the environs of Montevideo had 
been reduced to only one: that of Samuel Lafone.”131 Successful migrants displaced Orientales at 
the head of the most distinctly Uruguayan industry, cattle processing.  
The classic Uruguayan literature also contributes to the study of the geographical 
development of the Uruguayan economy. One major focus of the work of Pivel and Ranieri is to 
reject, for the Uruguayan context, the classic rural/urban polarized thesis of Sarmiento’s 
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Civilización y Barbarie.132 The Blancos and Colorados did not, according to Pivel and Ranieri, divide 
evenly along the lines of rural against urban or warlike caudillos against intellectual doctores. 
Neither was the split defined by a strictly ideological divide, with the basic precepts of liberal 
republicanism being largely accepted by both sides. Their conclusion is that the urban/rural 
geographical divide, stark as it may have been, did not have a defining effect on the political 
climate. In particular, they emphasize that the guerra grande was not a war of two economic 
classes set against one another. In the context of the economic activities of the patriciado, Carlos 
Real de Azúa comes to a similar conclusion: the economic interests of the Uruguayan elite prior to 
the guerra grande were heterogeneous, with the key families participating not only in traditional 
land-based cattle raising, but also in commercial and professional activities, as well as the military. 
In this regard, the patriciado was a cross-class group with strong links to Montevideo, but who 
were not centered in any one activity, and therefore not representatives of any one geographical 
locale.133 
Another geographical point, emphasised in Barrán and Nahum, which bears mentioning is 
the division of the hinterland into two major zones: the northeast, beyond the Rio Negro, where 
Brazilians formed a large part of the population and predominated economically, and the 
southwest, where Uruguayans, Argentines and European landowners prevailed. The littoral region, 
along the coast from Montevideo towards Entre Rios, and alongside the River Plate, was an area 
characterized by the high intensity of the saladero industry, and oriented more towards sheep 
raising, partly due to the presence of European landowners, and also partly to take advantage of 
the lower transportation costs afforded by waterways. The Brazilian-dominated north, on the 
other hand, was linked strongly with the economy of Río Grande do Sul, and was not a major area 
of British economic involvement.  
Barrán and Nahum show a change not only in the composition of the upper classes, but a 
change in mentality. European entrepreneurs brought new ideas to the lands they acquired in the 
wake of the guerra grande, first through mechanization of the saladero industry, and later through 
the development of wool as a major export commodity. They also represented a style of 
entrepreneurship more closely integrated with the city, with the world market, and with 
contemporary technology. Samuel Lafone, mentioned above, is credited with substantial 
innovations at his saladero La Teja, such as the introduction of steam power to render fat, which 
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both solved the problem of meat spoilage and provided new, exploitable by-products: the 
graseros, fats and other wastes which could be processed into saleable products. Nor is this a 
handful of isolated cases, according to Barrán and Nahum. They mention Lafone alongside and 
several other European entrepreneurs as only the ‘vanguard’ of the new immigrants transforming 
rural Uruguay. The established position in the Uruguayan literature is therefore clear: the new 
upper class, composed mainly of foreigners, came to dominate the economic life of the nation in 
the post-guerra grande period. 
The topic of social networks is dealt with in Barrán and Nahum, although mostly in relation 
to their effects on Uruguayan society, rather than their internal functions. Organizations devoted 
to rural development, such as the 1860 Club Nacional,134 and its successor, the Asociación Rural, 
were one direct method of bringing together landowners and rural  industrialists from both the 
Uruguayan elite and the nueva clase alta. Urban organizations also played their role in forging 
connections. Barrán describes the formation of the Banco Comercial in 1857, the first commercial 
bank in Uruguay, as a joint enterprise, with the directors being wealthy foreign merchants in the 
capital, including British merchants Thomas Tomkinson and Samuel Lafone. This functioned not 
only as a bank, but also as a pressure group, supporting the orista faction in lobbying for a gold 
standard currency during the financial crises of the 1870s.135  
Freemasonry also played a role as an important social group, although the connection to 
British merchants specifically is not explored by Barrán. In this narrative, Masonic ideas were 
widespread by the 1860s, and almost all of the “cultured youth” in Montevideo were Masons, who 
at first represented the liberal branch of Catholic opinion, and later many left the church entirely 
and hardened into the core of “a militant, rationalist, anti-clerical deism.”136  While this would not, 
in and of itself, implicate British merchants, in Carlos Real de Azúa’s study of the patriciado, when 
drawing the boundaries of the group, he deliberately excludes those who maintained their foreign 
character for, among other things, religious reasons. He explicitly includes Samuel Lafone in this 
group. 137 While Carlos Real de Azúa separates foreign merchants from the patriciado from a 
conceptual standpoint, it is clear that the two groups were not sharply separated, even if they 
were distinct. Intermarriages and godparenthood forged links between the two groups. Barrán 
                                                          
134 Barrán and Nahum, Historia rural, t. I/1, 350. 
135 Ibid, 68, 136-139. 
136 Ibid, 86-88. “un deismo racionalista militante y anti-clerical.” 
137 Real de Azúa, El Patriciado, 14. 
64 
 
 
and Nahum give a brief discussion of this trend.138 The Lafones were linked directly with the 
Quevedo, and indirectly through them with the Herrera; Jackson married into the Errazquin family; 
Richard Hughes’s children into the Gomez family; Stirling married into the Batlle; and so forth. The 
network created by these marriages connects the entire patriciado with at least the wealthiest 
foreign merchants within one generation.  The relevance of these connections was lost neither on 
Barrán and Nahum nor on Real de Azúa, but detailed analysis of the interconnections between the 
groups, and of their significance, has not been fully explored. 
Another gap in this classic literature pertaining to Uruguay in this period is that trade is 
not generally analyzed except at a macroeconomic or sociological level. Wealthy British merchants 
are invoked politically by nearly all authors, following Pivel, as Europeanizing influences on the 
Montevidean elite, especially the intellectual doctores of the Colorado party.139 Their role as 
financiers is generally well-considered because of their role in establishing the Banco Comercial, 
and their near-monopoly on credit prior to the 1870s. Where they shifted their business activities 
into landownership, stock raising and meat processing, they appear prominently in Barrán and 
Nahum’s analysis.140 Barrán and Nahum provide some fragmented statistics on the quantity and 
value of imports and exports, on the role of Britain as a primary market, and on the balance of 
payments problems that perpetually undermined attempts to establish a solid currency. The 
merchants themselves, their partnerships, and trading houses, remain comparatively less 
explored.  
Synthesis 
 The previous sections have examined pieces from several bodies of literature, ranging 
from merchant theory and business networks to dependency and institutionalism. There are 
several key ideas to be taken from each of the topics examined in this chapter. Understanding 
merchants and the business of trade in the River Plate in the 19th century requires a broad concept 
of merchants not just as conducting trade, but as entrepreneurs dealing in goods, services and 
information in an environment where both opportunities and risks were substantial. A  British 
merchant house trading at Montevideo might have been only incidentally related to the economy 
of the hinterland, acting as a pure intermediary transferring goods from Britain to Uruguay and 
back again, but this appears not to have been the case in many circumstances. Trade in rural 
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commodities such as hides, salted meat, and wool was always at the heart of the business of 
British merchants in this period, but they did not remain exclusively in this business. As suggested 
in the framework of Geoffrey Jones, merchants acted as precursors to the modern multinational 
firm.141 They moved into a variety of sectors, from banking to landownership to industrial 
production. Their connections with the high-capital, high-technology economy of Britain made 
them uniquely suited as innovators. British-owned landholdings and meat salting plants, or 
saladeros, were among the most progressive in terms of enclosure, crossbreeding, the application 
of technology, and the intensive use of land.  
 The invocation of social networks as being important to communities of merchants has 
been widespread in the literature. Casson and Cox offer a model for understanding the role of 
networks in British business in the 19th century,142 drawing on Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism.’143 Greif and Landa suggest routes for understanding network as static entities,144 
whereas Granovetter and Casson suggest how links can be used dynamically for entrepreneurial 
purposes.145 I will apply these models by developing the Uruguayan side of these networks 
showing how they functioned in this particular time and place. In order to function effectively in 
reducing the costs and uncertainties of transatlantic trade, an effective network would not only 
have to bridge the gap between groups and functions at the metropolis, and not only cross the 
Atlantic to a knowledgeable and reputable agent in the periphery. It would also have to connect to 
an elite network in the peripheral country, in order to assure the kinds of political and social 
influence necessary to overcome weak institutions. For Uruguay, these concerns were crucial to 
sustaining and expanding trade, since property rights were so uncertain. Exploring the links that 
made up these networks and examining their functioning as conduits for economic activity will be 
a major contribution of my thesis. 
 Following the analysis of both the business interests of the British merchant community, 
and the networks they forged, both with other Britons and the Uruguayan elite, this thesis will 
examine their place in the larger narratives of intercontinental trade. While in broad agreement 
with the notion that trade with Britain played a large role in the development of the Uruguayan 
economy, this thesis concludes that classic dependency theory is overdrawn and simplistic for this 
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case. The colonial heritage in Uruguay was not trivial, but neither did it endure unchanged over 
the course of the 19th century. No doubt there is some salience to the term ‘informal empire,’ 
given the important role played by British economic interests in Uruguay. However, this idea 
requires the nuance that the most important agents of this influence were merchants living in 
Montevideo. As their economic influence grew, they also began to integrate into Uruguayan 
society, marrying into elite families and buying land in rural areas. The situation in Uruguay was 
therefore more a matter of the creation of a new elite class, as suggested by Charles Jones and by 
Barrán and Nahum.146 British merchants in Uruguay began as foreigners, and slowly became 
integrated members of the Uruguayan elite. 
 As for the very largest narratives, those of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, and 
Engerman and Sokoloff, the case of Uruguay offers some potential insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses of their theories.147 By analyzing the crucial development period of the post-
independence 19th century, the thesis will contribute to understanding how a relatively 
uninhabited, chaotic hinterland can emerge, in less than a century, as one of the most developed 
countries in Latin America. An analysis of the role played by the British in Uruguay, both as 
economic actors and as a political pressure group, may shed some light on questions of how legal 
heritage does (or does not) determine economic outcomes. The strategies pursued by British 
merchants will shed light on the ways in which the institutional environment can be manipulated, 
accommodated, or altered by firms and even individuals. 
 This research will fill the gap in the historiography evident from this survey. There is no 
single, comprehensive study of British merchants in Uruguay that deals with their economic 
decisions, their social world, and their influence on Uruguay. There are studies, such as Reber’s, 
that incorporate them as peripheral to the larger story in Buenos Aires.148 They have been 
examined as adjuncts to the larger, later story of British foreign direct investment in Uruguay by 
Peter Winn.149 They play a large role in much of the ‘classic’ Uruguayan historiography as foreign 
political and cultural influences, and as progressive landowners. But there remains space for a 
study incorporating new theories of entrepreneurship, social networks, to increase our 
understanding of this unique period both in the history of Uruguay, and in the history of 
transatlantic trade. It is that space that this thesis is intended to fill. 
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Chapter 3: Historical Background 
For frontier regions, detailed historical context is required to understand merchants. Both their 
strategies and their impact on development are contingent on a variety of non-economic factors in 
a way which is less true of more stable, developed markets. In particular, assumptions about the 
exogeneity of merchant strategy and the legal framework in which they operate cannot be taken 
for granted; merchants are players not only in games of trade and finance, but also in larger games 
of politics, ideology, and state building. The conflict among competing groups not only over the 
borders of the emerging states, but over their political, legal and fiscal characteristics was 
constant. This was both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, the chaos of war clearly impeded 
the flow of trade by introducing uncertainty over production, taxation, and expropriation. But on 
the other, it created opportunities for investment in state debt, for tax farming, and for buying 
assets at low prices.   
British merchants were a privileged group. They were exempted by treaty from the most 
onerous demands of the state, such as conscription and forced loans. As British citizens, they were 
entitled to at least the nominal protection of their consulates. As merchants in small partnerships, 
they had the advantage of geographical flexibility, able to switch cities or even regions if it became 
necessary. They were not, however, immune to the indirect effects of turmoil. The counterparty 
risk involved in dealing with local actors was considerable. Governments were always short of 
funds and with urgent fiscal needs. Local producers and merchants were vulnerable to the 
vagaries of war and political turmoil. These problems could suppress demand, eliminate supply, 
and cause waves of credit default.  
As will be explored in later chapters, merchants also used this turmoil entrepreneurially. 
War generated not only devastation, but also opportunities. Penniless, threatened governments 
sold assets, contracted loans and offered privileges at prices unavailable in peacetime. Local elite 
landowners, when bankrupted by pillage, by forced loans, or by lack of long-term credit, sold their 
extensive estates out of desperation or poverty. Merchants with regional experience had a 
substantial informational advantage in perceiving these opportunities, in a time when information 
travelled very slowly, and on-the-ground experience was necessary to develop tacit, local 
expertise. Foreign merchants suffered less from the calamities of war, relative to locals. They also 
had superior access to credit through the channel of short-term, international trade credit, 
through merchant banking and bills of exchange.  
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However, despite the short-run opportunities created by this political volatility, the long-
run interests of merchants were in stable government that enforced contracts and maintained 
peace. Much has been made in existing literature about the importance of institutions and 
historical context in understanding merchants and trade. Avner Grief describes merchant 
behaviour in terms of a “fundamental problem of exchange.”150 The security of contracts, and the 
various methods used by agents of trade to negotiate trade ex ante, and to enforce agreements ex 
post, is the basic problem of merchants. The possible ways of solving this fundamental problem 
are legion, but divide roughly into two groups: formal institutions, which create legal barriers to 
contract breaking, and informal institutions, rules created among merchants without state 
sanction.  
Colonial Period 
Trade in the mid-19th century underwent a transition between two ages with markedly 
different characteristics.151 The first was the trade model of the 18th century, when commerce 
both within the periphery and between the peripheral and core countries was highly restricted, 
and conducted primarily by closed groups: chartered monopoly companies, privileged merchant 
guilds, and densely woven ethnic trading networks. These groups, by necessity, restricted 
entrepreneurship and enforced strict organizational forms on trade and investment. Their 
revenues came from their control over restricted commerce, rather than from the creation of new 
patterns of production and trade. The imperial powers of the late 18th century guarded their trade 
carefully, and conducted exchange along the lines of a quasi-military competition for dominance 
over particular regions, routes, and trades. Because of the nature of the competing imperial 
systems, ethnic and national organization was the rule rather than the exception. 
The age of revolutions and the emergence of Britain as the hegemonic naval power 
progressively undermined this top-down model of trade organization. The mid-19th century was an 
age of increasingly free trade, both at the policy and organizational level. The markets of Europe 
reduced their formidable tariff barriers, allowing peripheral countries freer access to the largest 
markets in the world. The collapse of rigid systems of imperial preference removed direct trade 
restrictions. If tariffs were set at high levels, as they often were in peripheral countries, this was 
largely for revenue purposes rather than in service of corporate interests. In this environment, 
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small, flexible partnerships of merchants dominated the landscape. They competed with one 
another, using information, pricing, and marketing to maximize profits, rather than relying on 
membership in oligopolies supported by imperial power.  
This transition was not a smooth evolution, but neither was it the product of one 
instantaneous shock. That the old imperial systems collapsed and did not return does not imply 
that the power structures that supported them disintegrated overnight. Rather, the new order 
was contested by the remnants of the old, as well as by formerly marginalized groups, including 
foreign merchants. These new commercial immigrants had a particular role to play in the 
development of a new political order. They acted as financiers and suppliers of arms and 
provisions, as economic advisers to governments, and as bridges to foreign (mostly European) 
countries, with their technology, capital, and markets. They themselves had interests in the results 
of this transformation. These took the form of general class interests in the creation of a strong 
legal state, able to support the enforcement of property rights and to mediate conflicts. As 
merchants moved beyond being trade intermediaries and became entrepreneurs and capitalists in 
the broader sense, they increasingly needed a reliable, codified, contract-based legal system, 
beyond what interpersonal reputation could provide. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that merchants’ interests were only in the 
general development of reliable contracting institutions. Individuals or groups of merchants also 
stood to gain or lose from the ascendancy of particular political factions. While merchants had 
some ability to stand above the fray, there were lucrative opportunities that could be exploited, at 
the risk of becoming tangled in political and military conflicts. In some ways, these two sets of 
objectives were connected, albeit in a chaotic and unpredictable way.  States formed only slowly 
in Latin America, and through a turbulent and violent procession of revolutions, dictatorships, 
coups, and foreign wars. Without access to the support offered by merchant capital, states could 
not maintain order, as their fiscal powers were outstripped by their short-run needs. The search 
for political leadership that would support the needs of merchants was tied in with this struggle.  
For Spanish America, this was particularly pronounced. Trade was controlled by the 
merchants’ guilds, the consulados de comercio.152 Traditionally, trade was restricted to Cádiz, 
which was, by the authority of the Spanish crown, the only port allowed to trade with the empire. 
Towards the end of the colonial period, including the entire period of settlement in the Banda 
                                                          
152 Adelman, Republic of Capital, 28. 
70 
 
 
Oriental, these restrictions were increasingly relaxed. A system of comercio libre, imperial free 
trade, had been adopted, allowing Spanish merchants to trade at any Spanish-controlled port. 
Despite the name, this was not free trade as would have been understood in the 19th century. It 
did not allow for foreign competition of any kind, which was still supressed in the name of the 
crown. Maintaining control over the silver trade was paramount, as mining was the lifeblood of 
the Spanish imperial fiscal system,153 although much of the empire provided its own finance 
through internal taxes on trade and consumption.154 The illegality of the trade prevented foreign 
merchants from operating directly in the ports, which constrained the scope for entrepreneurial 
transformation of the market. Enforcement was difficult, and smuggling was rampant,155 indicating 
that the formal institutions in place were far from impervious to penetration by merchants willing 
to take the risks.156 Nevertheless, the depth of the transformation was limited by the restrictive 
institutional structure in place throughout the empire.  
This system went into crisis with the collapse of Spanish Imperial authority, following the 
invasion of Spain by Napoleon and the resulting succession crisis. The particular way in which 
Spanish authority disintegrated, without having been initially forced out by a revolutionary 
movement, had important effects on the situation encountered by foreign merchants upon their 
arrival in the River Plate in the early 19th century. There remained a pre-existing social and 
economic structure dominated by a network of merchant elites who drew their power from 
membership in the old bureaucracies, the town cabildos and consulados. In the later years of the 
Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the dominance of peninsular Spanish merchants was 
counterbalanced by the Real Consulado de Buenos Aires, a corporation of merchant and 
landowner elites formed in the 1790s, representing local interests within the imperial trade 
system. As Rock points out, there was never any concept that the revolution would eliminate the 
existing structure of governmental ties between city and hinterland. 157 Key figures in the old 
power structure, such as Manuel Belgrano, emerged as the leaders of the post-independence 
order. 
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 Uruguay lacked the elaborate colonial power structures of the Viceregal capital, Buenos 
Aires. Nevertheless, it had a small elite, known in the historiography as the patriciado. This 
Montevideo-centred group was comprised largely of merchants, military officers, and landowners, 
along with the minor clergy and bureaucrats who maintained church and crown authority in the 
city.158 These were, in general, European migrants of relatively recent arrival, rather than 
aristocrats descended from ancient conquistadores, or Spanish nobility.159 While the old colonial 
population would be rapidly outnumbered by new migrants from Europe, both elite and plebeian, 
the influence afforded by their early positions of power would allow their status to persist long 
after independence. 
The crisis of independence offered substantial opportunities for entrepreneurship, as 
foreign merchants substituted themselves in the role of trade intermediaries, displacing the old 
Spanish elite.160  They remade the existing economic structure by introducing new products, 
reorganizing trade, managing finance, and engaging in local production.  However, in the early 
years of independence, the productive rural base, with its low-cost, high-value output of hides, 
was still under the control of local landowners. This entrenched group, with its region-specific 
knowledge and established social structures, rapidly gained predominance in the governance 
structures that sprang up following independence. These factors made local elites important 
contacts for foreign merchants looking to establish themselves in the newly-opened local markets. 
The merchants worked alongside the creoles remaining in positions of local, if no longer imperial, 
power. Integration into existing elite networks provided suppliers for export commodities, as well 
as access to influence and information. Contacts were a critical element in merchant strategy, and 
they provided a competitive advantage for the merchants who most successfully pursued elite 
connections.  
However, the collapse of Spanish authority did not only create economic opportunities. It 
also enabled a different kind of entrepreneurship, pursued by local elites, in reconfiguring the 
patterns of state authority. When the system collapsed, the Spanish institutions that governed it 
evaporated, leaving open the possibility for new institutional and economic configurations. In this, 
local elites used merchants as key allies, as they had privileged access to credit, due to their 
accumulated capital, their connections with transatlantic trade channels (including “parent” 
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houses in Europe in some cases), and their reputation. With short-run needs often being acute due 
to unpredictable warfare, blockades, coups, and revolts, elites needed merchants for credit, which 
in turn they needed to match irregular revenues to expenditures, and to consolidate (or contest) 
political power in competition with other elite groups. In this competition, merchants could be 
drawn into extending funds to one side or the other on the basis of their social networks.  
 The sovereign state of Uruguay did not come into existence until 1828, with the treaty of 
Montevideo, negotiated by Britain between Brazil and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. 
The term “Uruguay” will be used to denote the Uruguayan state after 1828, strictly titled the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay (República Oriental del Uruguay).  The term “Banda Oriental,” or 
eastern bank, denotes the geographical region east of the Río Uruguay, with its inhabitants called 
“Orientales.” This region historically includes some territories north of the current Uruguayan 
borders, the so-called “Uruguayan missions,” initially of the Jesuit/Guaraní reducciones, although 
these were ceded to Brazil in 1852, Artigas’s Liga Federal was a loosely associated federation of 
regions of the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, comprising Uruguay, and several adjacent 
provinces of modern Argentina, notable for their rejection of the congress of Tucumán. For the 
area eventually known as Argentina, the first post-independence state was the United Provinces of 
the River Plate (Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata), occasionally referred to as the Argentine 
Republic (República Argentina). Argentina under Juan Manuel de Rosas usually referred to itself as 
the Argentine Confederation (Confederación Argentina). 
 Throughout the colonial period, the Banda Oriental was a borderland between the 
Portuguese Empire in Brazil, and the Spanish Viceroyalty of La Plata. The region changed hands 
between the two colonial powers regularly. Montevideo and the territory that would become 
Uruguay stood at the periphery of this colonial system. The first city to be established in that 
region was Colonia do Sacramento, a small port on the Río de la Plata opposite Buenos Aires, 
founded by the Portuguese in 1680. It was little more than a smuggling port, used to evade 
Spanish commercial restrictions and to take advantage of direct commerce with the coastal 
areas.161 Imperial Spanish influence was not strong in what was a marginal, border region of the 
Viceroyalty. Montevideo had been founded in 1724, as a military rather than commercial or 
administrative centre, intended to do little more than harbour the fleet and deter Portuguese 
expansion.  Features that typified the Spanish imperial system elsewhere in Latin America, 
including a strong Catholic Church presence, were notably absent.  
                                                          
161 Alberto Zum Felde, Proceso Histórico del Uruguay (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1963), 31-2. 
73 
 
 
The hinterland remained sparsely populated, except by the great herds of wild cattle that 
formed the basis for the rural economy of the region. In his classic interpretation, Zum Felde 
named this era the “edad de cuero,” the age of leather, as the exploitation of the stocks of wild 
creole cattle was the predominant economic activity in the countryside, to the near exclusion of 
any other.162 There were substantial rents to be captured in exploiting the natural resource of wild 
cattle at very low cost in capital or labour. However, this gave little incentive for development, 
either in institutions or in capital intensity. Despite not having a frontier in the strict sense, the 
north of Uruguay was, from a European perspective, largely bereft of property rights either in land 
or in livestock.163 A local rural militia, the Blandengues, was used to maintain control of the region 
and to keep the balance of power with the indigenous peoples, the charrúa. There was a small but 
mobile rural population, who would later form the core of local resistance against Spain, Portugal 
(and Brazil), and Buenos Aires. They gave their support to local caudillos to resist the fiscal and 
legal encroachment of the colonial powers, or of the centralizing states, in the chaos following the 
breakup of the Spanish empire. However, the Banda Oriental was not entirely underdeveloped. By 
the late colonial period, the littoral region northwest of Montevideo had become a relatively 
prosperous area for the production of dried and salted hides, and the first experimentation with 
meat processing in the form of tasajo (dried beef) production.  
The Invasion of 1807 
 The first major encounter between Britain and Montevideo was in the wake of the 1807 
occupation of Montevideo, under the command of Brigadier General Sir Samuel Auchmuty. The 
invasion was not as much a part of a larger attempt to take control of the Río de la Plata region 
from Spain, so much as a target of opportunity. The attack was at least in part motivated by the 
perceived commercial possibilities of the region. Sir Home Popham had been an enthusiastic 
advocate of seizing parts of Spanish America during the course of the Napoleonic wars.164 When 
given a chance in the form of a sufficient naval force under his command at Cape Town in 1806, he 
directed his forces to attack the Río de la Plata, sending troops to both Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo. While both cities were taken, the invasion ultimately resulted in failure due to defeat 
at Buenos Aires. Santiago de Liniers, commanding a local militia, repelled the British occupying 
forces in August 1807, prompting a withdrawal from the region.  
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The expedition at Montevideo was more successful, with Auchmuty’s troops taking and 
holding the city for six months. General John Whitelocke was sent to take command of British 
forces in the region, and to administer the area.165 During that relatively brief period the British 
established the first newspaper in Uruguay, The Southern Star (Estrella del Sur), in order to 
convince the local populace of the advantages of British rule.166 However, the newspaper ceased 
to operate on the withdrawal of British troops, and no English-language newspaper would be 
published again until the 1840s.  
Much has been made of this initial contact, describing the region’s enthusiastic uptake of 
the manufactured goods of the British industrial revolution. Some have seen this as the 
introduction to more extensive import penetration later in the century, 167 others as a short-lived 
boom followed by general disillusionment.168 The value of this expedition as a marketing tool per 
se should not be exaggerated. British goods had been re-exported to the region from Spain, or 
smuggled in via Brazil, prior to 1807. Spanish control over trade was far from absolute during the 
colonial period. While it is difficult to establish any definite value or volume for contraband, the 
general magnitude is demonstrated by the suggestive changes in trade destinations for British 
goods sent to Latin America, but with little overall change in levels, noted by Llorca-Jaña.169 This 
implies substantial re-exports from British possessions in Latin America into the Spanish Empire, 
which were then sent directly once trade opened up in the wake of independence. The possibility 
of doing business directly in Montevideo, and using the port to access the isolated markets of the 
interior without Spanish intermediaries was tempting, sparking interest on the part of merchant 
houses, whose first direct operations in the region began in this period. 
By 1809, there were fifty British residents in Montevideo, perhaps remaining after the 
invasion.170 This was the beginning of a dramatic expansion in British involvement in the city, still 
in its infancy, but rapidly increasing through the 1820s and 1830s. By 1860, there were over 
twenty times as many British residents in the country. However, this still represented only a tiny 
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fraction of the population.171 There was never a large immigrant British community beyond the 
population of merchants and their dependents. This lack of an immigrant population contrasts 
notably with the Spanish, Portuguese, and French, all of whom had large groups of citizens in 
Uruguay, giving them a direct, non-commercial interest in preserving their rights and privileges. 
For the British, Uruguay was an entrepôt, but not a destination for emigrants. 
The chaos of the first post-independence years coincided with the initial entry of British 
traders directly into the markets at Montevideo. However, the pressing questions of political, fiscal 
and military control over the various provinces of the former provinces of the Viceroyalty of the 
Río de la Plata were, in the main, out of the hands of British merchants. The 1806-7 invasion of the 
Río de la Plata represented an early but unrepresentative attempt to establish direct control over 
the region, explained by the larger context of the Napoleonic wars, and of the military 
opportunism of Sir Home Popham, rather than a larger imperial plan. Direct British interests in the 
region were still small. Had the invasions been more successful, it might have been conceivable 
that British influence in Uruguay would have been more direct, in the form of colonization or a 
protectorate, as envisioned by Popham. With the defeat of the invasion, however, more pragmatic 
interests prevailed, as they would throughout the century. British interests in the region remained 
informal. 
Artigas and the Patria Vieja 
 The invasions of Buenos Aires and Montevideo were an important step in a larger, ongoing 
process: the disintegration of the Spanish Empire. Napoleon’s conquest of Spain in 1808 led to a 
crisis of legitimacy, which in turn led to the devolution of authority to the towns. The crisis of 
sovereignty was also an opportunity to re-create and renegotiate relationships, including the 
boundaries of polities, the constitution of political authority, and the relationship among social 
classes.172 This struggle was fought not only between the forces of independence and the Spanish 
colonial authorities, but increasingly, between cities and hinterlands, between elites and popular 
classes, and among regions. The vacuum of power left by the collapse of Spanish authority had led 
local elites to assert their power. The stakes of the political and military struggle were high. No 
single group was powerful enough to consolidate power and establish a monopoly of force, and 
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so, the region devolved into chaos. Buenos Aires became the centre of resistance to Spanish rule, 
whereas Montevideo became the holdout of colonial authority in the Río de la Plata. 
The interior of the Viceroyalty devolved into a chaos of rural uprisings, with regional 
caudillos raising irregular armies to challenge the social and political order. For the case of the 
Banda Oriental, the predominant rural insurgent leader was José Gervasio Artigas, whose 
successes and failures did much to shape the eventual shape of states in the region. Born in 
Montevideo to an elite family of ranchers, Artigas was a member of the Blandengues, and fought 
against the British during the 1807 invasion. He developed a reputation as a capable and inspiring 
leader among the rural population of the Banda Oriental, to the extent where many were willing 
to follow his army into “exodus,” in Entre Ríos following the seizure of Montevideo by the 
Portuguese.173 Artigas opposed the (re)-establishment of centralized control, be it from Spain, 
Portugal, or Buenos Aires, all of whom he fought at various points during the 1810s. To this end, 
he established the liga federal, a loose federation of regional powers along the littoral, and in the 
Banda Oriental. Artigas espoused a program of federalism, egalitarianism, and “popular 
sovereignty,” a radical republicanism that set him apart from the oligarchical liberals of Buenos 
Aires.174 While this program gave his movement the broad, popular appeal that allowed him to 
briefly become the “protector” of a large multi-state alliance, it also alienated elites in 
Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Río de Janeiro. As the political climate shifted in the course of the 
1810s, Artigas came into conflict with the revolutionary elites of Buenos Aires. His allies in the liga 
federal found it easier to bargain with the increasingly powerful United Provinces rather than fight 
the former capital. 
 By 1816, the political situation had become untenable for Artigas and his movement. Brazil 
had become increasingly alarmed over the existence of a radicalized, Republican insurgency on its 
southern border. They also saw a chance to settle disputes over the territories of the “Uruguayan 
missions,” in modern Río Grande do Sul, which had been traded back and forth by Spain and 
Portugal during the 18th century. The conflict between the Liga Federal and Buenos Aires had 
politically and militarily divided the credible counter-threats to a Brazilian invasion. Artigas found 
himself without powerful allies, and in 1816, the Banda Oriental was invaded by Brazilian troops. 
For four years, Artigas fought an increasingly desperate guerrilla war in the countryside, but was 
eventually defeated at the battle of Tacuarembó, after which he sought asylum in Paraguay, 
                                                          
173 Tulio Halperín Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin America (London: Duke University Press, 1993), 
53. 
174 Frega, “La virtud y el poder,” 103. 
77 
 
 
where he lived out the rest of this life in exile. With the defeat of Artigas, the Liga Federal 
crumbled, and the first independence of Uruguay, the Patria Vieja, ended. 
The 1820s were an optimistic and interventionist period for British interests in Latin 
America. Uruguay played its part in this process, as a potential Britain-friendly entrepôt into the 
Río de la Plata markets. The overall phenomenon is larger, however. It reflected the enthusiasm 
generated by the end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, and the possibilities opened up by the 
independence of Latin America. The popular understanding, as reflected in the bullish rhetoric of 
Lord Canning, was that independence would bring liberality and prosperity to the region. There 
was a large but ephemeral boom in loans to the region, both in sovereign debt and private 
investment.175 Uruguay could only participate in the 1820s capital boom as the Cisplatine province 
of Brazil, and therefore did not take on its own sovereign debts, yet the basic pattern of increasing 
exposure to the international economy held for Uruguay.176  
British mediation in the Brazilian-Argentine war by Lord Ponsonby reflected this high point 
of region-shaping influence, leading to the creation of Uruguay as a buffer state. But by the end of 
the 1820s, the spectacular investment boom had come crashing down. With widespread defaults 
and on-going chaos in Latin America, Britain retreated to a more cautious, introverted policy 
towards Latin America, doing little to intervene in regional affairs. Despite the withdrawal of 
formal influence, British merchants continued to find and exploit opportunities for trade and 
investment in Uruguay, both in the real economy, and in financing the new government during the 
recurrent foreign and civil wars. 
Cisplatine Period 
 Brazilian rule followed the surrender of Artigas in 1820. Integration into Brazil as the 
Cisplatine province represented one possible future for Uruguay, looking forwards from the 
contingent and chaotic situation of the 1820s. However, despite this potentiality, it would be a 
mistake to suggest that the period of Brazilian domination represented a major change in 
institutional framework. General Lecor, the Brazilian governor of the Cisplatine province, refrained 
from systemic reform, preferring a conciliatory stance with local elites and customs. Given the 
constant upheaval, the de facto was of more importance than the de jure in determining law, 
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government, and trade at Montevideo.  One contemporary observer suggested that despite the 
fact that a “constitution and code of laws has been given by the Brazilian government,” local 
interests and customs were strong enough that the law was a matter of “expediency and 
conciliation,” and that under Lecor local institutions were “permitted to go on in the old way,” so 
as not to disrupt the transition of power. Thus, British merchants adapted to Brazilian rule much 
the same as to independence during the time of Artigas. The port remained a promising, yet little 
developed, outpost for British trade in the region. 
Despite its marginal status, the attempt to maintain Montevideo as a free port, outside 
the control of either Brazil or Argentina, appears to have been an objective of British foreign policy 
in the region in the 1820s. However, the Foreign Office appeared unwilling to spend substantial 
resources on the Río de la Plata.177 The only two instances of direct military action, the abortive 
1806-7 invasion, and the 1845-49 Anglo-French intervention, were both rapidly withdrawn and the 
key decision makers disowned by the Foreign Office. There were approximately ten British 
merchant houses in Montevideo in 1825, a number which did not suggest large commercial 
interests, when compared with the larger firm densities observed in Buenos Aires and in 
Montevideo later in the period.178  
Nevertheless, there were real British commercial interests in keeping Montevideo as an 
alternative to Buenos Aires, as more was expected from the future development in of the region, 
both in Uruguay and the interior. Montevideo remained a promising point of entry. A report by 
Thomas Samuel Hood, the British consul at Montevideo in 1824 suggested several features of the 
River Plate trade which continued throughout the period. He emphasized the importance of 
Montevideo as a port for transhipment to Buenos Aires and the Argentine interior, the influence 
of unpredictable political swings in Buenos Aires in determining the fate of Montevidean trade, 
and the role of the small port of Colonia de Sacramento further west upriver for smuggling 
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contraband in and out of Uruguay. Hood also made a prediction that Montevideo would become a 
major commercial centre, should it remain free from civil wars and the baneful influence of 
political entanglement with Buenos Aires. 
“Should the Brazils succeed in establishing its independence [from Buenos Aires] without further 
internal convulsions, and by salutary laws be enabled to keep this province tranquil, there can be 
no doubt that it will rise rapidly into commercial importance and be highly worthy of commercial 
consideration.”179   
This which would become a refrain for British observers of the region throughout the 19th 
century, a guardedly optimistic prediction of tremendous regional potential, but contingent on a 
peaceful resolution to the on-going internal conflicts. 
 The political and military situation in Uruguay did not stabilize under Brazilian rule. 
Supporters of the independence of the Banda Oriental from Brazil rallied in Buenos Aires, from 
whence they organized to foment a rebellion in Uruguay. In April 1825, the treinta y tres 
Orientales (thirty-three Uruguayans) disembarked to liberate Uruguay from Brazil, and declare its 
allegiance to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Both their leader, Juan Lavalleja, and 
second in command, Manuel Oribe, would go on to become important caudillos during the early 
years of Uruguayan independence. Their forces, though initially small, gained support among 
other local caudillos such as Fructuoso Rivera. They had some initial success against the Brazilian 
occupiers, which convinced the uncertain government in Buenos Aires to side with the treinta y 
tres, possibly hoping to reunite the territories of the former viceroyalty. The United Provinces 
declared war on Brazil, leading to a larger conflict between the two countries.180 These events 
would have severe consequences for both countries. In the United Provinces, they caused the 
downfall of the liberal Rivadavia government in Buenos Aires, and the ascent of the Federalist 
Party, and eventually the Rosas dictatorship.  In Brazil, the war became one of several major crises 
leading to the abdication of Dom Pedro I. British negotiation between the two parties of a peace 
guaranteeing the independence of Uruguay as a buffer state between the two belligerents. 
Ponsonby and the Treaty of Montevideo (1828) 
 The resolution of territorial disputes between Brazil and the United Provinces of the River 
Plate became a diplomatic goal for the British government, which had an interest in maintaining 
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both peace and open trade. British merchants had substantial dealings in both countries. Trade 
with Buenos Aires and Montevideo fluctuated enormously from year to year, with the value of 
British exports to the two ports reaching a high of £1,142,000 in 1824, and crashing to merely 
£155,000 in 1827, and remaining at or around £700,000 per year in the subsequent decade, 
accounting for just under 2% of total British exports by value. The area was an emerging market in 
which the future role of Britain was not yet fixed. Brazil, meanwhile, received between 6 and 9% of 
British trade during the period. Taken together, the warring parties represented nearly a tenth of 
the market for exported goods, not counting those re-exported from British possessions in Latin 
America. 181  This was doubly true for textiles, which were the predominant export to the region.  
Both sides of the conflict were indebted to Britain. Buenos Aires especially financed its war 
with Brazil with the proceeds of the £1,000,000 in bonds issued on the London market. The more 
money was spent fighting costly wars over marginal territories and the greater the impediment to 
trade and economic growth, the less likely it was that the bondholders would be paid back. This 
fear turned out to be entirely justified, as the Argentine government defaulted in July 1827, and 
no agreement would be reached for three decades, until 1857.182 Brazil had issued £3,200,000 in 
bonds on the London market. While Brazil never defaulted during this period, the war with Buenos 
Aires cost the Empire a considerable sum, leading to widespread inflation, and increasing the risk 
of default.183 Whichever side won, it was clear that British merchants and investors both stood to 
lose from a protracted conflict. 
Possession of both sides of the Río de la Plata by any one power would potentially 
compromise commercial access, whereas favouring one side over the other would be a violation of 
neutrality. Montevideo provided an overseas port that merchants could use alongside or in 
substitute for Buenos Aires. An independent Uruguay also diminished the vulnerability of British 
trade to potential competitors. Both France and the United States had made inroads in the region. 
France especially represented a potential threat due to the possibility of military intervention. An 
alliance between France and one or another of the regional powers might have cut off access to 
interior markets.184 Given the substantial French migration to Montevideo, and the later alliance 
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between France, Rivera, and the Unitario exiles, this was not an unreasonable fear given the 
chaotic circumstances. Had events transpired differently, British interests might have been 
compromised. It was in anticipation of these potential problems that the British Foreign Office 
sent Lord John Ponsonby to mediate the end of the Brazilian-Argentine war. As for the question of 
what to do about the Banda Oriental, Britain supported the creation of an independent state in 
the Banda Oriental to act as a buffer between Brazil and Buenos Aires. Although there was 
discussion both at the time and throughout the 19th century of making Uruguay (or Montevideo 
alone) a formal colony, independent Uruguay was a less expensive solution, one without costly 
defence obligations.185 
Oribe and Rivera (1830-1838) 
 The first years under the new Uruguayan constitution were turbulent. Montevideo 
remained essentially a city-state, with little control of the hinterland except via the support base 
of the caudillos. Alliances between the urban political elite of Montevideo and rural caudillos 
would be typical of Uruguay prior to the 1870s, since neither group could govern alone, absent a 
consolidated central state with fiscal and military powers. After the treaty of Montevideo, Uruguay 
came into existence as a de jure state. However, there was not by this point any clear idea of what 
the Uruguayan state was to be, or by what political arrangement it was to be governed. There was 
a pre-existing locus of power in Montevideo, not only due to the port, but also because the city 
was the only administrative centre with urban elites capable of organizing the formation of a state. 
What areas exactly constituted Uruguay, and whose voices would be heard in its political system, 
was constantly contested among caudillos, doctores, and ever-shifting constellations of regional 
and foreign powers.  
In the elections of 1830, the first presidency went not to Lavalleja, the leader of the 
insurgency against Brazil, but to Rivera. The latter allied himself with the “five brothers,” Nicolás 
Herrera, José Ellauri, Lucas Obes, Julián Alvarez, and Juan Andrés Gelly, Montevidean political 
elites who had been closely connected with both the resistance against Spain during the struggle 
for independence and the Brazilian government of Lecor during the Cisplatine period.186 With this 
urban/rural alliance, one political group was formed, which would be later known as the Colorado 
party, whose influence was drawn from Rivera’s rural support base, and a majority of the 
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intellectual and administrative elite in Montevideo. In opposition to this alliance were those loyal 
to Lavalleja, and to the project of the treinta y tres, who supported closer integration with the 
federalist state under construction in the United Provinces.  
Years of intermittent insurgency followed the election of Rivera to the presidency. The 
power struggle between the two caudillos dominated the period prior to 1835. In 1832, uprisings 
broke out in both Montevideo and in the countryside against Rivera’s presidency. By 1833, 
Lavalleja and his supporters were in open revolt,187 and by 1834, the Riverista faction had defeated 
Lavalleja, driving him into exile in Brazil. To maintain a semblance of democratic order, Rivera 
stepped down, although almost immediately became Commander-General of the Countryside, a 
quasi-presidential position created in frank recognition of his importance in maintaining internal 
peace and defending the country’s ill-defined borders. Lavalleja, for his part, had made enemies in 
his insurgency against Rivera, and so theLavalleja faction put forward a candidate from the old 
treinta y tres: his second in command, Manuel Oribe, who came to power in 1835. He was a 
popular and moderate candidate, elected unanimously with the support of Lavalleja, and the tacit 
consent of Rivera. His presidency focused on building institutions in the nascent state, 
emphasizing the necessity of order and effective administration. 
Montevideo, during this time, was host to a large community of exiles from Argentina, 
mostly Unitario soldiers and ideologues. Uruguay was a place of refuge for political and military 
elites out of favour or out of power across the river, with Buenos Aires serving the same function 
for Uruguay. The two cities were ideal staging grounds for reorganizing, disseminating 
propaganda, and plotting revolution, as the treinta y tres had during the Cisplatine period. For his 
part, Oribe was sympathetic with the Federalist cause, and cultivated close relations with the 
government of Rosas in Buenos Aires. This caused tensions with the Argentine exiles, especially 
when Oribe used his authority to close down anti-Rosas newspapers publishing from 
Montevideo.188 Oribe also pressed to restrict the powers granted to Rivera as Commander-General 
of the Countryside. Both groups had their grievances with Oribe, and thus, were enthusiastic when 
France decided to resolve its trade disputes with the Rosas government by military force. The 
French sought regional allies, and Rivera responded in exchange for support.  
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The Guerra Grande, 1838-51  
The ongoing conflict between Oribe and Rivera became international in 1838, with the 
alliance among Rivera, the Argentine Unitario General Juan Lavalle, and the French, in order to 
overthrow Rosas. In 1837, Rivera and his followers rose up, and by 1838, had once again seized 
power in Montevideo, forcing Oribe to step down and accept exile in Buenos Aires. Support for 
Lavalle over Rosas was a secure policy for Rivera, so long as the war could be confined to the 
Argentine provinces. Economically, the French blockade of Buenos Aires redirected overseas trade 
to Montevideo, bringing prosperity and raising customs house revenues. However, by 1839, 
Lavalle had been dealt a series of defeats, and had adopted a cautious strategy of raising support 
in the Northern provinces, rather than proceeding directly to Buenos Aires. This strategy was 
disastrous: an attempted rebellion in the south of Buenos Aires province failed,189 Lavalle himself 
was killed and his armies defeated by Oribe (as Rosas’s general) in the interior, and the French 
lifted their blockade, partly due to its futility, and partly due to mounting British pressure.  Rivera 
tried to restore the status quo, declaring that he himself had no ambitions beyond the Banda 
Oriental, but to no avail. The defeat of the anti-Rosas alliance turned the military situation against 
Rivera.  
Oribe, meanwhile, had served for several years as a general under Rosas. When the 
opportunity arose, the Argentine Confederation supported Oribe’s claim as rightful president of 
Uruguay, and supported an invasion of Uruguay as auxiliaries of the Blancos.190 The lifting of the 
blockade at Buenos Aires was rapidly followed by the establishment of one at Montevideo by the 
navy of the Argentine Confederation under Admiral William Brown, and redirecting the entrepôt 
trade in the opposite direction. The war in Uruguay went poorly for the Colorado faction. In 
December 1842, at the battle of Arroyo Grande, Rivera was routed by Oribe, and forced to retreat 
to Montevideo. Oribe, meanwhile, did not press his immediate advantage, and instead besieged 
the city, a decision which would prove to have devastating consequences.  
Following Arroyo Grande, the lines were drawn outside the walls of Montevideo, and the 
siege began. It seems likely that Oribe assumed Montevideo could not hold out when 
disconnected from its hinterland. However, the “government of the defence” at it became known, 
scrambled to organize the defences of the city, led by Colonel Melchor Pacheco y Obes. Slaves 
were liberated in exchange for military service. Volunteer legions of immigrant groups were 
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formed, notably among the French, Italian, and Argentine communities. These militias were critical 
defending the city, as they represented not only the majority of the population, but also its best 
military expertise. The Italian legion included veterans of war of the farrapos in Río Grande do Sul, 
led by Giuseppe Garibaldi. Based on his experience, he was put in charge of what little naval force 
could be mustered, and sent raiding along the coast.191 To finance the war, the defence raised 
funds among local merchants through loans, tax farming, and the mortgage and sale of public 
property.192  
The result of this mobilization was that Oribe did not take the city, and so the war 
continued for two more years of skirmishing, both in the outskirts of Montevideo, and along the 
coast of the Río Uruguay. The situation of the besieged Colorados steadily deteriorated as they 
increasingly lost what little control they had over the countryside. Rivera, who had raised another 
army to campaign in the interior, was finally and decisively defeated by the Blanco and Federalist 
forces, commanded by Urquiza, at the battle of India Muerte in March 1845. The Argentine 
blockade of the port held strong, as the superior Argentine navy easily outgunned Garibaldi’s tiny 
squadron. Without support from outside, it appeared as if the city would fall to the Blancos.  
The most obvious potential sources of foreign support were the French and British. The 
threat of reincorporation into the Argentine Confederation, in violation of the 1828 treaty, was 
raised, and Britain was implored to intervene by the defence and its supporters. Earlier attempts 
by the diplomats José Ellauri and Florencio Varela, to convince the European powers of the 
urgency of intervention had fallen on deaf ears. Many merchants in Montevideo believed (or 
found it convenient to assert) that Lord Howden had given his word that Rosas would not be 
allowed to invade Uruguay without British retaliation. This muscular interpretation found support 
not only among merchants.  Commodore John Brett Purvis, commander of the British fleet at 
Montevideo, intervened repeatedly in the early days of the siege at the behest of British 
merchants. This was ostensibly to protect merchant property against war damages, but likely also 
to assist the defence of Montevideo, and to commit the Foreign Office to supporting their cause. 
The property involved in at least one notable incident belonged to the Lafone brothers, whose 
partisanship was notorious on both sides of the river.193 Purvis was widely criticized among Buenos 
Aires merchants for having supported the government of the defence, violating neutrality and 
                                                          
191 For information on Garibaldi’s participation in the guerra grande, see: David McLean, “Garibaldi in 
Uruguay: A Reputation Reconsidered,” English Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 451 (1998), 351-366. 
192 The methods used by the government to generate credible commitment during the siege, and 
merchants’ reactions, are examined in chapter 6. 
193 British Packet and Argentine News, Dec. 30, 1843. 
85 
 
 
prolonging the conflict. George Frederick Dickson, head of a Buenos Aires textile trading firm, 
wrote to his London branch that it was a “pity” that Purvis had ever come to the River Plate, as he 
has brought “ill will” upon Englishmen, and that so long as he maintained his presence, 
Montevideo held out hope for intervention.194  
The intervention divided the community of British merchants in the River Plate, with vocal 
advocates on both sides writing pamphlets and organizing interest groups to lobby the British 
government either for protection, or to maintain neutrality. Few British merchants liked Rosas’s 
personalist method of government, which was seen ruthless, bloody, arbitrary and xenophobic. 
Dickson, quoted above and clearly no anti-Rosas partisan, nevertheless wrote that he was “not 
altogether free from anxiety as to the way in which foreigners are regarded by our 
government.”195 However, Rosas also brought peace in Buenos Aires. Arbitrary government was 
better for trade than anarchy, and, given the constant chaos of the pre-Rosas period, was 
acceptable. Those merchants who disliked Rosas, or who preferred his enemies, took the opposite 
view, that Rosas should be overthrown rather than tolerated. This view was popular with those 
who had either substantial social connections to the Unitarian exiles, or had made relatively large, 
immovable investments in rural industry in Uruguay. 
 In 1845, Britain and France intervened diplomatically and militarily in the guerra grande, 
attempting to broker peace. Lord Aberdeen and Francois Guizot, foreign ministers for Britain and 
France respectively, agreed to intervene to preserve the independence of Montevideo, an 
intervention which ultimately lasted until 1849 (1850 in the case of the French). They sent a joint 
fleet, and a diplomatic mission composed of William Gore Ouseley for the British, and Baron 
Deffaudis for the French, to attempt to mediate. The intervention was meant to make peace 
between the forces at the Cerrito and the Defence of Montevideo, but in practice this meant 
dealing with Rosas and his representative, Felipe Arana, whose support for Oribe was critical to his 
war effort. What followed was several years of complex, often contradictory negotiations in which 
multiple missions, (Ouseley and Deffaudis, Howden and Walewski, Hood, Southern, Gore) each 
with their own set of perspectives and biases, negotiated at cross-purposes with the various 
factions in the region: the Uruguayan caudillos Oribe and Rivera, the government of the defence of 
Montevideo, Rosas the governor of Buenos Aires, and Urquiza the governor of Entre Ríos. 
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The optimism of the initial intervention quickly waned. It had been intended to provide a 
quick diplomatic victory to solidify and demonstrate the entente cordiale between Britain and 
France, rather than to support any particular group or to achieve any lasting strategic objective. 
Rosas was expected to submit to the show of force by the great powers, and the Uruguayan 
situation was assumed to be easily resolved. Neither of these things turned out to be the case. 
Comfortable with his domestic position, and perhaps thankful for the redirection of conflict away 
from Buenos Aires and towards Uruguay, Rosas was resistant in the face of the intervention, and 
pressed Oribe’s claim as president of Uruguay.   
The shallowness of Britain’s interests in the conflict is evidenced by the rapidity with which 
the correspondence between Aberdeen and Ouseley deteriorates over the course of the 
intervention from optimistic about a resolution, to alarm over the difficulties involved, and finally 
to a desire to simply end the intervention as soon as possible on good terms.196 Ouseley and 
Deffaudis, for their parts, interpreted their instructions broadly. They were accused of exceeding 
their brief on several occasions, out of apparent dislike of Rosas, and sympathy for the defenders 
of Montevideo. Lord Palmerston’s ascent to the Foreign Office in 1846 under Lord Russell 
increased the pressure for withdrawal. Whereas Aberdeen had carefully nursed the relationship 
with France, and had at least initial zeal for the intervention, Palmerston pursued different goals. 
He pressed Ouseley to conclude the intervention, and when he evaded such instructions, replaced 
him with Lord Howden, and later Henry Southern, giving orders to negotiate a treaty quickly, and 
withdraw the fleet. 
 One effect of the intervention was to redirect riverine trade from the interior provinces 
away from Buenos Aires and towards Montevideo. The merchants of Montevideo who had 
invested in the tax farming of government revenues did very well during this period. Rosas had 
closed the Paraná to trade, stranding ships in the interior, many of them holding British cargoes.197 
Ouseley and Deffaudis arranged for a “commercial” expedition to liberate these ships. The 
expedition amounted to an attempt to force open the rivers, and led to the only major combat of 
the intervention. A convoy of ships ascended the Paraná, and at Vuelta de Obligado, where Rosas’s 
forces had fortified a position, the ships fought briefly with Argentine forces, winning the battle, 
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and forcing the opening of the rivers to trade with the merchant convoy following in the wake of 
the fleet. 
 While this expedition has long been interpreted as futile, both on the British side, falling in 
line with the later change in British policy towards ending the intervention, and on the Argentine 
side, emphasizing the successful repulsion of Britain and France, David McLean has recently 
offered a reinterpretation of the expedition.198 From the perspective of the fate of the defence of 
Montevideo, and of the merchants who had invested in its success, it has several key strategic and 
commercial advantages. First, it encouraged trade from the interior towards Montevideo, directly 
through the rescued ships, and in the wake of the expedition. Second, it diverted the attention of 
Urquiza from the siege of Montevideo by altering the apparent balance of power, and causing him 
to withdraw his troops from the conflict, albeit temporarily.  
Third, and most importantly, it allowed the interior provinces to trade with Montevideo as 
a way to evade the fiscal control of Rosas. Urquiza himself encouraged trade via Montevideo, 
despite being nominally (although vacillatingly) loyal to Rosas.199 Rural products from the interior 
provinces had accumulated in great number due to the closing of the rivers, not only in Entre Ríos 
but also in Corrientes, Santa Fe, and even Paraguay, and the increase in trade following the 
expedition was considerable.200 The funds generated through customs house revenues would 
prove to be critical to the defence of the city, and this relied critically on the flow of trade. The 
increase in customs revenue, and its importance not only to the government of the defence, but 
also to the merchants and tax farmers of Montevideo, will be discussed further in a later chapter. 
However, it is worth noting that the tension between the interior provinces and Buenos Aires 
would lead to the alliance against Rosas, the end of the guerra grande, and the battle of Caseros, 
ending Rosas’s rule in Buenos Aires. Here, as in both earlier and later times, the existence of 
Montevideo as an alternative port was of decisive importance not only for Uruguay, but for the 
balance of power in the region. 
 The guerra grande continued after the withdrawal of the British and French fleets, ending 
in 1850. The loss of the European powers’ support was a double blow to the defenders of 
Montevideo, who had relied on the military provided by the blockade of Buenos Aires and the 
occasional reinforcement of their defences during the initial phases of the war, but also on the 
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redirection of trade through the Montevideo customs house to fund their efforts. A subsidy by the 
French government of 40,000 pesos monthly kept their war effort from collapsing entirely, but this 
fell well short of the extraordinary revenues generated from 1845-48, during the blockade.201 An 
attempt was made by Melchor Pacheco y Obes, one of the charismatic military leaders of the 
Defence, to procure support in Europe.202 While he was well-received, it made little difference to 
the war effort, and the situation became dire inside the walls of Montevideo.  
Just as the conflict appeared to have been decisively won by the forces of Oribe and Rosas, 
the negotiations of Andrés Lamas gained the support of Brazil for the Defence of Montevideo. The 
Brazilian Empire sent the Baron de Mauá to advance funds to the war effort. In secret, they 
negotiated a “triple alliance”203 among the Colorados, the Brazilian Empire, and Urquiza, who by 
the late 1840s had chosen to break decisively with Rosas over the issues of fiscal control and free 
navigation of the rivers. The three groups quickly reversed the military situation in Uruguay. Oribe, 
left without his auxiliaries from Entre Ríos, quickly surrendered. The armies of Urquiza and Brazil 
proceeded to march on Buenos Aires, where they defeated Rosas in the battle of Caseros, leading 
to his flight to exile in England.  
Between the Wars (1852-64) 
 The end of the guerra grande brought relative peace to Uruguay for over a decade. The 
alliances necessary to secure the victory of the Colorados led to a series of unequal treaties with 
Brazil, transforming Uruguay into a near-protectorate, dependent on Brazilian subsidies. Trade in 
tasajo with Brazil was restricted, but the movement of cattle across the border into Río Grande do 
Sul was not, the effect of which was to redirect cattle from northern Uruguay to saladeros in Brazil 
rather than towards Montevideo or the littoral. The borders of Uruguay were redrawn, with Brazil 
claiming much of the disputed northern territories.204  
 The guerra grande had left both Blancos and Colorados exhausted, disillusioned, and 
penniless. The phrase “ni vencidos, ni vencedores,” (neither victors nor vanquished) was inscribed 
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in the agreement between the parties on the 8th of October, 1851.205 This compromise was meant 
to end the bloodshed and recrimination following the long civil war, but also to acknowledge 
pragmatic reality that neither party had the strength remaining to establish control via military or 
political means. This period of low-conflict equilibrium led to a new political alignment known as 
fusión, a nationalist collaboration between the two parties. 206It was supported by the writings and 
political influence of doctores from both parties, notably Andrés Lamas for the Colorados, and 
Bernardo Berro for the Blancos. The “fusionistas,” as its advocates were known, sought to put 
aside the conflicts of the past, and to advance common Uruguayan interests against the perceived 
dominance of foreign powers during the guerra grande. This anti-party tendency was first pursued 
by Juan Giró following the end of the war, and more forcefully pursued under the presidencies of 
Gabriel Pereira (1856-60) and Bernardo Berro (1860-64). The government of Berro especially 
attempted an ambitious program to re-assert Uruguayan sovereignty over its own territory in the 
north, pressing property tax claims, imposing export duties on cattle, and insisting on the 
liberation of slaves. These measures were directed against the Brazilian ranchers who had come to 
dominate the area in the wake of the 1851 treaty with Brazil.207   
 Economically, the most important fact was the end of the civil war, which had depleted 
the stock of cattle, undermined any fiscal development, disenfranchised the landowning classes, 
and left both the countryside and Montevideo devastated. The return to pre-war levels of 
productivity would necessarily depend on the recreation of capital, mostly in the form of livestock. 
The local elite, with a handful of exceptions, had been left impoverished by the demands of war, 
due to forced loans, expropriation of lands, and the slaughter of cattle for military provisions. The 
large estates were purchased by foreign merchants, who became what has been called the new 
rural upper class (nueva alta clase rural).208 With access to capital and credit, and as the major 
creditors of both the Uruguayan government, and many local landowners, these merchant-
entrepreneurs were ideally poised to take advantage of the state of livestock and the low land 
values to remake the agricultural economy under their ownership. 
A nominal commitment to liberalism was insufficient to secure the allegiance of the 
merchant community. For those who had made loans to the government of the defence during 
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the siege, as well as an extensive list of foreign residents with claims for war damages, the 
government was still a misbehaving debtor. The spiralling debt of the 1850s, discussed in the next 
chapter, was a function of the impossible fiscal situation of the government, obligated to pay hard 
currency to their merchant creditors in quantities far exceeding their ability to pay under any 
plausible circumstances. As the nominal value of the debt soared, the questions for creditors 
became: How much would be repaid, and to whom? The resolution of war damages via the Anglo-
French commission of 1857 left some influential claimants, notably Samuel Lafone, with far less in 
recompense than was claimed.   
 Fusión, however, was only as long-lived as the economic devastation that inspired it. The 
governments of 1856-64 were confronted with the same precarious balance between internal and 
external forces as had existed since independence. The internal situation remained stable so long 
as conditions were dire, since nearly every group’s interests aligned in restoring rural production. 
But as people and livestock returned to the countryside, increasing property values, the contest 
over political control once again became urgent. State-building efforts required the assertion of 
national sovereignty over territory, and the suppression of caudillos and political parties as 
independent entities. The state, mired in impossibly large debts carried over from the war, 
remained far too weak to break the dependence on (and vulnerability to) caudillo influence.209 
National independence was a theory, and influential caudillos, a reality. Uruguay remained 
entangled in regional affairs, and support for a local caudillo on the part of regional allies was one 
of the strongest weapons in the conflict over political control.   
In order to mitigate the influence of Argentina and Brazil, Berro forged an alliance with the 
only remaining power: Paraguay. This proved a dangerous alliance, as both Brazil and Argentina 
were aligning against Paraguay. The ruling groups in both countries were uncomfortable with the 
increasingly militarized state, so close to fragile and insurgency-prone areas of their own countries. 
Argentina, emerging out of a decade of civil war between Buenos Aires and the interior, had 
unified under Bartolome Mitre after the Battle of Pavón in 1861. With internal peace secured, 
Buenos Aires once again turned its attention outwards to adjacent countries, as allies against 
internal enemies, or as potential threats. Mitre worried about Paraguay’s potential support for the 
Federalists in the fight against centralization, as had happened during the 1840s and 1850s.210 
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Brazil, for its part, was faced with the threat of being cut off from its own interior by increased 
fortifications of the river Paraguay, potentially blocking riverine access to Mato Grosso.211   
Flores and the Paraguayan War (1864-70) 
The period of relative peace under the “fusión” governments ended in 1863, with the 
revolution of the Colorado caudillo Venancio Flores. The pact of “fusión” between the parties had, 
in the end, turned out to be little more than a treaty of convenience, representing mutual 
exhaustion more than a governing coalition. Flores made use of the undercurrents of partisanship 
to revitalize Colorado resistance to the rule of Bernardo Berro who, despite strict personal 
adherence to the fusionista philosophy, was still associated with his former Blanco allegiances. 
Flores agreed to an alliance with Argentine president Bartolome Mitre. The affinity between Flores 
and Mitre had its roots in earlier conflicts, with Mitre serving under Rivera during the guerra 
grande,212 and Flores fighting for Mitre against Urquiza during the Argentine civil wars of the late 
1850s.213  
This returned the Mitre-friendly Colorados to power. It also served as the spark for the 
Paraguayan war, as the alliance between the Blancos in Uruguay and the Lopez government led to 
Paraguay declaring war on Brazil. In turn, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (now under Flores) 
declared war on Paraguay. The result was the War of the Triple Alliance, also known as the 
Paraguayan War, the bloodiest conflict ever fought in South America. Despite losing over three 
thousand soldiers in the war, amounting to almost 1% of total population, Uruguay remained by 
far the smallest player in the conflict, and the furthest removed from the theatre of battle.  
Nevertheless, the influx of demand for supplying Argentine and especially Brazilian troops 
upriver augmented the riverine trade, creating a boom in Montevideo. From 1865-68, capital 
investment increased markedly, driven by the emergence of the banking sector, comprising a 
number of key players. Baron Mauá and his bank represented Brazilian imperial interests, and his 
own substantial wealth. The Mauá bank also organized the first foreign sovereign loan in 1864, to 
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be floated in London. This emission largely failed and very little of it was sold to the public.214 The 
Banco Comercial acted as the channel for the old merchant elite, funding its members’ substantial 
investments. The London and the River Plate Bank, established in 1862 in Buenos Aires, opened a 
branch in Montevideo in 1863.215 This was a free-standing banking company, the first direct British 
banking investment in the region, with George Drabble as director. Drabble was the most 
influential transitional figure, bridging the gap between the two career models: that of his early 
career, as a regionally-specialized merchant, and his later role managing investments as director of 
the London and River Plate Bank.  
The resulting investment boom led to economy-wide developments in infrastructure and 
industry. In 1864, the Liebig’s Extract of Meat Company was established.216 Their plant at Fray 
Bentos, built on the estancia and saladero of British merchant-estanciero Richard Hughes, was the 
first instance of foreign direct investment in industry in the region. An ambitious mining project, 
the Compañía de Minas de Oro de Cuñapirú was launched to exploit potential gold reserves in the 
north of Uruguay, although the project failed due to disputes between the miners and managers, 
and the imported machinery was left to rust.217 By the end of 1866, Montevideo had established a 
telegraph connection with Buenos Aires.218  Long-delayed plans for a railway finally came to 
fruition with the Ferrocarril Central del Uruguay in 1869. While construction was late to begin and 
slow to develop, it developed into one of the densest (and least economically useful) networks in 
South America.219These investments were spearheaded by an entrepreneurial group of both old 
merchants and new capitalists. In some cases, these were the same merchants who had made 
their fortunes in the early years after independence, and during the guerra grande. In others, they 
were the second-generation decedents of the former, including notable Anglo-Uruguayan 
entrepreneurs.220.  
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 By 1866, the flaws in this system were apparent. The Mauá bank was highly leveraged far 
beyond its legal reserve requirements. It was also heavily exposed to government debt. As a 
financier working at an international and transatlantic rather than national level, Baron Mauá had 
considerable resources to draw upon, but was also exposed to international crises. The 
government, as the major debtor of the bank, began to suspend convertibility in six month 
periods, starting in June 1866, to defend the Mauá bank following the Overend Gurney crisis of 
1866, which dealt the highly leveraged Mauá a heavy blow. 221 The fragility in the economic 
situation was mirrored in the political. Factionalism was rampant, and the state remained weak 
enough to be unable to enforce any particular order on the various groups contending for power 
in the city and countryside. The most devastating expression of this chaos took place on February 
19, 1868, when both Venancio Flores and Bernardo Berro were killed.  While there remains 
substantial mystery about the motivations for the killings, they reflect the general conditions in 
Montevideo of political infighting. In this atmosphere of debt and crisis, Lorenzo Batlle came to 
power as president, a Colorado strongman largely representing the interests of the intellectual and 
commercial classes of Montevideo. The state military, increasingly organized following the 
Paraguayan war, was increasingly active as a force independent of the established political 
parties.222 
By the late 1860s, many of the wealthiest foreign merchants had become landowners, 
with extensive holdings in the most valuable areas of the country around Montevideo and along 
the Uruguay river. Barrán suggests that persistent defaults by landowners in the context of high 
real interest rates and persistent economic instability led to creditors becoming landowners via 
repossession. 223 While this is a plausible mechanism for the initial transfer, it does not explain why 
creditors from the merchant class kept their repossessed landholdings, rather than selling them. 
Another possible explanation is that the periodic suspensions of convertibility drove merchants 
away from state finance and towards inflation-proofed investments in real estate, in much the 
same way as inconvertibility had done in Buenos Aires in an earlier period.224 A third, which will be 
explored in more detail in chapter seven, is that the wake of the guerra grande and the resulting 
impoverishment led to an entrepreneurial opportunity, since land was cheap, and livestock 
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depleted.  Whatever the cause, the result was increasing pressure on the part of influential 
merchants to extent property rights and the rule of law into the interior.  To obtain this, the 
merchants and capitalists of the city sought a strong government that would secure their 
economic interests.  
The Revolution of the Lances and the Rise of Latorre (1870-75) 
While many supported the Colorados in their state-building efforts, Batlle proved unable 
to provide the security they sought. The Blancos maintained a substantial following in the interior 
of the country, and could still raise armies to oppose control from Montevideo. Dissatisfaction 
with the Colorado government and its attempts to centralize power increased in the countryside. 
From 1870 to 1872, Blanco caudillo Timoteo Aparicio led a revolt against Batlle, known as the 
revolution of the lances. The Blancos won a series of victories, even managing to take and hold the 
fortress at the cerro on the outskirts of Montevideo. However, the slow modernization of the city 
increasingly contrasted against the crudely armed and poorly organized Blanco troops, and the 
government army was too strong to overcome with men on horseback, using tactics and weapons 
from decades earlier. Nonetheless, the government proved unable to defeat the Blancos 
decisively, and the conflict ended in a military and political stalemate.   
From that point until 1904, the Blancos and Colorados governed their respective spheres 
of influence, the former in the interior, and the latter concentrated around Montevideo and along 
the Río Uruguay below the salto. An electoral accord was reached between the two parties 
formalizing this arrangement. While this power sharing bargain brought peace to the countryside, 
it was a second-best solution. With investment portfolios that were becoming fixed in land, 
infrastructure, and industry, the old merchant class pressed for stable governance, sound money, 
and secure property. The country had gained access to European bond markets with the floating 
of a £3.5 million loan in 1871. The fiscal situation remained fragile, and the government remained 
unable to raise substantial sums in taxes except via the customs house.  This perennial weakness 
manifested once again in the financial crisis of 1873, an international banking panic originating 
with a stock market crash in Vienna, but quickly spreading to other markets, and causing a 
“sudden stop” in global capital flows to peripheral countries, as well as a collapse in trade.225 This 
shock collapsed government revenue and forced the state to default on its loans.  The 
governments of José Ellauri (1873-5) and Pedro Varela (1875-76) were idealistic “principista” 
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governments, comprised of urban intellectuals with weak bases of support. Without the funds to 
develop the state, or possessed of a popular following, they were brought down by the crisis.  
 Military rule was the result of several overlapping trends: the increasing interests of the 
capitalists of Montevideo in law and order; the deteriorating fiscal situation and economic crisis; 
the partisan conflict between the political parties. In 1876, Colonel Lorenzo Latorre, previously 
Minister of War, led a coup against the civilian government of Pedro Varela, and installed himself 
as a non-partisan dictator. In this, he was supported by three key groups: The professionalized 
army, of which he was a member, the liberal elite of Montevideo, and the landowners, with its 
vanguard merchant capitalists. The resulting coalition was at once conservative and modernizing, 
seeking to develop the economic infrastructure of the country, and at the same time reform 
Uruguayan political institutions, creating a liberal state resilient against the chaos that had 
doomed previous state-building efforts.226 The spread of the railroad network throughout 
Uruguay, which had been long-delayed, finally eroded the mobility advantage of the gaucho on 
horseback. The telegraph allowed for rapid communication between capital and countryside. 
Literacy advanced following the reforms of José Pedro Varela, establishing the beginnings of a 
common state system of schooling. Modernized weaponry, including firearms, increased the 
capital costs of effective resistance.  
With the dramatic changes of the 1870s, the era of the old overseas merchants was slowly 
coming to an end.  Among the British community, the old Uruguay hands who had come to the 
country in the 1830s, and who had played such a key role in the guerra grande and its aftermath, 
were coming to the end of their careers. Thomas Tomkinson, Richard Hughes, Samuel Lafone, and 
John Jackson had all constructed economic empires to pass on to their descendants.  Their 
interests had changed as they became less merchants than bankers, landowners and rural 
industrialists, and the following generations largely inherited these occupations, rather than 
commerce.  The of the landowning elite, which by the 1870s involved both the remaining 
Uruguayan landowners and the overseas merchant elite, all of whom had intermarried, forming a 
dense web of relationships with both Uruguayan and foreign elements. The establishment of the 
Asociación Rural as an industry pressure group had created a new locus for organizing and voicing 
the interests of this network.
                                                          
226 López-Alves, Between the Economy and the Polity, 45-6. 
96 
 
 
Chapter 4: Uruguay in Regional Context 
Although Uruguay was formally independent from 1828, its status relative to the surrounding 
territories was not a settled question. The area that is presently Uruguay was neither a pre-
existing region with a history of separate governance, nor did it have an obvious role relative to its 
neighbouring regions. Rather, Montevideo was one potential overseas port for the riverine 
provinces, well-positioned to compete with Buenos Aires and to serve the surrounding region as 
an entrepôt. However, it was only intermittently capable of exerting military and political authority 
over its surrounding territories, the borders of which were fluid. Regional and political factions led 
by caudillos, the Brazilian monarchy, as well as European powers vied to establish, or re-establish, 
dominion over the area. The Banda Oriental was not merely a field of conflict, but one potential 
locus of power among many, participating in the shifting network of alliances and factions among 
caudillos for political and economic control. 
 
 The economic objectives of conflict largely revolved around the fiscal importance of trade. 
In the Río de la Plata, even more than in most other areas of Latin America, taxes were extracted 
through tariffs at the port, to the near exclusion of other sources of revenue. The 19th century was 
an era of low state capacity and underdeveloped fiscal institutions, and as such, control over the 
ports was a “high stakes”227 political and military objective, of substantial importance for 
participating in the ongoing struggle for control over the larger region. It is in this context that the 
position of Uruguay, and especially the port of Montevideo, must be understood during and 
following the wars for independence, both from Spain in the 1810s, and Brazil in the 1820s. As an 
overseas port, it was a potential trade intermediary for the Río de la Plata region, most 
importantly for the littoral zone alongside the navigable parts of the Río Uruguay, below the salto 
grande. This region was the largest contributor to the growth of the hides trade, which was far and 
away the most important export of the whole zone.  
 
Montevideo was a better port, in terms of its natural characteristics than Buenos Aires or 
Porto Alegre, both of which suffered from natural barriers preventing the direct approach of 
ocean-going shipping. As such, Montevideo was a potential rival for emerging regional powers; 
whatever undermined dominance over trade, undermined fiscal revenues, and in turn, 
undermined military and political control. Buenos Aires had a political and administrative legacy as 
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the seat of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, and its elites directed their efforts towards centralizing the 
former colonial region under their own control. The existence of a separate seaport in Uruguay 
meant a competitor for international trade, reducing the extent to which administration in Buenos 
Aires could effectively tax the interior of the country, and introducing an unwelcome level of 
competition into an otherwise enviable position as sole trading port at the mouth of the Río de la 
Plata.  
 
In addition to impairing the monopoly on trade, and thus on the tariffs which were the 
fiscal lifeblood of the emerging state, the presence of Montevideo also encouraged alternative 
political and military configurations that escaped the domination of the former capital. Governors, 
caudillos, insurgents from the interior provinces and exiles from Buenos Aires, used Montevideo 
both as an alternative to Buenos Aires, and as leverage against attempts to bring them under 
control. Both Uruguay and Argentina had a strong fiscal interest in capturing the overseas trade 
with the interior. Buenos Aires had the stronger claim militarily and politically, and under the aegis 
of the Argentine Confederation, there existed a kind of proto-nation-state wherein the monetary 
and fiscal hegemony of Buenos Aires was precariously maintained. Montevideo, however, offered 
an alternative port for the use of the littoral provinces. So long as Uruguay remained independent, 
and free navigation along the rivers was permitted, there were soft limits on the revenue that the 
customs house at Buenos Aires could capture, passing the costs on to consumers in the interior. 
 
Merchants had two distinct sets of interests in this conflict, depending on their relative 
involvement with the Uruguayan government, and with the liquidity of their assets. For those who 
were predominantly involved in commerce, rather than finance or rural industry, the key 
questions were the accessibility of interior markets, and the tariff rates paid at the ports. British 
merchant trade was, in terms of imports, largely a textile trade, conducted at the ports rather than 
with the interior. Transport costs to the interior were high, and competition from indigenous 
producers remained substantial well into the 19th century.228 However, the production of hides 
flowing outwards through the ports represented interior demand, for which British textiles could 
be exchanged. Regardless of whether that value was captured at the port or in the interior, the 
free navigation of the rivers was necessary to bring its production to the Montevidean side. 
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There were also on-going conflicts with Brazil. Montevideo was a potential port for the 
interior of Brazil, with access as far north as Mato Grosso via the Río Paraná. The opening and 
closing of the River Plate waterways was therefore of direct interest to Brazil. Mostly, however, 
Brazilian interests concerned the ranchers of Río Grande do Sul. The northern departments of 
Uruguay are contiguous with this southernmost Brazilian province. Many landowners operated 
extensive cattle ranches on both sides of the border, and these cattle could be driven to saladeros 
either around Montevideo, or in Río Grande do Sul. There was also substantial concern over the 
stability of the region. Insurgencies and revolutionary movements, such as the Guerra dos 
Farrapos, suggested the potential for an independent state, or integration with Uruguay. 
Uruguayan caudillos such as Fructuoso Rivera both supported and sought support from local 
insurgents. Control of the frontier between the two countries was fluid, until the treaty in 1851. 
Even following the formal settlement of the border issue, there were de facto jurisdictional issues 
between the two countries until the end of the 19th century, as neither state had the capacity to 
establish permanent order in the frontier region.229 Disputes over law, taxation, and territorial 
control would cause conflicts between the two countries, and occasionally provided a casus belli 
for armed intervention. All these factors meant that Brazil maintained an active interest in its 
southern neighbour, even after losing control of it following the Cisplatine era.230 
 
The eventual conflict between Brazil and Argentina concerning the fate of the Banda 
Oriental involved British participation at several levels. Formal intervention came in the shape of 
official mediation by Lord Ponsonby, whose negotiations eventually led to the creation of Uruguay 
as an independent state.231 British sailors and officers also fought on both sides of the naval 
conflict. In addition to the Commodore (later Admiral) of the Argentine fleet, William Brown, 
British subjects comprised many of the officers and sailors on both sides, especially the 
Argentine.232  
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Economic Geography of Uruguay 
 
From the late colonial period until the present, Uruguay has been a country with one 
major city and a rural hinterland, with no other large or medium-sized cities. Montevideo has 
always stood at the centre of Uruguay’s economic geographical space. Since Montevideo is both 
the locus of most domestic consumption, as well as the point of export for a highly specialized 
pastoral economy, distance from the port is critical in understanding the functioning of the 
economy, the contours of trade, and especially the behaviour of rural investors.  
 
Uruguay has two main distinguishing characteristics that defined its role in the larger 
transatlantic economy. First, it is a land-abundant pastoral economy, with extremely low 
population density and a natural endowment of land suitable for pastoral farming, but largely 
unsuited to any other use available in the 19th century. Second, unusually for a pastoral primary 
producing region, it is located right next to the Atlantic Ocean. Uruguay occupies a relatively low 
transport cost zone along the littoral, where the basic processing of rural products (hides, tallow, 
salted beef and wool) could be profitably done due to riverine transport. The western parts of 
Uruguay, along the eastern bank of the Río Uruguay, were part of a larger zone of extensive 
ranching production that emerged in the last decades of Spanish rule, consisting also of the 
Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos, and the southern parts of Corrientes.233  
 
As will be discussed in chapter 6, British merchant-entrepreneurs expanded into the zones 
of production with the most potential for backwards linkages with their commerce. With neither 
banks nor a state capable of financing even the most basic investment projects, overseas 
merchants had an entrepreneurial advantage in having easy access to capital. They were able to 
draw credit from Liverpool and London, either via small-scale merchant banking, or by calling 
directly on parent firms. Making use of this comparative advantage in credit meant investing 
heavily in the capital-intensive production of export commodities. For Uruguay, this largely meant 
three activities: cross-breeding cattle for domestic meat production, enclosed sheep farming, and 
industrial cattle processing for export. The British merchant-entrepreneurs of Uruguay 
concentrated their activities in the southwest of the country, in the immediate region of 
Montevideo, and the smaller ports along the littoral of the Río Uruguay.  This stood in contrast to 
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the north, which had poorer transport links, and was sparsely populated with extensive cattle 
ranches. This region was economically and demographically dominated by Brazilian ranchers and 
their workers.234  
 
The productive uses of the rural landscape in Uruguay were shaped predominantly by the 
channels of transportation. Along the Río de la Plata and Río Uruguay, there had been intensive 
cattle processing operations dating back to the 1780s.235 These expanded and intensified with the 
introduction of technology and capital via the entrepreneurship of merchants, notably British at 
the technological frontier. Burgin gives a table of relative transport costs for rural products, 
showing the distance after which half a product’s price reflects the cost of transportation, relative 
to sale in Buenos Aires.236 Hides, the ubiquitous product the interior, had a transport ‘half-life’ of 
515 leagues, or approximately 2,500 km, whereas salt beef (tasajo or charque) would lose half its 
value in 95 leagues, just under one fifth of the distance. These costs created an incentive for dried 
and salted meat processing to cluster around the overseas ports, and along the rivers, to minimize 
transport costs. In the deep hinterland north of the Río Negro, there was little except extensive 
cattle ranching, as transport costs were prohibitive for any production that could not be driven on 
the hoof to a port for slaughter, or had extraordinarily high price to weight ratios, as in the case of 
dry hides. 
 
Soil quality also helped determine what products were suited to which regions. Unlike 
Argentina, with its expansive pampas, only small zones of Uruguay are particularly well-suited to 
crop agriculture. Near Montevideo, and in the bordering departments of Maldonado and 
Canelones, there was a relative concentration of land usage for intensive, high transport cost food 
production. Coincidentally, the zones of Uruguay with the most fertile soils, suitable for intensive 
agricultural production, happen to be located along the rivers. These were also the areas most 
densely populated by European migrants, even from relatively early on following independence. 
The processes involved in rural industry up until 1830 was basic, dating back to the colonial era. 
During the 1830s, however, the first major investments in large-scale saladero production of 
tasajo were made, notably by Samuel Lafone, who had opened his famous La Teja saladero by 
1840. Many others followed, along the outskirts of Montevideo and upriver. 
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Traditionally, British trade with Latin America has been seen as a relatively small overall 
part of British total trade, dwarfed by the much larger markets in Europe, the United States, and 
the Empire. The tone of the literature was set by D.C.M. Platt, when he wrote that Spanish 
America, after the transient boom of the 1820s, “could sell nothing to Europe, so that it could buy 
nothing in return,” and “retired over the edge of the periphery.”237 David McLean writes more 
recently, “… trade with the Plate, as with the whole of Latin America, was but a small part of 
Britain’s international commerce in the mid-nineteenth century.”238 Recent, detailed work 
reconstructing British trade statistics by Manuel Llorca-Jaña has given us a new perspective, 
showing that not only was Latin America not trivial as a market for British manufactures during the 
early 19th century, it was among the most important markets, absorbing more value of exports 
than the United States until the post-Civil War period.239 The part played by Uruguay in this 
broader pattern of trade is small on an absolute basis, accounting for approximately 0.5% of 
British trade, but a high value per capita, similar to Argentina.  
 
The institutional environment in the Banda Oriental from the late 1820s was very similar 
to that of Buenos Aires, as might be expected by the relatively similar social and economic 
structure of the two areas.240 The most important forces in the political economy of the new state 
were merchants and landowners whose interests were in maintaining the trade in commodities 
for manufactures. There was little impetus for extensive redistribution of power or property, as 
Artigas had attempted, but failed to achieve. A relatively exclusive liberalism was enshrined in the 
constitution of 1830. The resulting political system was oligarchical, with sharply limited 
suffrage.241 Slavery continued until 1842,242 although a treaty had been signed with Britain (though 
not ratified) abolishing the slave trade in 1825. Religious toleration was substantial, and increased 
throughout the 1840s during the height of the Anglo-French intervention, and of British merchants 
as government financiers.243  
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Economic institutions were relatively liberal, in regional context. Interest rates and prices 
were freed from colonial regulation as of 1838, although the default interest rate for otherwise 
unspecified debts was set at 12%.244 Tariffs were initially kept low relative to Buenos Aires, in 
order to compete for rents from trade intermediation. The Uruguayan interior lacked any 
domestic craft industry, and thus there was not even the Argentine Confederation’s limited 
federalist pressure for protectionism. Only the fiscal needs of the state put upward pressure on 
tariff rates. Public ejido lands were sold in times of fiscal emergency to private creditors, a practice 
which continued at least until the end of the 1840s.245  These reforms, even more favourable to 
merchant interests than in Buenos Aires, show the relative weakness of the Uruguayan state. It 
lacked even the relatively shallow fiscal basis of its Argentine counterpart, and was even more 
dependent on import tariff revenue, supplemented with borrowing from merchant lenders. 
 
Although slavery persisted in Uruguay until the 1840s, when slaves were liberated in order 
to be drafted into the armies of the Colorados, and later Blancos, the country was, in general, a 
difficult area for slave labour. Extraordinarily low population density imposed high monitoring and 
enforcement costs, and created incentives for escape. Persistent conflicts also increased the 
likelihood of liberation in order to fight in wars, reducing the viability of slave ownership as an 
economic proposition. The slave trade had been legally banned by treaties signed between Britain 
and Brazil 1825, and reaffirmed by the treaties signed during the second independence of Uruguay 
in 1828. However, the importation of slaves persisted under the guise of importing “colonos,” 
colonists from the Canary Islands. There was widespread use of slaves in and around Montevideo. 
Prominent British merchants used slaves as labour in proto-industrial activities and for household 
service. For example, Samuel Lafone employed both slaves and “colonos,” at his brickworks246 and 
in his household.247 It is suggestive that Samuel Lafone proposed a plan to the government of 
Rivera in 1837 to attract immigrants to Uruguay. While this appears to have been a legitimate 
attempt to bring in Basque colonists, which Lafone had been doing at least since 1832 via the 
partnership Lafone Wilson and Co., the inclusion of the Canary Islands and Cabo Verde as sources 
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of migrants suggests that this was also a cover for working around the ban on the slave trade and 
bringing slaves or quasi-slave colonos into the country.248 
 
Demographics of Uruguay 
 
This was a society in constant process of self-recreation. Groups rose and fell in 
importance as new waves of migrants entered the country. There was no long-standing colonial 
elite society, elaborate church hierarchy, or Vice-regal bureaucracy. Uruguay had been a late, 
small, and peripheral settlement in the Spanish colonial empire. Nearest to a late-colonial elite 
was the “patriciado,” in the terminology of Carlos Real de Azúa, a local group of multi-functional 
elites performing the roles of political elite, landowners, merchants, and intelligentsia.249 These 
were themselves migrants one or two generations prior to the 1830, with the very earliest born in 
the 1750s, They were mostly lawyers, writers, and newspaper editors, that is to say, participants in 
the political and intellectual development of the region, trying to impose their political 
preferences on the emerging states through both the written word and their political influence, 
either via elections or by force.250 Uruguay was being transformed demographically at the same 
time it underwent the process of state and institutional formation.  
 
During 1830-75, Uruguay was an area of new settlement. The nominal population at the 
end of the colonial period (1796) was 30,685, a figure that may have shifted considerably during 
the years of Artigas and the Patria Vieja, and in any case does not include the seminomadic 
indigenous groups, such as the Charrúa. This was a time of a mobile population, most famously 
during the “exodus” of the Orientales, in which Artigas and his supporters crossed the border into 
Entre Ríos, to evade defeat by the Brazilians. Whatever the disruptions, the turmoil of the post-
independence years did not stop population growth, which continued at a rapid pace. Population 
growth was smooth throughout the century, excepting the 1840s, during wartime.  
 
By the second independence, measured in 1829, there were approximately 74,000 
inhabitants, and shortly before the guerra grande, in 1835, the population had reached 128,371. 
During the 1840s, however, the protracted shock of war in the countryside and the siege of 
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Montevideo essentially halted population growth, and the figure recorded in the 1852 census is 
scarcely higher than that of 17 years prior, 131,696. Despite the political chaos and occasional 
coup or uprising during the remainder of the 19th century, the population continued to grow 
geometrically, driven by rapid immigration. By 1860, there were 223,238 people in Uruguay, and 
by 1870, it had nearly doubled to 420,000.251  
 
The overall implied population growth rate is 4.4% per year, a rapid rate of growth 
consistent with a frontier economy with relatively high immigration. The population density 
however, remained very low. Even by 1870, after substantial migration had taken place from 
Southern Europe, the population density was only 2.4 people per square kilometre.252 To put this 
into the perspective familiar to British merchants, Uruguay had an area two-thirds the size of the 
United Kingdom, but with less than 1% of its population. The degree of land abundance was 
extraordinary. However, this also meant that “second nature” geographical factors pertaining to 
human, rather than natural, geography were critical in determining the location of economic 
activity. However important the ranches of the countryside became, Montevideo remained the 
centre of the economic world of Uruguay.  
 
The proportion of Uruguayans to foreign nationals remains remarkably stable across the 
mid-19th century. Montevideo during the beginning of the siege in 1843 was 37% foreign, although 
we do not know by this point how many Uruguayans or foreign migrants had left the city.253 As the 
war continued, many either crossed into the camp of the Blancos at the Cerrito immediately 
outside the walls, or left the environs of the city entirely. Following the end of the war, a partial 
census was taken. In 1852, the overall population was 35% foreign, 48% for Montevideo.254 This 
proportion is roughly stable throughout the next quarter century. In 1860, the same proportions 
prevailed, 35% foreign and 49% in Montevideo.255 This share rose slightly during the 1860s, then 
declined by the early 1870s, but remained at approximately 1/3 of the population being foreign 
born.256 Uruguay was cosmopolitan as early as the 1840s, and would remain so throughout the 
19th century. As an entrepôt, merchants were well represented in the city. According to Lamas, in 
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1843 there were 1,483 merchants in Montevideo, or nearly 13% of the working population.257  
Unlike Argentina, however, there was no great wave of migrant labour in the 1890s, yet the 
population grows steadily until 1914.   
 
Migrants had a high degree of regional specificity, representing group or chain migration, 
colonization schemes, and targeted choice of destinations on the part of migrants. Basques of 
both French and Spanish origin made up a large proportion of early migrants to the city, along with 
Genoese, Catalans, and Galicians. Immigrants from Argentina were another substantial group, 
with 2553 in the city, reflecting in part the substantial community of Unitario exiles from the 
Argentine Confederation. The hinterland was largely divided into three zones: the littoral along the 
Río Uruguay with a relatively high proportion of foreign colonists, including Basques, as well as 
Swiss and Waldensian colonies established in the 1850s and early 1860s; the North, with a 
preponderance of Brazilians, for whom the border with Uruguay was essentially a fiction prior to 
the guerra grande, and an unrestricted pasture for wintering cattle afterwards; and the middle 
and eastern provinces, sparsely populated, and mostly by Uruguayans.258  
 
Broad statistical information about the mid-19th century in Uruguay is scarce. Various 
attempts at measuring the population had been made during the 1830s through the 1850s, but 
these are partial, typically represent Montevideo alone. They were also compiled largely for tax 
reasons, making their figures questionable. The census of 1860 was the first full-scale 
demographic study of the country. The polymath Andrés Lamas, during his tenure as jefe politico 
of Montevideo, organized the first attempt at collecting statistical data for the state: the Apuntes 
Estadisticos. This survey gives a partial glimpse at the realities inside the walls of Montevideo, as 
well as some historical information from the 1830s. However, the coverage is both geographically 
and temporally poor. The first relatively reliable statistical works on the demographics of Uruguay 
date from 1872, when Adolfo Vaillant, a French merchant, landowner, statistician, and freemason, 
published the Cuadernos de la Dirección General de Estadística, and from 1884, the Anuarios 
Estadísticos. Two works by Vaillant prefigure the establishment of regular state statistics in 
Uruguay: the Apuntes estadísticas y mercantiles259 for 1862, which gives only a very brief but 
revealing snapshot of the state of the country, and La República Oriental del Uruguay en la 
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Exposición de Viena, which is an obvious precursor to the Anuarios Estadísticos in the scale, 
coverage and quality of data.260  
 
Political Factions: Blancos and Colorados 
 
The rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas as Governor of Buenos Aires in 1829 led to a political 
schism in the region. Exiles affiliated with the liberal Rivadavia government, the Unitarios, 
migrated across the Río de la Plata from Buenos Aires. They exerted considerable influence in 
Montevideo as writers and intellectuals, including such key figures as Esteban Echeverría, 
Florencio Varela, Juan Bautista Alberdi, José Mármol and Bartolomé Mitre.261 The exiles used 
Uruguay as a base for their anti-Rosas activities, culminating in General Lavalle’s disastrous 
invasion in 1839. Their ideological affiliation was partly a carryover of the liberalism of the 
Rivadavia era, and partly a partisan opposition to all things related to Rosas. Their affiliation to the 
government of Fructuoso Rivera, in opposition to Rosas’s ally Manuel Oribe, meant that the 
ideological liberalism from the earlier Argentine experience also helped shape the state-building 
process in Uruguay during the 1830s and 1840s. Among their allies were some key British 
merchants, notably Samuel Lafone, whose fierce anti-Rosas partisanship was legendary on both 
sides of the Río de la Plata.  
 
These affiliations gave an ideological spin to Uruguayan political factions that emerged 
during the conflicts of the 1830s, eventually taking their names from the flags flown by their 
respective sides during the beginnings of the guerra grande. Those associated with Rivera became 
known as the Colorados, named for their red banners, whereas the group associated with Oribe 
became the Blancos, or whites.262 Initially, neither group stood for much more than allegiance to a 
particular side in the struggle. The parties began to take on positions as their respective causes 
were shaped by the differences between Montevideo and the countryside, by regional political 
and national alliances, and eventually by ideology. The alliance between Rivera and the Argentine 
exiles led by Juan Lavalle against Rosas gave the Colorados a pro-Unitario tendency, and an 
association with Argentine liberal intellectuals. Oribe’s time in Buenos Aires serving as a general 
under Rosas meant that the Blancos were allied with and supported by the Federalists. The siege 
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of Montevideo during the guerra grande gave the Colorados an urban element, whereas the 
Blancos more closely represented rural interests. These tendencies increased over the course of 
the 19th century, and by the 20th century, had hardened into party identities. For most of the 19th 
century, however, the two identities were flexible, more closely representing the changing 
coalition of interests and alliances with the surrounding regions, and the participation of 
Uruguayan political figures in larger Argentine and Brazilian clientelist networks, than with any 
well-defined ideological differences. All parties involved maintained broad agreement with the 
oligarchical liberalism of the time, and the differences between the parties remained primarily a 
matter of competition for power among factions and leaders.263 
 
During the 1830-75 period, the major political figures were either caudillos, who were 
rural military-political strongmen, or doctores, urban intellectuals, writers, and career politicians. 
While both parties largely shared a purported ideological commitment to liberalism, the Colorados 
slightly more than the Blancos, both also contained substantial authoritarian elements. Both 
aspects were regularly brought to bear during the persistent civil wars, and it is impossible to tell 
one party from the other from the division between doctores and caudillos alone. The political 
factions existed as symbiosis between urban and rural elements in Uruguayan society.  For every 
Manuel Herrera y Obes on the Colorado side, there was a Bernardo Berro for the Blancos, 
educated and ideologically sophisticated urban intellectuals who published extensive polemical 
writings in defence of their respective causes. Likewise, for every Manuel Oribe or Timoteo 
Aparicio for the Blancos, there was a Fructuoso Rivera or a Venancio Flores for the Colorados, 
charismatic military figures able to command loyalty and raise armies in the countryside.264  There 
were also figures such as Andrés Lamas, originally one of the Colorado doctores, who attempted to 
forge a “fusión” between the factions, notably during the 1850s following the divisions of the 
guerra grande.  
 
For the most part, however, polarization between the two parties was the rule rather than 
the exception. Until the 20th century, the parties offered less of a differing ideological or political 
vision for Uruguay, than two competing clientelist networks, each with its own patronage system, 
charismatic leaders, and regional alliances. The control exercised by the central state was derived 
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not from the power of the state itself, but from the influence of the governing party’s local military 
strength, foreign alliances, and access to funds. The parties were locked in near-constant conflict 
for control over Montevideo. Control over the capital meant control over the institutions of state 
power, limited though they were, and also the wealthiest and most influential region of the 
country. Most importantly, it meant control over the customs house and its revenues, which were 
the most reliable source of funds to pursue inter-party conflict.  
 
Merchants, both local and foreign, served a key function in this process by providing credit 
and provisions to the warring factions. Among the British, some merchants took clear sides in the 
political and military conflict. Samuel Lafone, and a group affiliated with his position, stood clearly 
with the Colorado faction, in opposition to the Blancos, and to Rosas. Lafone was an early financer 
of the war effort by Rivera and Lavalle, and consistently supported any effort against the governor 
of Buenos Aires. On the other side, John Jackson supported the Blancos. Jackson was one of the 
earliest and most important British merchants to establish in the region, and the predominant 
merchant banker in the city, acting as lender of last resort by consistently discounting the bills of 
other houses. Most merchants, however, stood relatively apart from the conflict, supplying and 
lending to whoever was in power in Montevideo, rather than supporting one faction in particular. 
 
Money and Credit 
 
 The monetary system of Uruguay was, in general, based on the use of metal rather than 
paper. This balance among three problems would vex the Uruguayan treasury throughout the 
century: providing liquidity and small change for transactions; maintaining government accounts 
denominated in hard currency; and preventing runaway inflation by accepting rapidly devaluing 
foreign coins and paper notes at fixed rates. Prior to 1862, there was no national currency, and 
foreign coins circulated freely, with values fixed by law to their metallic content, expressed in units 
of account, notional currencies used for bookkeeping without any tangible circulating instrument. 
In the region, this was usually the patacón, or peso fuerte, which had no metallic or paper 
equivalent, but represented a quantity of silver or gold.265 The emission of inconvertible paper 
money in the style of Buenos Aires was strongly opposed by local merchant interests.  
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Two other financial instruments must be considered in any discussion of money prior to 
1862. One is the heterogeneous mass of debt instruments emitted by the government, notably 
during the 1840s and 1850s, both internal bonds issued by legislation,266 and particulares, 
individual loans arranged between the state and its merchant financiers. The other is bills of 
exchange, which acted as a medium for transactions at the level of the alto comercio, or overseas 
trade, because of their usefulness as remittance vehicles. While quantitative data are largely 
unavailable on the overall flows, Llorca-Jaña’s analysis of the remittances of Hodgson, Robinson 
and Co. of Buenos Aires suggests that bills of exchange were a major and increasing share of 
remittances, rising to 73% of the total by the 1840s, whereas specie and bullion represented less 
than 10% after 1829.267 Different merchant houses had different remittance methods based on 
firm structure and line of business.268 Nevertheless, it shows that there was a substantial use of 
credit instruments as a medium of exchange. This system did not improve the Uruguayan fiscal 
situation, being essentially equivalent to using the bills on London and other major ports as a 
second currency. However, it helped avoid the transaction costs and risks of shipping relatively 
scarce specie, allowing for cheaper credit and relieving pressure on local coinage. 
 
 According to Millot and Bertino, merchants exercised near-total control over the 
circulation of currency: “The monetary policy of the state is that of the large merchants. Their 
control over money and credit in this period was total.” The small size and weakness of the state 
meant that there was no credible, circulating domestic currency. While this surely reflects the 
absence of a monopoly of force and of an extractive ‘fiscal state,’ it is also a function of the 
relative power of Merchants in the Uruguayan political economy. The absence of a sovereign 
currency meant that merchants, notably overseas merchants, with access to hard-money credit 
through bills of exchange, became the de facto “central bank” of Uruguay, in control of the 
issuance of credit and the discounting of bills.269 It also protected merchants from the risks of 
taxation via inflation, as had happened repeatedly across the river in Buenos Aires. There, 
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merchants structured their contracts to receive payment in kind, and diversified their asset 
portfolios away from paper pesos in anticipation of successive rounds of money printing. 270  
 
These strategies were unnecessary in Uruguay, which made investment in the country 
another possible way of hedging against inflation risk in Buenos Aires, while simultaneously 
retaining access to the same markets. The interpretation of monetary policy in Millot and Bertino 
constructs merchants in terms of a class-based political economy relationship. The element of 
foreign influence was also substantial. Throughout the 1850s, creditors of the state negotiated for 
the settlement of wartime debts at favourable rates. Foreign merchants lobbied heavily for the 
resolution of their claims via their respective consulates. The ultimate prize was control of the 
customs house, the administration of which promised repayment in hard currency without having 
to deal with the risks of non-payment. But participation in these schemes was voluntary, and if 
British merchants could not predict the problems of negotiating debt repayment with the 
Uruguayan government, neither could they be forced to accept contracts denominated in a 
currency that the government could print. The risks were counterparty risks of insolvency, rather 
than inflation risks. 
 
Centeno gives a description of Uruguay that fits uneasily with this picture of a merchant-
dominated hard-money port, with no ability to inflation tax. He describes Uruguayan monetary 
policy as “printing insanity,” pointing out that “[b]etween 1859 and 1901, the Uruguayan state 
issued 342 million pesos of which 124 million were still outstanding.”271 On this basis, Uruguay 
used an inflation tax to finance its wars, similar to the rest of Latin America.  The emission of bills 
in Uruguay after 1857 was not a government monopoly, but rather a privilege issued to particular 
banks, notably the Banco Mauá in the 1860s and early 1870s. Second, Uruguay was on a hard-
metal currency standard, something disrupted only in times of commercial and banking crisis, and 
during the turmoil and insolvency of 1843-57. While there was some scope for monetary 
expansion under a bimetallic regime or during the gold standard by issuing notes, such issuance 
would not be accompanied not by persistent inflation, since the value of the currency cannot leave 
the narrow arbitrage band against metal. The persistent inability of the government to pay its 
debts devalued the value of the various debt instruments circulating in Montevideo, but could not 
directly move prices in the real economy, which were denominated in metal currency.  
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Even during the siege of Montevideo, when fiscal constraints were severe, and 
government debt rising precipitously, the law passed allowing almost unlimited powers to raise 
money still prohibited the issuance of paper money.272 Indeed, these things may be endogenous: 
the guerra grande created a rift in the monetary system, with the Blanco camp introducing Rosas’s 
paper currency, and the Colorados reiterating their commitment to metal currency. The monetary 
conflict mirrors the overall ideological conflict between Rosas, emphasizing American sovereignty 
over European influence, and the defenders of Montevideo, emphasizing the civilizing influence of 
commercial integration with Europe. Eduardo Acevedo writes that three denominations of silver 
and gold coins circulated during the guerra grande: the gold onza de oro, worth sixteen patacones 
(also known as pesos fuertes), the silver patacón, worth 960 reis, and the silver peso corriente, of 
800 reis. Attempts to mint currency within the besieged plaza were attempted, but failed after a 
short time, presumably due to the extreme shortage of available funds.273 
 
Despite its early nominal commitment to hard money, Uruguay was not immune to 
inflationary pressures imported from abroad.  Both Brazil and Argentina experimented with 
various inflationary regimes of either inconvertible or highly devalued paper currency, causing 
substantial dislocations in neighbouring economies. The circulation of devalued currencies was a 
problem in the context of fixed exchange rates for gold and silver coins, as exchange rates 
required constant updating to prevent arbitrage. During the Cisplatine period, low-value copper 
coinage circulated widely. This led to substantial arbitrage opportunities following independence, 
due to the difference between the cost of minting copper coins in Brazil, and the official value of 
the coins in Uruguay. The governments of Rivera and Oribe took measures to withdraw copper 
coinage from circulation, subsidizing a group of merchants to purchase coins to be melted down 
and resold in bars. This, in turn, created a shortage of small change, which the government then 
tried to remedy by minting 20,000 copper coins of its own.274  
 
Fiscal weakness prevented the state from pursuing sovereign currency as a solution to this 
problem. The state did not even have the available reserves to remove copper currency from 
circulation, relying instead on a junta of merchants to capitalize the venture.275 This type of 
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monetary policy, wherein currency issue, government debt, and control over interest rates was 
mediated through groups of merchants rather than through a banking system, would characterize 
the Uruguayan fiscal and monetary system for most of the 19th century, up until during the 
establishment of the first banks in the late 1850s, and the printing of a sovereign, convertible 
currency in 1862. At no point during this period did the government maintain a central bank, 
private or public, which gave the state only limited powers to control the money supply. What the 
state could do was honour debt contracts in metal, and accept its own paper debts as revenue at 
the customs house, but even this became difficult during times of stress. In particular, during and 
following the guerra grande, government commitment to hard money became increasingly 
fictitious.  
 
The question of control over currency and taxation has been well-explored by Mario 
Etchechury and Juan Carlos Garavaglia in a recent project examining the development of taxation, 
bureaucracy, and the fiscal state in Latin America.276 They emphasize the alienation of the 
Uruguayan from its own revenues, and the development of a “parallel bureaucracy” of merchants 
in control of both revenue and monetary policy in Uruguay from the guerra grande until the 
1860s.277 The two groups, while in some sense antagonistic given their lender/borrower 
relationship, were also engaged in a cooperative symbiosis. Without the continued consent of the 
state, the group of merchants would lose control of their source of revenue, and without the 
merchants, the state would lose its source of hard-money credit.  
 
This sentiment is echoed in the contemporary press, with claims that the Sociedad 
Compradora de los Derechos de Aduana, the tax farmers who had purchased the rights to 50% of 
the customs revenue, had become a species of government bank, and that in doing so, they had 
committed themselves to “mutual support.”278 This prefigures the rationale for independent 
central banking; the state, in order to obtain the credibility to borrow, withdrew from monetary 
control by alienating its own best source of revenue. This structure created incentives for the 
quasi-“central bank” of merchants to continue to support the state by providing necessary funds 
to the government in order to finance (mostly military) expenditures, thereby securing their own 
source of revenue.   
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This situation continued long after the termination of the guerra grande in 1851, and 
practical control of the monetary system remained in the hands of merchants and financiers well 
into the 1850s. The accumulated interest on perpetually rolled-over government debts, and 
wartime damages claimed by foreign citizens, was impossible to pay in hard money under any 
arrangement. This absurd quantity of nominal debt was the function not only of the constant 
emission of new debts, but also the diminution of hard metal revenues. The acceptance of internal 
debt as payment for tax revenues was the major incentive for the purchase of government debt, 
which was attractive to any merchant paying import duties at the customs house. Absent a central 
bank capable of maintaining convertibility, and with dwindling real revenues, the credibility of 
internal debt became increasingly fictitious. The customs house received its revenues increasingly 
in paper by 1855, to the point of crowding out nearly all metal revenues.279 The question of the 
1850s became not whether the government would pay its debts, which was clearly impossible, but 
how much to repay, on what terms, and to whom? 
 
The varying answers to these questions involved a chaotic balance of short-term financing 
needs, access to further loans, foreign pressures, and internal political infighting. A subsidy in the 
form of 60,000 pesos monthly was provided by Brazil as part of the terms of the treaty of 
Montevideo. However, this proved insufficient, and the governments of the 1850s were 
perpetually short of funds. In the immediate aftermath of the guerra grande, the government of 
Juan Giró (1852-53), desperate for hard currency, re-nationalized the customs house from the 
Sociedad Compradora. This alienated the investors, whose revenues had been guaranteed by the 
Defence of Montevideo, and according to those who purchased the 1848 contract, by Britain and 
France.280 This repossession freed up immediate revenues to be paid to other groups, notably the 
bureaucracy and soldiers of the government. However, having ruined its relationship with the 
overseas merchants who had previously been the only source of hard currency, the government 
became increasingly unable to control the internal debt, which spiralled out of control.   
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By the late 1850s, the value of the outstanding internal debt, in the form of diverse 
obligations emitted by the state, reached over 100 million Uruguayan pesos.281 These figures can 
be reconciled by understanding the government emission of internal debt. The various bills 
generated by the state, and by the quasi-state groups of merchants who managed government 
revenues, came increasingly to function as a quasi-currency, as argued by Etchechury. These bills 
were never the circulating medium in the plaza, nor were they used to denominate commercial 
transactions, which remained denominated in hard metal. However, they were paid to 
government employees, were accepted at the customs house in payment of debts, and were used 
extensively in negotiations between the state and its creditors in the sale of government contracts 
and property.282  
 
The ballooning of government debt and the increasing penury of the treasury forced a 
reversal of course. In April 1856, the administration of the customs house was returned to the 
government’s creditors. The directorship of the new Sociedad Compradora in 1856 consisted of 
largely the same merchants who had advanced funds to the Defence of Montevideo a decade 
prior, and who had lobbied most strongly for British and French support for the cause of 
Montevideo: Samuel Lafone, John MacFarlane, John Halton Buggeln, Francis Hocquard, and Adolf 
Pfeil, among others.283 It is these British merchants, and their counterparts from other 
nationalities, such as the Catalan merchants Jaime Cibils and Felix Buxareo, the Frenchman Pablo 
Duplessis, and migrant Argentine elites such as Carlos Navia, that formed the nucleus of the 
Uruguayan banking sector.  The tax farmers and quasi-central bankers of the 1840s and 1850s 
became the first private bankers, from 1857, when the Banco Mauá and Banco Comercial were 
formed.  
 
These organizations purchased large quantities of devalued internal debt at an enormous 
discount, as little as 1% of par, according to Barrán, in an attempt to come to an agreement with 
the government over repayment. In 1859, the Baron Mauá secured such an agreement, having 
accumulated 56% of outstanding government debt. The agreement negotiated with Andrés Lamas 
converted outstanding debts at 5% of the nominal value. Even taking so substantial a haircut, 
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there were large profits made due to the extraordinary devaluation prior to the conversion.284 This 
substitution of public debt for private banknotes stabilized the currency situation by eliminating 
the debt spiral of accumulating interest, and establishing credibility by putting the emission of 
currency in the hands of private interests.285 This bargain paralleled the process of currency 
stabilization on the other side of the River Plate, in Buenos Aries, albeit at a delay of two years.286 
The two processes were not identical, as in Uruguay, it was the credibility of the state to repay its 
metal-denominated debts that had collapsed, whereas in Buenos Aires it was the inability to 
commit credibly to refrain from inflating debts away. However, in practice, this was a distinction 
without much difference, so long as both Uruguayan state debts and the Buenos Aires paper peso 
sold for only a fraction of their nominal value. In both cases, the state, having lost credibility as a 
borrower, turned over control of central banking merchant capitalists in order to restore 
credibility. It amounted to the creation of an independent system of central banking.  
 
In Uruguay, this process of stabilization was controlled jointly by Baron Mauá, and by the 
members of the alto comercio through the Sociedad de Cambios and Banco Comercial. The 
devaluation of the debt halted, and repayment at a new, much reduced par level commenced. 
Uruguayan debt in 1860 is given by Barrán and Nahúm at only 2,726,880 pesos, an incredible drop 
from the enormous values of 1855-58, representing the “haircut” negotiated by Mauá.287 Millot 
and Bertino show the total debt service to be 410,362 pesos in 1860, or approximately 20% of the 
budget, and implying a high but not implausible average interest rate of 15%, consistent with the 
high interest rates at the time, and with the rates faced by the government in international bond 
markets in the following decades.288 Millot and Bertino place the 1860 budget at 3.1 million 
pesos.289 
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Tariffs 
 
 The tariff regime in Uruguay was largely a function of fiscal needs, not protectionist 
ideology.290 High tariffs, absent any particular protectionist motives were not unusual for Latin 
America.291 Uruguay, as a small country with extraordinary revenue needs due to near-constant 
civil wars, was among the highest tariff countries even in Latin America, which was itself the 
highest tariff region of the world. The country had neither substantial import-competing domestic 
industry to protect, nor any plausible ambitions to develop such industries prior to the late 19th 
century. Internal markets were small, labour was expensive, and pre-existing industrial interests 
with political clout were almost entirely absent.292 Taxation at the port was simple to administer, 
which was an attractive feature for weak states with little informational, administrative or judicial 
reach or sophistication. Import taxes were also relatively painless in political economy terms. Their 
burden fell on consumers generally, rather than any specific group, which had important benefits. 
First, it was difficult to evade. Second, consumers were a dispersed group largely incapable of 
exerting serious public pressure against the state.  It was simple to maintain, compared with taxing 
particular groups, who often had either the ability to evade taxation, or to disrupt or overthrow 
governments who attempted to increase their share of the fiscal burden.293 Taxes were generally 
administered ad valorem on declared market values.294  
 
 The tariff regime increased over time, as government expenditures rose, and the need 
became urgent to cover mounting debt obligations, either with new hard metal revenues, or by 
liquidating government bills at the customs house. Immediately following independence, tariffs 
were fixed at low rates, by the relatively high standards of the region. In 1829, there was a 15% 
general tariff, and some specific duties on key imports.295 Clothing, in particular, was taxed at 25%. 
In 1831, these were raised to 18% and 30% respectively. As wartime increased revenue needs, 
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tariffs were raised in response, at first in small doses, but with precipitous increases following the 
blockade of Buenos Aires. During the conflict, the Rivera government raised the general level of 
import tariffs to 25%, in 1838 and then to 35% during 1840, with tariffs on manufactured clothing, 
the key British import, increasing to 47.5%. The extraordinary level of tariffs reflects both 
extraordinary revenue needs, and a strategic reaction to regional conflict. During wartime, a high-
tariff policy allowed the state to capitalize on the windfalls generated by blockades on the one 
hand, and to raise funds from what scarce trade remained during the times when Montevideo was 
blockaded, as competitive tariffs only mattered when the ports were open and therefore in 
competition for the import trade. 
 
 Following the guerra grande, and over the course of the 1850s, tariffs were slowly reduced 
to more moderate levels. In 1853, the general tariff was decreased to 24%, with clothing paying 
36%. By 1861, rates were set at 17% and 24% respectively, approximating the peacetime tariffs of 
the 1830s.296 This diminution reflected several factors. Ideological liberalism was at its apex in 
government, with urban doctores holding the major positions of power under the government of 
Bernardo Berro, including Tomas Villalba as minister of the hacienda (treasury).297 While a 17% 
tariff rate could hardly be considered “free trade,” the comparatively low rates did reflect an 
ideological commitment to liberalization. And in any case, the dominant role of tariffs in state 
revenues could not be replaced overnight without introducing direct taxes, which were politically 
difficult to implement, and costly to administer.  It also reflected the sounder footing of 
government finance, following the resolution of the spiralling debts via an agreement with the 
Banco Mauá. It also reflected increasing ambitions to compete for regional entrepôt trade. The 
natural protection afforded by the civil war in Argentina ended following the battles of Cepeda 
and of Pavón, and the reintegration of Buenos Aires into the Argentine Confederation. These 
relatively low rates of import tariffs lasted throughout the 1860s, including throughout the 
Paraguayan war.  
 
Tariffs were raised again in 1872, in response to the revenue needs of the Latorre 
government during and following the revolución de las lanzas, a rural insurgency led by the Blanco 
caudillo Timoteo Aparicio from 1870-72. The general tariff was nearly doubled, from 17% to 30%, 
although there does not appear to be any special treatment for cotton textiles or clothing, still the 
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major imports from Britain. In 1875, rates were once again revised upwards, imposing a high tariff 
of 40-50% on almost all kinds of finished consumer goods, including clothes (50%). 
 
Commercial Overview 
 
Just as both the merchant community and population at large reflected the cosmopolitan 
reality of the port of Montevideo, so too did the shipping. While British ships represented the 
most tonnage of any nationality, at least for most years on record, the trade was obviously 
diversified and competitive among nations, with French, Spanish, Brazilian, Sardinian (Genoese), 
and North American ships each taking substantial portions of the total tonnage arriving at the 
port.298 The North American ships are notable, in that there was no large community of North 
American immigrants in Montevideo, the group being tiny even when compared with the small 
British community. The average size of British ships is not particularly notable, starting at 194 tons 
per ship in 1836, and rising to 225 tons by 1842, while the average of all ships arriving at the port 
rose from 183 to 192. The slightly smaller average size is due to the Italians, Brazilians, and 
Spanish, whereas the French and Northern European traders operated slightly larger vessels. The 
total number of English vessels arriving at the port increased from 61 to 189, and the total 
tonnage from 11,825 to 42,593.299 Some of this increase may be due to the chaos of war in the 
Argentine Confederation and the redirection of some trade towards Montevideo. However, the 
increase in trade is smooth across the years both before and after the French blockade of Buenos 
Aires (1838-40), indicating an overall increase in trade carried on British ships, rather than a 
temporary wartime windfall.  
 
By the 1870s, this relatively balanced situation had changed, and British dominance of 
shipping at Montevideo was far more pronounced. In terms of overseas trade, ships sailing under 
British flags represented more vessels, and more than twice the tonnage of their nearest 
competitors, the French. The Italians and Spanish also had a substantial share of ships arriving at 
port, but at much smaller average tonnage.300 The coastal trade was dominated by local traders, 
Argentines and Uruguayans, with British coastal traders coming in a distant third.301 Analysed in 
terms of ports of origin and destination, however, the situation looks very different, reflecting the 
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asymmetrical flows of trade through the port. 356 ships arrived from Britain in 1869, but only 93 
departed for Britain. By contrast, 54 ships arrived from Buenos Aires, but 267 ships departed 
towards it. This clearly reflects the routes taken by merchant vessels, with trade conducted not 
bilaterally, but by trading from port to port along known routes. Places with which Uruguay had a 
negative trade balance, such as Britain, had ships arriving filled with British cargoes, to be sold at 
Montevideo, or taken across to Buenos Aires and sold there, or even around Cape Horn to 
Valparaiso in Chile. Some of those ships would carry back exports in the form of frutos de pais, 
rural products from upriver in Uruguay, and the interior provinces. Regardless of the flag they 
flew, they would proceed to the ports where those goods were to be sold, in Brazil (for tasajo), 
Belgium and France (for hides) with whom Uruguay had a trade surplus.302  
 
 Andrés Lamas also provides a ranking of trading partners for both imports and exports for 
various years, although unfortunately not always the same years. He provides import data for 
1830, 1831, and 1835. Reading it at face value, it appears that Uruguayan imports came from a 
variety of sources. In rank order: Britain, France, North America, Spain and Italy served as the 
major non-regional sources of goods. Brazil remains the largest source of imports in 1830-31, and 
second only to Britain in 1835.303 The Argentine provinces also have a substantial share. However, 
it is difficult to account for the extent to which these last two may represent transhipment, rather 
than direct imports. Certainly it was the case that the Argentine provinces, with pastoral 
economies of nearly identical type, produced few consumer goods sought in Uruguayan markets.  
 
 A negative balance of payments was a standard structural feature of the Uruguayan 
economy, as would be expected from a capital-importing region. Our best statistical pictures of 
trade begin with the work of Vaillant, who gives a detailed breakdown of trade for 1869. As in 
most years, Uruguay had a negative balance of payments, with nearly 3 million pesos more in 
imports than exports, at official values.304 Measuring only by bilateral trade, France was Uruguay’s 
largest trading partner for that year, at nearly 36% of total trade. Britain represented 17%, Brazil 
12%, and the US and Belgium 9% each. However, these total figures conceal a great deal of 
variation in the balance of trade. Britain provided 24% of Uruguayan imports, but only 8% of its 
exports, resulting in an especially pronounced large trade deficit with Britain.  
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Imports into Uruguay were consumer goods, divided along the lines of nation of origin. 
From Britain, textiles and metal manufactured goods were the main items; from Spain, wine and 
spirits; from France, wine, fine clothes and textiles, and luxury goods; from Brazil, sugar, 
aguardiente (spirits), coffee, yerba mate, and tobacco. Even as late as 1869, there was very little 
import of machinery or infrastructural goods, the latter categories comprising only at most 8% of 
total imports.305 The import basket mostly reflects the consumption goods that were not produced 
domestically in the highly specialized pastoral economy. Textiles accounted for 70-90% of the 
value of imported British goods into Uruguay in the 1840s and 1850s.306 It is of little surprise then 
that the majority of British merchant houses dealt in clothing and textiles. Individual merchants 
specialized in particular products, in order to mitigate the effects of cutthroat competition among 
commercial houses. With the beginnings of infrastructural development in the 1860s and 1870s, 
textiles declined to a smaller share of trade, no longer the majority in most years, but still the 
largest single category of traded commodities, with cottons being the most important import in 
every year except 1873, when a commercial and financial crisis coincided with the construction of 
the first railroads, making iron and steel the largest import category for a single year.307 
 
Britain’s trade with Uruguay followed a pronounced boom and bust cycle, clearly visible in 
the import and export data. During boom years (1847, 1852, 1859-60, 1866-67, 1872-73) imports 
surged to as much as double the previous years’ levels, only to crash again to half their values 
during major crises (1848-51, 1868, 1875).308 These commercial booms and busts had a variety of 
causes. Some are clearly internal; the disruptions caused by civil wars and insurgencies suppressed 
trade, creating temporary troughs, such as during the 1870-72 revolution of the lances. This 
process also generated small export booms immediately following the restoration of peace, as 
inventories built up in the form of livestock, hides and wool were liquidated. More important than 
internal events were regional ones, associated with the conflicts in the greater Río de la Plata area. 
While internal warfare was always disruptive of trade, regional conflicts generated both setbacks 
and opportunities. The guerra grande, with its siege and intermittent blockades, generated 
enormous swings in British trade, from nearly zero during years when Montevideo was blockaded, 
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to far above average, when trade was redirected from Buenos Aires.309 Similarly, the constitutional 
conflicts between Buenos Aires and the provinces in 1859-61 generated years of above-trend 
trade, as did the opportunities created by the early stages of the Paraguayan war in 1865-66. 
 
As Uruguay became more directly exposed in the 1860s to international finance, at first 
through the Baron Mauá, and later the London and River Plate Bank, as well as the London bond 
markets, crises were transmitted directly via financial constraints. The attachment of Uruguay to 
larger patterns of liquidity and crisis was an older phenomenon, however, as merchants were the 
primary conduits of both trade and credit during the mid-1850s. Before contagion could spread 
through the formal banking sector, it spread through merchant networks of credit. Bills of 
exchange owed their value to the solvency of their counterparties, and so bankruptcies anywhere 
in the chain of signatories could endanger firms everywhere in the credit network. This financial 
contagion would undermine trade not only by causing a shortage of liquidity, but also by 
undermining the very trade which was the source of revenue for the merchant firms.  
 
While textiles remained the most important import, capital goods gained an increasing 
share. Imported British metal, machinery and fuel were critical inputs into the process of 
infrastructural development, for which the construction of railways was far and away the largest 
infrastructural projects of the period.  Railways developed late in Uruguay, beginning only in 1869, 
forty years after the dawn of the railway age, and over a decade after the same processes had 
begun in Brazil and Argentina. This delay is explained by the availability of water transport, the 
relative penury and powerlessness of the Uruguayan state, and the recurrent civil conflicts. 
However, once the process of development began, Uruguay became a comparatively important 
consumer of imported capital and energy goods.310 Much of the imported coal during the second 
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half of the 19th century was destined for “bunkering,” supplying steam ships rather than domestic 
consumption. 
  
 According to the 1872 trade statistics, exports were concentrated on relatively few 
destinations.311 Those destinations were also divided sharply by product. Cow hides, still the most 
important rural export, were exported in two varieties, dried and salted. Salted cow hides were 
sent largely to continental European markets, whereas dried cow hides were shipped to North 
America, and to the Mediterranean, mostly to Italy and Spain. Tasajo (dried beef) went exclusively 
to Havana and Brazil, for consumption by slaves, a captive market that would absorb the 
inexpensive, low-quality product.312 By the late 1860s, the predominance of hides and other beef 
by-products (tasajo, fats, and bone) had been challenged by wool, which became the single largest 
export of Uruguay, accounting for 38% of official export value.313  Wool was exported largely to 
markets in France and Belgium. The increasing importance of wool in the export basket reflects a 
number of trends that will be discussed later in the thesis: the increasing value of land, the 
intensification of capital-to-land ratios, the introduction of new breeds of livestock, and the 
entrepreneurship of British merchants at the forefront of these processes that increased rural 
productivity. However, unlike Argentina, Uruguay never became a major exporter of grains. Less 
than 10% of the wheat and maize produced in Uruguay, 1855-72.314 Intensification in land use 
came from the introduction of sheep, and the crossbreeding of cattle, rather than in conversion of 
pasture to mixed farming, except in the immediate vicinity of Montevideo, where wheat and 
maize were grown for the domestic market.  
 
 Taken as a whole, trade from Montevideo had several structural features. First, there were 
persistent trade deficits, which is to be expected for a capital-importing country. Merchants were 
expanding their operations in the region by drawing on European merchant houses. Second, there 
were even larger persistent deficits with European manufacturing nations, mostly resulting from 
the purchase of textile goods, especially in the earlier period. Hides, and later wool, were the high-
value exports sent by merchants to European ports, often in remittances, but not in quantities 
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sufficient to cover imports. The final leg making up the difference was the tasajo trade. The 
markets in Havana and Brazil imported large quantities of this low-value but high-volume beef 
product in order to feed slaves, and exported little to nothing in return to Uruguay, leaving the 
country with only a small, persistent trade deficit consistent with a developing peripheral country. 
There was also a healthy entrepôt trade with the Argentine, and to a lesser extent Paraguayan and 
Brazilian interior, which extended the reach of Montevideo merchants as trade intermediators. 
During wartime, when blockades and other military and political disruptions redirected trade away 
from Buenos Aires, this comercio de tránsito became a major source of windfall profits for 
merchants and the Montevideo customs house. Taken as a whole, however, Montevideo 
remained a secondary port for the larger River Plate region, with the political and military 
influence of Buenos Aires generally taking precedence over the advantages of trade through 
Uruguay. 
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Chapter 5: Social Networks and Entrepreneurship 
In mid-19th century Uruguay, British merchants formed the vanguard of economic development in 
Uruguay, largely displacing the local elite, and taking a leading role among European merchants. 
While their individual attributes surely have some role to play in explaining their 
entrepreneurship, it is unlikely they could have succeeded as a group, except for shared 
advantages. This chapter will examine two types of networks that gave entrepreneurs the 
resources necessary to use their judgment effectively in order to generate wealth, and make 
several arguments concerning these networks: first, that it is the complementary quality of 
specifically international links that gave British merchants their comparative advantage as 
entrepreneurs, and made them an attractive addition to networks, in Uruguay, in Britain, and 
among merchants of other nationalities; second, that these ties provided resources such as credit, 
information and trust that were diffiuclt to obtain in other ways; and third, that these ties were 
used not just statically to enable and maintain trade, but dynamically to enable entrepreneurship 
across multiple sectors and activities. This then helps explain why British merchants functioned as 
the entrepreneurial vanguard in Uruguay in the mid-19th century, as well as the personalized, 
inter-ethnic cooperation that characterizes the form of their activities. 
This chapter will be divided into two broad sections, first considering the importance of 
networks in entrepreneurship. In this, it follows an extensive literature on the role of trust in 
merchant activity, and on the importance of interpersonal ties in establishing the preconditions for 
successful entrepreneurship. Following this, it will examine examples of the networks of ties used 
by British merchants through a series of cases, showing how prominent merchants used their 
connections to further their business interests, first in trade, and later in diversified investments. 
The Jackson family will be used as a case to examine how strong family and friendship links could 
help develop and maintain elite connections through an examination of their dealings with the 
Rathbones in Liverpool, and the Errazquin in Uruguay. The Lafones will serve as an example of the 
use of family ties to generate agents, contacts, and organize complimentary entrepreneurship on 
both sides of the Atlantic. It will examine the letter books for the house of Anderson MacFarlane 
and Co. to sketch out one merchant house’s connection to the correspondence network of weak, 
informal ties that generated the transatlantic flow of information and credit, which in turn drove 
the River Plate trade. And finally, it will examine the career of Richard Hughes, whose active and 
changing career provides an overview of how multiple ways of securing entrepreneurial 
advantages came together over the course of a merchant-estanciero’s career. 
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The Entrepreneurial Community 
 Operating in an area of new development, the merchants of the River Plate faced a 
particularly imposing set of obstacles to establishing and maintaining their businesses. The post-
independence period was one of institutional instability. This is clear from the turbulent military 
and political situation. Wars, coups, revolutions, insurgencies and shifting borders were 
commonplace, and confidence in the endurance of any particular government or ideological 
program was low. Property rights were differentially enforced, depending on the political faction 
in power, the variable strength of the government, and current needs. Loans were insecure and 
markets illiquid; a crisis in one location could lead to businesses calling in their loans and refusing 
to extend further credit and with no developed banking system, this could cause contagion in 
times of crisis. The inland rivers, critical to expanding trade into the interior, were opened and 
closed at the will of the government of Buenos Aires, which controlled the mouth of the Paraná 
river. In short, there was little about the turbulent situation in the River Plate that would 
encourage stable, long-term investment. 
 However, what from one perspective were a series of challenges, from another 
perspective were barriers to entry. Regionally specific expertise and elite social connections meant 
that career merchants possessed substantial advantages over non-merchants, both in trade and as 
investors. The costs of learning how to do business in the region shielded incumbent merchants 
from competition; without understanding the state of local markets, the interrelations between 
the ports and the interior, the commodities involved in trade, and most importantly the ever-
shifting political struggle for political dominance, a new potential entrant would run enormous 
risks in setting up a new house. In time however, and given the abundance of opportunity created 
by overall underdevelopment, those merchants who invested the time and money to obtain the 
requisite social capital and regional knowledge could obtain high returns. While the risks of 
operating in the region were many, the scarcity of capital gave entrepreneurs with access to credit 
an open field in which to invest. This situation persisted at least until the opening of the telegraph 
in the 1860s, which reduced the importance of local agents and triggered the decline of 
import/export merchants and their houses as the chief mediators of external trade. 
Some theories of entrepreneurship, especially those associated with Schumpeter, tend to 
have a heroic flavour.315 They emphasize the risk-taking and visionary qualities of the individual 
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entrepreneur, who creates wealth through superior judgment, hard work, and charisma. The 
entrepreneur here is the disruptor of existing systems, who disturbs the status quo through 
application of their ideas. Theories in the tradition of Weber, by contrast, emphasize the relevance 
of culture as a determinant of entrepreneurship.316 Individuals have distinct traits, but the relevant 
factor for success is whether a particular society encourages the drives and values that lead to 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Other theorists of entrepreneurship, such as Casson, have looked at 
the entrepreneur from a functional perspective, asking not what creates the entrepreneur, but 
rather what must be created in order for the entrepreneur to succeed, based on economic roles 
rather than cultural or individual values.317 
The specific ideology, religion or culture of the network is less important than its power to 
transmit information, recruit skilled labour, and generate trust. Of course, the basic roles of the 
entrepreneur, finding and exploiting opportunities for profit and absorbing the risks of exercising 
judgment, are still at the centre of the theory of entrepreneurship. What is distinct about this view 
is the support the individual agent receives from those around them. Kinship groups, friends, 
social clubs, class groups, religious organizations and other link-forming entities both natural and 
engineered are valuable to entrepreneurs. Social connections are both an existing pool of 
resources that can be exploited for gain, and an area in which the entrepreneur can attempt to 
secure new resources. For each entrepreneur, that pool of resources is distinct, and that 
distinctiveness helps determine the economic strategy they pursue. Each individual merchant 
carried with them a specific set of interpersonal links, of brothers, sisters, parents, in-laws, 
acquaintances, co-religionists, neighbours, as well as business partners both current and former.   
For the particular case of Uruguay in this time, the most important dimension of social 
links is their ability to transcend distances. For a merchant operating in Montevideo, sheer 
geographical separation between markets, capital, information, and technology put a substantial 
strain on the capacity of a firm to do business. The scope of trade required a permanent 
establishment, which took the form of the import/export house. Managing this type of business 
required considerable market knowledge, since the trade situation was highly volatile, and highly 
competitive. Without a managing partner able to make decisions on the spot in Montevideo, there 
was little possibility of carrying out a profitable trade. The failure of manufacturers to guess what 
would sell in the region was a source of constant complaint in the correspondence of merchant 
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houses.318 Without a large inventory to accommodate the variety of orders, and without a source 
of market feedback in the form of constant correspondence, there would have been little chance 
of turning a profit in the River Plate trade. Social networks provided a method of maintaining the 
necessary flexibility while simultaneously preserving sufficient trust to overcome the inherent 
barriers to trade. 
However, if the British merchant community relied on ethnic links to establish trust, they 
certainly did not use those links exclusively. This does not entirely invalidate the in-group trust 
model, but it does suggest that it was both possible and relatively common to bring useful 
members of other ethnic groups into the inner trust circles by making them into family, through 
strategic marriages. What may have begun as a set of separate, ethnically defined networks 
transformed, over the course of time, into an interconnected web of relations which owed more 
to shared economic interests and relationships established in Uruguay than to pre-existing ethnic 
identities. This is best understood as a dynamic process of social adaptation and economic change, 
rather than a static network designed to maintain long-standing, pre-existing advantages in trade. 
The British used their success to gain influence, and their influence to transform the economy 
through the importation of new technology, new forms of organization, new ideas, and new 
products. Thus, the question becomes less how existing networks generated the preconditions for 
trade, but rather, how networks connected and expanded in order to increase the potential for 
entrepreneurship. 
Firm Structure: Networks and Partnerships 
Partnership had several qualities that made it well-adapted to the international trade 
taking place between Uruguay and Britain. First, it gave broad discretionary powers to agents on 
both sides of the Atlantic, which had both positive and negative effects. On the negative side, it 
greatly increased each partner’s exposure to the mistakes of the others. This meant that 
entrepreneurs had to exercise considerable judgement of character, since an otherwise successful 
enterprise could be scuttled quickly by an incompetent or untrustworthy partner. Trust and 
reputation were thus held at a premium. On the positive side, it meant that decisions could be 
made on the spot, without the lengthy process of consensus building. By the mid-19th century, the 
Atlantic journey from Uruguay took five to six weeks each way.319 Mere information transfer was 
thus prohibitively slow to conduct business in a rapidly changing environment. Consensus building 
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through discussion and argument was simply impossible, at least until the introduction of the 
telegraph in the 1860s. A partnership obviated the need for this kind of process. Decision making 
was handled entrepreneurially by the appropriate partner, who had wide legal as well as practical 
latitude in allocating the resources of the firm to their greatest advantage.  
Partnerships were not enduring, clearly defined entities in the sense of modern firms. 
Rather, they were porous, temporary arrangements, forming, dissolving and reforming on a 
regular basis to incorporate new partners, expand into or vacate from cities, and to liquidate in the 
event of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the same groups of merchants continued to work with one 
another, in interlinked groups. As the opportunities for infrastructural development increased, and 
with them the need for increasing levels of capital security, these merchants came together to 
form the directorships of the first companies in the region, for banking, insurance, gas, shipping, 
telegraphs, railroads, land development, colonization and rural industry. 
Groups of merchants-cum-investors can be seen as the precursors to modern grupos 
financieros, the diversified finance networks organized around kinship that were widespread in the 
20th century.320 They managed a series of different businesses under the control of the inter-family 
group. While 19th century industrial organization was much looser than in the 20th, and the scope 
for broadly-based clusters financed through holding companies was much smaller, the same basic 
principles apply. Entrepreneurs connected to one another not via formal contracts or firm 
structures, but by kinship and intermarriage, grouped their projects together to secure the 
potential advantages of cooperation: increased scale and scope, information transfer, For 
Uruguay, there is clearly a similar pattern: extended kinship alliances of merchant families, 
cemented through strategic marriages, who came together, first informally and later formally, to 
finance their various entrepreneurial projects. 
Being Inglés 
The extent to which the British community can be described as an ethnically 
homogeneous middleman group is ambiguous. In support of the idea, it is clear that being British 
was a coherent identity, with a separate language, religious institutions, and social clubs. 
Furthermore, unlike most middleman groups, they had national representation as British citizens. 
The diplomatic representatives of Britain gave the British merchants of Uruguay substantial 
protection, and an official voice as a community. While the Foreign Office was always guarded 
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about committing itself to what it generally saw as the private speculations of merchants, this was 
nevertheless a source of substantial support.321 Being inglés in Uruguay was a clearly marked 
identity, and in this regard, we can consider this community as similar to other ethnically 
homogeneous middleman groups. 
However, there are also substantial problems with this interpretation. Notwithstanding 
the stereotype about the British community being aloof, something which was perhaps truer late 
in the 19th century, the British merchants of Uruguay did not keep to themselves. They engaged 
directly and frequently with the various groups operating in the area: Uruguayan criollo elites, 
both political and economic; other foreign merchant groups; and Brazilian and Argentine émigrés 
and exiles. They were not catalytic middlemen, enabling trade with Britain while remaining largely 
unchanged by the local society. They mixed and were changed by their mixing, although to varying 
degrees depending on the particular case. A more reasonable formulation would be to say that, 
while British merchants were certainly a distinct group, they were one part of a larger 
cosmopolitan nexus of actors gathered at Montevideo. Some groups were similar to the British in 
that they were primarily interested in conducting business. Migrant merchants from various 
regions of Europe clustered in Montevideo largely for the same purposes: to export Uruguayan 
rural produce to Europe, and to supply the markets of Uruguay and the littoral regions of the River 
Plate with the commodities particular to their home region. For Catalans and Italians, this largely 
meant wines and oils; for the French, a large wine trade, plus luxury goods; for the British, textiles 
and clothing, as well as some small quantity of machinery, and later, coal. 
However, if the import trade was differentiated by commodities and nationalities, the 
community of foreign merchants was open and increasingly integrated, both among one another 
and with local groups. Partnerships between merchants of different nationalities were rare at the 
firm level, but cooperation between firms for lobbying, investment, or finance was relatively 
common. Intermarriages between merchant families were a regular method of establishing and 
reinforcing valuable connections. The most successful British merchants established family links to 
merchants of other nationalities. Their children in the second generation continued not only their 
business interests, but also expanded the network. There are many examples of the typical 
pattern of strategic marriages, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. This 
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pattern fits less closely with the ethnically homogeneous group theories of Landa and Greif,322 and 
more with the “cosmopolitan bourgeoisie” proposed by Charles Jones.323 The integration of British 
merchants into the elite of Uruguayan society was a parallel process to their economic success, 
rather than a cause and effect. It was neither the case that integration did not matter, as social 
links simply followed on from economic success, nor that the links are the primary cause of that 
success. Rather, there was a dynamic cycle of increasing experience, resources, and social prestige.  
Establishing the Community 
 During the 19th century, Uruguay, and especially Montevideo, was a meeting point for a 
wide variety of groups, divided by ethnicity, nationality, religion, and status. Unlike many other 
regions of the former Spanish colonial empire, Uruguay was only sparsely populated, leaving 
substantial scope for immigration to change the demographics of the country. Over the course of 
the century, Montevideo, like its neighbour Buenos Aires, but also like other emerging 
metropolises such as New York or São Paulo, became a polyglot city, inhabited by distinctive 
groups of migrants, each with particular backgrounds and identities.324 Groups of foreign migrants 
had a large share of the population, and the origins of these groups are not stable over time. The 
Banda Oriental of the 18th century was still Spanish colonial in character, although a marginal part 
of the overall colonial system. It was only with the transformation of the Atlantic world, begun in 
the late 18th century, and accelerating through the ‘first globalization’ in the 19th, that Uruguay 
takes on its distinctive character as a cosmopolitan, immigrant society, as one of the destination 
countries for the great waves of European outmigration. 
The population of Uruguay during the early 19th century largely comprised relatively 
recent migrants from Europe. In the period before mid-century, these are largely French and 
Spanish immigrants, mostly from the Basque regions through the Atlantic ports Bordeaux in 
France, and Bilbao in Spain.325 By 1860, a third of the population were first generation migrants, 
and large shares of the remainder were the children or grandchildren of migrants, mostly from 
Europe, although Brazilians were predominant in the north. In Montevideo, the figures are even 
more remarkable, with 48% of the population being foreign, and mostly European, born. The total 
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number of Frenchmen in the country was 8,924, the number of Spaniards 19,064, and even at this 
early date, there are 10,209 Italians, the vanguard of a much larger, late-19th century migration to 
follow. 326   
By contrast, the British community in Uruguay was small, numbering only 1068 across the 
country, 0.5% of the population. They were clustered in high-trade regions, including Montevideo 
and the littoral along the river Uruguay. The British were more concentrated in Montevideo than 
the population average (56%as opposed to 26%) but less so than many other European groups, 
including the French (69%) or the Italians (74%).327  In Montevideo, the proportion rises to 1% of 
the total, and in Colonia, it is as high as 1.3%. By contrast, in Cerro Largo on the border with Brazil, 
there are only ten inhabitants returned as British, for a tiny total of 0.05% of the population. 
British residents lived alongside British- owned businesses: at commercial houses in Montevideo, 
and estancias and saladeros in the countryside. Those in turn were located for economic efficiency 
by the major waterways and communications routes. Without barriers to entry or a large pre-
existing community, British merchants were free to migrate to wherever they found economic 
opportunity.  
It is in this context, then, that the British community of Uruguay must be situated, as a 
small but highly influential minority group. They are the British segment of a European merchant 
diaspora, originating from a variety of major trading centres, including Liverpool, Barcelona, 
Bordeaux, Hamburg, and Genoa. The British community is most similar to the German, in terms of 
numbers and occupations, and dissimilar to the larger waves of French, Spanish and Italian 
migrants that dominate the population. However, the merchant elites from these latter groups 
share more with their economic class, the British merchants included, than with their national 
compatriots. 
What characteristics were typical of the British merchants of Uruguay? While each 
merchant has a particular story, there are some generalities that can be extracted from their 
experiences.328 First, they were mostly Northerners and Scots, from the areas around Manchester, 
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Liverpool, and Glasgow. Second, they were generally young men when they arrived in South 
America, around 18 years of age. They came as commercial apprentices, clerks, and supercargoes 
seeking markets. Their families were generally in commerce, specializing in the emerging lines of 
trade with the River Plate: clothing and textiles for exports, and hides for imports. 
Constructing a definitive list of British merchants in Uruguay is problematic, due to the 
paucity of sources, as well as the constant flux of firms entering and leaving the market. To 
establish the dimensions of the British merchant community, this chapter relies on the 
commission of directors for the Sociedad Compradora de los Derechos de la Aduana (investors 
who had purchased the rights to the customs house) who compiled a list of 144 merchants and 
firms accredited to make dispatches at the customs house in 1844. Since the Sociedad 
Compradora had control over the customs, it seems plausible that this list is a more or less 
complete register of the companies trading at Montevideo in this period. There are a total of 28 
British merchant firms listed on this register, comprising approximately 20% of the total.329 
Further evidence regarding the scope of the community and its development can be found 
by examining the contributors to the protestant church and burial ground. The British status as a 
religious minority set them apart socially and institutionally from the rest of the population, since 
most of the native Uruguayan European immigrant communities were Catholics. A list of 
subscribers to the protestant burial ground from 1825 contains 30 names of individuals and 
companies.330 While it is unclear how many are merchants, the list shows many important early 
firms and families: John Jackson, Francis Hocquard, Stanley Black and Co., the Gowlands, McLean 
and McEachen. It also shows substantial turnover in the community from the date of the list, in 
1825, and the date of the enclosing document containing the list sent to the Foreign Office in 
1832; of the 30 names on the list, 12 are given as having left Montevideo, and 5 were dead. 
Nevertheless, looking forwards to the 1830s and 1840s, many of these names persisted, an old 
guard for the merchant community dating back at least as far as the Cisplatine period of the 
1820s. A letter requesting payment from the British government for the costs of operating the 
                                                          
329 See: Appendix 1, table 3. April 10, 1844. Carpeta 13, Caja 1632, Ministerio de Hacienda, Archivo General 
de la Nación. This list can be compared to other, more subjective lists, such as that presented in Isidoro de 
María, Anales de la defensa de Montevideo, 1842-51, t. 1 (Montevideo: Imprenta a vapor del Ferro-Carril, 
1885), 260. 
330 List of Subscribers to the English Burial Ground at Montevideo, made the 10th of August 1825. National 
Archives at Kew, FO 51/142, 24. 
133 
 
 
British Cemetery was sent to the Foreign Office in February of 1841, and was signed by 23 
individuals or firms, many of which are the same names as appeared in the earlier 1825 list.331  
Nevertheless, there are many new names that appear by the 1840s, merchants who 
migrated to Montevideo, either seeking opportunity in the newly independent port, or in reaction 
to the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas as Governor of Buenos Aires, and de facto dictator of the 
Argentine Republic. While Rosas’s relationship with the British community in Buenos Aires is 
complex, it is clear that his authoritarian rule and anti-foreign sentiment put many British 
merchants on guard, even as they largely accommodated his influence, and perhaps even 
benefitted from his law and order regime. Those who could not reconcile themselves with Rosas, 
however, had an alternative locus for trade at Montevideo. Several key merchants, most notably 
Samuel Lafone and several of his close associates, such as George Hodgskin, John Kemsley, and 
Thomas Tomkinson, gathered in Montevideo and began assembling an anti-Rosas coalition of 
merchants that would come into prominence during the guerra grande. Others maintained 
operations in both cities, either under their own name, such as the Hughes Brothers, or through 
associated inter-partner linkages, such Anderson Macfarlane and Co., who were connected with 
Anderson Weller and Co. in Buenos Aires. 
Elite Connections: The Jacksons of Uruguay 
 The family of John Jackson, one of the earliest and most successful British merchants in 
Uruguay, provides a case study for merchants serving a linking function between elite groups in 
Europe and in South America.332 Jackson had established his wealth by a variety of means, acting 
as an importer of Manchester manufactures on consignment, from such major firms as Owen 
Owens and Co. 333 He was partnered early in his career with members of the Gowland family, who 
were influential on both sides of the River Plate. He also acted as a discounter of merchant bills, 
putting him at the centre of the nascent credit market in Montevideo, earning large sums from his 
relatively extensive capital, plus his reputation in the community.334 He was also one of the earliest 
merchants to invest in land, acquiring substantial rural estates as early as 1825, where he raised 
both cattle and sheep. John Jackson, and his eldest son Juan Dámaso Jackson, were integrated at 
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the highest levels into both societies, a position they used to obtain advantages and forge linkages 
for themselves and for their respective families.  
On the British side, the Jacksons were closely linked with the Rathbone family of Liverpool. 
Rathbone Bros. was a commission house of worldwide scope, leaders in the Liverpool merchant 
community, with dealings around the world, from China and India to Latin America and the United 
States. Their firm had capitalization of £100,000 in 1855335, making them one of the best 
capitalized, and presumably largest, merchant firms operating in Liverpool. The Rathbone family 
was involved in a series of philanthropic works as well as political causes. They were active 
Gladstonian Liberals, proponents of free trade, and staunch anti-slavery abolitionists. Politically 
ascendant in the 19th century, the Rathbones could claim prominent politicians among their 
members. William Rathbone V was elected Mayor of Liverpool in 1837, and his son William 
Rathbone VI became an MP for Liverpool in 1868. The family moved in and out of the Society of 
Friends, disagreeing, reconciling, and eventually splitting with the church over the exclusion of 
dealings with members of other faiths.336 Nevertheless, the Rathbones were strongly connected 
with the Quakers, whose society was famous for its closely-knit merchant networks. 
A social connection of this magnitude was a source of  advantage for the Jacksons. First, it 
gave them a substantial commercial contact. Rathbone Bros. acted as buyers for the wool 
produced on the estates of the Jacksons, at least from the 1850s. They also served as one of the 
connections leaned upon by Uruguayan merchants and saladeristas to assist in opening up the 
British market for the sale of tasajo. In 1861, Juan Dámaso Jackson sent samples to William 
Rathbone, telling him about the importance of new markets and that the alternative to selling it in 
Europe was to simply waste the beef. When the directors of the Club Nacional agreed upon the 
necessity of finding new, European markets to counteract the crashing price of tasajo, they set out 
to find those merchants in Uruguay who had the most useful connections with Britain, among 
whom the Rathbone Bros. figured prominently, along with the Lafones. Juan D. Jackson also used 
Rathbone as a potential source of entrepreneurial information, asking for samples of cotton for 
use in cash crop experimentation.337  
It is clear from the tone and topics of correspondence that the connections between the 
Rathbones and the Jacksons were as much a matter of family as of commerce. The second 
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generation of Jacksons in Uruguay, Juan, Pedro, Alberto and Clara and Elena, were educated in 
Britain, and lived with the Rathbones for some time. It was there that Juan received his 
commercial education. Even at the time, there was a perception that the Rathbones, perhaps due 
to their Quaker affiliation, valued hard work and entrepreneurship. Juan D. Jackson them with his 
acquisition of such values, saying he acquired in their house “the habit of occupation.”338 It is 
possible, then, that this was kind of education was one mechanism for transferring 
entrepreneurial culture from Britain to Uruguay, one which would extend its influence to later 
generations. 
This type of cultural transfer must be considered with caution, however, especially in light 
of Juan’s brother Pedro Jackson, whose demeanour was “quite opposed” to the disciplined and 
entrepreneurial character ascribed to his brother.339 Clara Jackson, his sister, thanked William 
Rathbone for his salubrious influence.340 However, it became clear that Pedro was neither 
interested nor suited to following in his father’s footsteps, nor in working alongside his brother. He 
himself claimed that he was “never made for a merchant.”341 His family despaired of finding 
gainful employment for him, and after several abortive attempts to set him up working alongside 
Juan in the barraca (warehousing) business, he was sent to live on the family estancia where he 
was put in charge of managing their extensive flocks of sheep. Far from inheriting the Quaker-
influenced entrepreneurial spirit of the Rathbones, he was considered ill-tempered, rash, and lazy, 
with his family having to intervene on many occasions to prevent scandal. It is worth 
remembering, then, that even if there is some transference of entrepreneurial culture, there were 
still substantial individual variations in aptitude and personality, and that not every Englishman 
was prepared to be a member of the economic elite.  
 On the Uruguayan side, John Jackson’s marriage to Clara Errazquin, the daughter of 
influential merchant and politician Pedro José de Errazquin and Josefa Larrañaga, herself a 
member of another major Uruguayan political family.342 Clara’s brothers included Joaquín 
Errazquin, a local merchant who played a significant role in managing the Jackson estates after the 
death of John in 1854, and Manuel José Errazquin, who was, at various times, a Senator, Minister 
of the Treasury, a representative for Montevideo in the legislature, and successful merchant in 
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partnership with Joaquín. These family connections in turn attached the Jacksons to some of the 
most influential Blanco party luminaries: the Berro family, who were business partners with the 
Errazquin, and the Oribe family, including Manuel Oribe, second president of Uruguay and one of 
the feuding caudillos during the guerra grande. The connections of the Jacksons to the Blanco, 
rather than Colorado side of the political elite marked them as a slightly unusual case during the 
political conflicts of the 1840s and 1860s. They were closely associated with the government of 
Bernardo Berro, from 1860-1864, and had a strong antipathy towards the Colorado caudillo 
Venancio Flores, who dominated Uruguayan politics in the early 1850s, and eventually returned to 
overthrow Berro. 
 Within one generation, the Jacksons had established direct family links to Basque, German 
and Catalan merchant families. They were well-situated to take advantage of connections to the 
local political elite, and to the international merchant community. Through the Errazquin, they 
were connected with Felix Buxareo, a Catalan merchant of substantial wealth. Juan Dámaso 
Jackson married Petrona Cibils, daughter of Jaime Cibils, merchant, saladerista, and banker. The 
Cibils and the Jacksons would later collaborate on the Cibils-Jackson docks, begun in 1874, and one 
of the earliest and most important dry-dock facilities in South America. Albert Jackson, the 
youngest son of John, had a brief marriage to Rosa Artagaveytia, daughter of the Basque merchant 
and Blanco colonel Ramon Artagaveytia, although Albert died soon afterwards. Clara Jackson, for 
her part, married Carlos Heber, merchant and native of Frankfurt. 343 
Having arrived at least a decade earlier than most British merchants, and more deeply 
integrated into the local elite, they opposed foreign intervention, and reacted with scarcely-
disguised loathing at their British contemporaries’ attempts to influence the political situation in 
favour of the Colorado faction. John Jackson wrote on several occasions to the Times of London 
complaining of the ways in which many British merchants, along with Commodore Purvis and the 
plenipotentiary William Gore Ouseley, had compromised their otherwise good name by violating 
the principles of neutrality and involving themselves in local conflicts.344 His son Juan D. Jackson 
clearly shared this view of the community, writing bitterly to William Rathbone that: 
“…most of the Englishmen of note here have made their fortune in our revolutions, either buying 
confiscated or public properties or obtaining privileges from generally revolutionary & illegal 
governments of course sure always of the protection of their government... We have several 
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Englishmen who occupy themselves in nothing more than claims & who are the declared enemies 
of the present government, because it is the only one that has put an end to revolutions & who has 
had pluck to call them to order…”345 
This political stance may explain the general lack of linkages between the Jacksons and other 
British merchants in Uruguay. John Jackson also converted to Catholicism, and his children were 
raised in that faith, marking a further rift between the Jacksons, who were deeply integrated into 
the Blanco faction of the Uruguayan community, and the Colorado-oriented faction led by Samuel 
Lafone. The latter was centred not only around Lafone’s economic sphere of influence, but also 
around the Anglican Holy Trinity church, which had been built with his donation of land and 
money. The Jacksons, by contrast, left the legacy of the Jackson family chapel, built by Clara 
Jackson de Errazquin, the widow of John Jackson, a Catholic rather than Anglican institution.  
Family Networks: Samuel Fisher Lafone 
The case of Samuel Lafone provides another concrete example of the ways in which a 
merchant’s family network could contribute to their entrepreneurship. Lafone was one of the 
most influential, and for most of his career successful, British merchants in Uruguay. He was 
known for the tremendous scope of his entrepreneurial activities. During his career, he was a 
merchant, banker, estanciero, saladerista, land speculator, and tax farmer. His various projects 
ranged from colonization schemes such as the Pueblo Victoria on the outskirts of Montevideo, or 
Lafonia in the Falkland Islands, through importing machinery for the production of tasajo, to being 
one of the principal financiers of the Colorado faction in the guerra grande. He owned mines in 
Catamarca and in Cuñapirú, tried convert Punta del Este into a new port, and generally involved 
himself in an astoundingly large range of entrepreneurial projects. Given that Samuel could not 
possibly oversee all of these projects directly, how did he overcome the problems of trust and 
supervision in finding managers and agents? 
The answer is family.346 Samuel used his connections in Britain, not only with his family’s 
firm, but with allied firms in Liverpool and London, to secure finance and to sell rural produce. 
First, and most important, were his family’s connections in the Liverpool leather trade going back 
to the 18th century. Samuel Fisher’s great-grandfather, Alexander Lafone, is listed as a merchant 
in Gore’s Directory of Liverpool as far back as 1774, but little is known about his status. A firm 
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named Samuel Lafone and Co. of Liverpool was dissolved in February 1796,347 and shortly 
afterwards, a Liverpool merchant named Samuel Lafone was declared bankrupt.348 While it is not 
certain that this is the same Samuel Lafone as the father of the Uruguay merchant, what is certain 
is that by March 1826, there is another bankruptcy for one Samuel Lafone, along with James 
Graham. In this case, it is clearly the correct Samuel, living in Toxteth Park and described as a 
“Tanner, Cowkeeper, and Farmer, Dealer and Chapman.”349 
We can gain some concept of the scale of the Matthews, Brothers and Company tannery 
in which Lafone (père) was a partner through evidence he gave as a witness for the Select 
Committee on the Leather Trade in 1816. From his testimony, we learn that “the house with which 
he is connected” paid 1/24th of the total duties on leather for England and Wales, on over 
2,100,000 lbs. of leather. Matthews, Brothers and Co. was also already in 1816 much more in the 
business of processing imported hides than domestic ones, at a ratio of 10,000 British hides to 40-
50,000 foreign. Thus the supply of cheap imported hides was already a priority for the firm, and 
probably a factor in the eventual relocation of Samuel and Alexander Lafone to the River Plate; the 
family moved upstream into the hides trade, presumably acting as suppliers for themselves, 
although evidence from inside the firm is lacking. 
The elder Samuel complains in his testimony to the select committee of excessive duties, 
and mentions that his firm has been operating at a loss, at least since the introduction of new 
duties in 1812, claiming that many tanners in North England must “inevitably be ruined” by such 
measures.350 Given the bankruptcy of his house, he may have been correct. So, while the Lafone 
family was well-placed in the Liverpool hides trade, and dealt in large volumes, they had fallen on 
hard times. Samuel Lafone complained that “I have been ruined, and all those concerned with me, 
by the restrictions and duty alone, and a princely fortune lost.”351 While some of this is no doubt 
histrionics in lobbying for the repeal of the duties, it seems plausible that it also reflects a 
genuinely poor situation in the trade, as evidenced by his later bankruptcy. It also suggests that 
the Lafones had some measure of wealth prior to this point, and the elite status of the family 
throughout the 19th century suggests their setback was, at most, a temporary one. 
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In 1813, Samuel Lafone was a partner in the hides trading firm Thomas Beckwith and Co., 
from which Thomas Beckwith separated, leaving the remaining partners to continue their 
operation as Mathews, Brothers and Company.352 The family association with the Beckwiths must 
have continued, as Falconnet wrote in 1843 that Samuel Lafone’s agents were the Beckwiths in 
London, although in 1844 he reported Lafone’s agents as Boutcher, Mortimore and Co. That firm 
also operated under the name Ricketts, Boutcher and Co., and was involved directly in the River 
Plate hides trade.353 This would also become an important alliance between firms and families, 
solidified through Samuel’s half-brother Alfred, who joined, and eventually headed, the firm of 
Boutcher, Mortimore and Co. 
Alfred went on to marry Jane Boutcher, daughter of William Boutcher and Elizabeth 
Mortimore, in 1852, reinforcing the integration of the Lafone family with their business network. 
While Alfred Lafone’s political career postdates the death of Samuel Fisher Lafone, it indicates the 
upwards trajectory of the family: he was elected as the Conservative MP for Bermondsey twice, in 
1886 and again in 1895. Although we cannot know for each case whether a shared social circle 
caused intermarriage, which then had economic consequences, or whether economic priorities 
were the incentives for marriages, it is clear that the social and business worlds were not at all 
separable. In Britain as in Uruguay during the era of the family firm, marriages could also be 
mergers. 
On a more direct level, Samuel Lafone used his brothers and half-brothers as managers 
and even as diplomats, overseeing his enterprises. His closest business connection was with 
Alexander Ross Lafone, his younger brother. They initially divided their labours across the River 
Plate, with Alexander managing their affairs in Buenos Aires in the 1830s and early 1840s, and 
Samuel doing the same at Montevideo.354 During the first years of the siege of Montevideo, 
Alexander returned to England to manage their enterprises from Liverpool, and also to lobby the 
British government for intervention against Rosas.  Samuel’s younger half-brother Henry 
apparently worked in partnership with their father in running the family tanning business. His 
other half-brother, William Lafone, worked alongside him in Montevideo throughout much of this 
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period. He owned a small estancia with three thousand sheep and two thousand cattle at the 
Rincon del Sauce in 1854. Likely, this estancia is connected to his brothers’ interests at Punta del 
Este. 
Samuel’s brothers-in-law also played a major role in his businesses. His sister Martha 
married John Pownall Dale, and the two of them moved to Uruguay in the 1830s so that he could 
manage Lafone’s new model saladero at La Teja. He would later go on to manage Samuel and 
Alexander’s colony in the Falkland Islands before moving back to Britain. Dale also acted as 
temporary British consul in Uruguay during the initial years of the siege of Montevideo, a political 
position that no doubt both reflected and extended Lafone’s political influence. Juan Quevedo, the 
brother of Samuel Lafone’s wife Maria Quevedo y Alsina, played a crucial role in the operation of 
his business empire, acting as his agent and attorney in countless transactions until the death of 
Samuel Fisher in 1871. He appears in the 1836 Montevideo census in the household of Samuel 
Lafone, only 18 years of age at the time, which means he most likely left Buenos Aires along with 
Samuel.355 He would go on to become an entrepreneur in his own right, as a merchant, estanciero, 
and director of the Montevideo gas company.356 
International Commercial Networks 
Family, however, could only go so far in generating a network. Commerce required 
exchanges of products, credit, and information on a far wider scale than could be accomplished 
entirely through intermarriage. In the 19th century, trade moved along networks of 
interconnected firms. Individual commercial houses were the regionally-specific intermediaries of 
these networks. In order to carry out their business, they relied heavily upon one another to 
overcome the difficulties of trade by providing information, advancing credit, and forging 
international connections. Most importantly, they required a consistent flow of commercial paper. 
Merchants regularly advanced their own credit to local retailers in order to sell their products, and 
drew upon their connections in Britain to obtain the funds to operate flexibly in the Uruguayan 
market. 
But, of course, credit could not only move one way, and bills eventually had to be paid. 
Remittances to Britain were made through one of three channels: rural products, commercial 
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paper, and precious metals.357 The safest choices, silver and gold, faced prohibitive opportunity 
costs for removing specie from Montevideo, where it earned a premium of “12% per annum at 
least,” and frequently more.358 The British merchant therefore sought to keep their hard currency 
in the River Plate and loan it out locally to take advantage of high rates of return. Looking for 
alternatives, merchant houses remitted directly in “frutos del pais”, the rural produce of the 
countryside. For some merchants, including Samuel Lafone, this was their primary business, 
supplying hides and other cattle by-products such as tallow and bone ash to the British market. 
However, the preferred method for remittances was commercial paper.359 Merchant 
networks helped ensure the international flow of credit without relying directly on banking 
institutions, which did not exist in Uruguay until the late 1850s. The commercial houses of 
Montevideo were the nearest substitute to serve financial functions because they stood at a 
nexus; they were connected to the secure, high-capital economy of Britain via their parent firms 
and commercial networks in the UK, and also to the capital-scarce, speculative, developing 
economy in Uruguay. They could, in essence, borrow at a low rate, and loan it out again at a much 
higher rate by making advances in manufactures to retailers, or more riskily, advances in cash to 
the government or private borrowers. 
The supply of merchant credit was maintained by the differing needs of various firms, and 
by their respective strategies. Firms making major purchases of pastoral products for remittance, 
or who were temporarily short of cash, would issue credit, which functioned as a substitute for 
paper money amongst merchants. The ability to draw upon firms from Europe when funds were 
needed, and to remit the paper of other firms, was the key to the operation of British businesses 
in Uruguay, and to their rapid expansion into other sectors. Without this, they would have been 
constrained by the same lack of credit that plagued local entrepreneurs, and would have had to 
borrow at the high rates prevalent in Uruguay, from 12% to 24% annually. Since there was neither 
a banking system, either private or state- operated, nor any scope for direct investment in the 
form of international firms until the 1860s, commercial houses were the best method by which 
capital could move from capital-abundant Britain to capital-scarce Uruguay. 
Functioning as conduits for credit for the lucrative Uruguayan market was remunerative, 
but also tremendously risky. Interruptions in trade could lead to mismatched liabilities, with assets 
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being largely held in illiquid properties and debts in South America, whereas liabilities were held 
bills, which regularly came due in Britain. An imbalance in flows, or a temporary downturn could 
spark a crisis of confidence. Such was the case of Samuel and Alexander Lafone in 1858. The 
Liverpool side of the firm, managed by Alexander, found itself massively in debt, to the amount of 
£246,549 pounds, and had to call in its creditors to arrange an agreement for repayment.360 He 
claimed that Samuel had been late in remitting goods, and that this had led to this suspension of 
payments. Alexander nevertheless obtained an agreement to repay 20 shillings to the pound, at 
5%, in three instalments at six month intervals.361 Enough confidence was placed in their house 
that no inspectors were required. This hands-off strategy for recouping debts appears to have paid 
off. He was reported to have paid the entire sum, and “fully justified the confidence reposed in 
him.”362   
We know from contemporary sources that Samuel Lafone’s problems owed much more to 
the commercial crisis of 1858, which had forced some of the major houses in both Montevideo 
and Buenos Aires to suspend payment, and likely to Samuel’s own highly expansionary and 
speculative investment strategy, than to a mere failure to remit frequently enough. A scathing 
article in The New York Times described the house’s failure as being due to Samuel’s “desperate 
ventures in exchanges, and from injudicious loans, including some to the Montevidean 
government, who are in an utterly penniless state, with enormous obligations.”363 The loans 
advanced by Lafone and others to the government will be the subject of another chapter; what 
concerns us here is the difference between American observers who saw Samuel Lafone as a 
speculator and loan-jobber, that is to say, observers outside the social and trade network of the 
Lafones, and their creditors in Liverpool, who made relatively generous arrangements to ensure 
the continued solvency of the house, on the strength of their reputation, the belief in their assets 
in Uruguay. 
Paying down this debt, however, required a substantial liquidation on the part of Lafone, 
and for this, he drew upon his social connections in Uruguay. Without access to his archive, we 
have a necessarily limited view of the measures he took to acquire the funds necessary to pay 
down the debts of his house. We do, however, have some indications from the judicial and 
notarial archives in Montevideo about the types of arrangements made, as well as the people with 
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whom he dealt. A committee from the Banco Comercial was established by his creditors to deal 
with the liquidation of his property, consisting of three major merchants: Thomas Tomkinson, 
Richard Hughes, and Joaquín Errazquin. It is likely not a coincidence that these were all closely 
connected to him, especially Tomkinson, the father-in-law of his daughter, and frequent business 
collaborator. Just as in Liverpool, deep connections in the local business community and an ethic 
of mutual support cushioned what would otherwise have been a crippling liquidity crisis. 
This was not necessarily a smooth process. In 1861, the escribania de comercio registers a 
series of protested bills against Samuel Lafone. These protests were made by some of the most 
important merchants and merchant firms in the plaza, including Jaime Cibils, Burrasco y Piñerua, 
Farriols y Guimara, Ramon Arocena, and Enrique Ochoa.364 In an attempt to cover his debts, 
Lafone offered his famed saladero, La Teja, to the Barón de Mauá, on condition of resale in a 
year’s time, for £20,000 in Sterling. In addition, he was extended credit though the firm of 
Carruthers de Castro and Co., Mauá’s firm in Río de Janeiro, although it appears he did not make 
use of it.365 Throughout this process, Juan Quevedo, his young brother-in-law, acted as his legal 
representative, likely an indication of how integrated he was in Lafone’s businesses. By all 
accounts, by the mid-1860s, Samuel Lafone had cleared his debts, and continued to operate as 
one of the major saladeristas in the region, and although it was clear that the peak of his influence 
as a merchant-investor had passed, his businesses had largely survived a crisis by drawing upon 
the social resources available to him. His colleagues and relatives made arrangements to cover his 
short-term debts in hopes of saving his long-run interests, thus preserving their own stake 
The Case of Anderson Macfarlane and Co. 
The merchant firm of Anderson Macfarlane and Co. was a commercial partnership 
operating between John Anderson in Glasgow, Scotland, and John Macfarlane, in Montevideo. Like 
most British houses, they were primarily in the business of importing manufactured textiles and 
clothes, and remitting both in rural produce and in commercial bills.  It is important to note that 
this firm was part of a relatively dense network of firms in both Buenos Aires and Montevideo, on 
the South American side, and Glasgow and Liverpool in Britain. John Macfarlane also partnered 
with John Rennie in the firm Rennie Macfarlane, whereas John Anderson operated in Buenos Aires 
along with the Liverpool merchant Spencer D. Weller as Anderson Weller and Co. In Montevideo, 
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their correspondence was written by John MacColl and the Macrae brothers, William and 
James.366 
The major surviving source for this firm is a letter book from their Montevideo house, 
covering the years 1846-1850, held at the National Archives at Kew in London.367 The letters 
contained therein reveal the various functions of the merchant firm in action. They reveal how the 
Montevideo branch represented itself to its suppliers, creditors, fellow merchants, and internally 
to its overseas partner, John Anderson.  The overall picture is bleak. The last years covered by the 
letter book were the darkest years of the guerra grande for British commerce in Uruguay, 
following the end of the armed intervention in 1848 and the peace with Rosas. The firm was 
eventually forced, in 1848, to suspend payments, and to liquidate its assets, although the 
prolonged process for doing this meant that their operations continued throughout the period. 
The Anderson Macfarlane and Co. letter book contains all outgoing correspondence from 
the Montevideo house. Sorted by unique correspondents, it reveals the breadth of their network, 
including suppliers, creditors, and informational contacts. With this information, we can 
tentatively answer some basic questions about merchants’ international networks: with how many 
firms did they correspond, and what was the geographical distribution of those firms? Being a 
Scottish firm, rather than an English one, there is a strong emphasis on correspondents in 
Scotland, and particularly in Glasgow. Since they do not appear to have been involved in the tasajo 
industry, there are no correspondents in Cuba or Brazil. The list reveals the areas both in South 
America and Britain that were within the scope of a firm’s operations.368For the United Kingdom, 
the correspondence list is dominated by four locations: Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and 
London. Trade through Liverpool, and to a lesser extent Glasgow, supplying goods manufactured 
in Manchester, was the most important element of commerce. For this particular firm Glasgow 
alone accounts for almost half of all correspondents (48 of 106), since commercial paper from 
Glasgow houses was an important element of Anderson Macfarlane’s remittances. Information as 
well as remittances flowed from Montevideo to Glasgow. The correspondence network served to 
update their peers of the turbulent state of affairs in Montevideo. Letters carried crucial 
information about prices, credit, politics, and the trustworthiness of local agents, all necessary to 
successfully conduct business. 
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The question of obtaining bills for remittance was of primary importance for Anderson 
Macfarlane and Co. The supply of such bills, and the price at which they could be gotten, 
functioned as a kind of exchange rate between capital in Britain and capital in Uruguay. When 
times were good, and firms who wanted to purchase products and make investments in Uruguay 
were drawing heavily upon their parent houses, their credit could be purchased to make 
remittances at good rates. In times of economic disruption, when firms were trying to cover 
existing debts rather than create new ones, options became more limited, forcing prices up and 
driving the safest paper out of the market. Samuel Lafone, consistent with his risk-taking approach 
to business, appears to have been a major source of bills, as one of the few merchants in the 
market consistently drawing upon his factors in England, the leather firm Ricketts, Boutcher and 
Co.369 
London was the home of Cotesworth, Powell and Pryor, who served as financiers for 
Anderson Macfarlane and Co. Most of their discussions with that firm concern issues of credit, 
rather than supply of goods. Remittances were made via Cotesworth, Powell and Pryor for goods 
sold on consignment to other firms.370 The larger London firm acted as a major network hub, 
connecting several suppliers to make consignments at the Montevideo house, and receiving 
remittances to Britain in the form of bills of exchange. In this supply network, we can see the 
outlines of a more sophisticated banking system beginning to take shape in order to facilitate 
international transactions. Although during the 1840s, it remained at the level of a network of 
commercial paper, by the 1850s many of these merchants, including Samuel Lafone, were at the 
forefront of developing the earliest banks in Uruguay. By the 1860s, British banks were operating 
in the region, most notably the London and River Plate bank, which established branches at 
Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and used old River Plate merchants (notably James Lowry for 
Uruguay) as local consultants. 
Immigrant Entrepreneurship: Richard Bannister Hughes 
This section will examine the case of Richard Bannister Hughes, merchant and landowner. 
His case is notable for several reasons. First, Richard Hughes did not act as an agent of an existing 
British firm seeking to internationalize. The firm of Hughes Brothers was established directly in the 
River plate, without an associated merchant house in the United Kingdom. Second, his career is 
both a literal and figurative example of entrepreneurial exploration. Hughes moved between 
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trades, regions, sectors, and countries over time. More exploration than diversification, Hughes 
engaged in a near-constant entrepreneurial search for new ventures. The examination of Hughes 
as a case study lends biographical concreteness to the broader issue of British merchants as 
transformative agents and profit-seeking, risk-taking entrepreneurs in Uruguay in this period. It 
focuses on several phases: the accumulation of human capital, the exploratory search for markets 
and resources, the development of his merchant house, his forays into banking, the transition 
from merchant to estanciero, and finally his role as president of the Asociación Rural del Uruguay, 
an influential lobbyist and advocate for progressive economic ideas. It will also show the parallels 
with the progression of British entrepreneurship in the region, from the era of the merchant 
house, through their upstream diversification into rural investment, and finally, the connections 
between the activities of merchant-entrepreneurs and the emergence of the modern meat 
processing firm in Uruguay: the Liebig’s Extract of Meat Company.371 An evaluation of the overall 
career and impact of Hughes will show empirically how merchants adapted their strategy to the 
changing situation in Uruguay, and the impact of British entrepreneurship in the development of 
the Uruguayan economy.  
The career of Richard Bannister Hughes fits elegantly with the epoch of the merchant 
house in the River Plate, both in terms of period and in representing the evolution of British 
entrepreneurship. The scope of his economic activity was geographically broad; while Hughes’s 
independent entrepreneurial career was launched in Uruguay, and also ends in Uruguay, he was 
far from a single-country specialist. His career spans much of Latin America, having begun in the 
West Indies, and involved substantial periods in both Brazil and Argentina before settling 
permanently in Uruguay. More even than most River Plate merchants, his scope was regional, 
moving not only between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, but also up the Uruguay river, both on 
his landmark exploratory commercial journey to Paraguay, and later as a colonist and landowner 
in Paysandú.  
Like most River Plate merchants, he was a northerner, born on the 27th of March 1810 in 
Liverpool.372 Not much is known about the situation of his family. What we do know is that he had 
at least two brothers, James and Thomas, who later joined him in forming the firm Hughes 
Brothers, which operated at Liverpool, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Río Grande. At the age of 
13, he travelled to Santo Domingo as a commercial apprentice. Sometime later, he worked for 
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Richard Carruthers in Brazil, at his import/export house Carruthers and Co. It is said that there he 
met a teenaged Irineo Evangelista de Souza, the future Barón de Mauá, banker to the empire of 
Brazil and the most important financier in Uruguay during the 1850s and 1860s.373  
Richard’s first exposure to the River Plate market appears to have been as a clerk for 
Uruguayan merchant León Ellauri, a post he held at least as early as 1829. It was from this base 
that he went into business with his brothers, and founded the firm that would be the basis of his 
later successes. At some point in the early 1830s, Hughes launched his own merchant house 
alongside his brothers. Hughes Bros. appear to have begun as a small merchant house of good 
reputation. It does not appear to have been one of the large, well-connected firms working 
directly as commission agents for a large manufacturer, nor as buyers for a large leather firm. 
Instead, the prosperity of their firm rested entirely on managing a small quantity of capital well. 
This relied on the entrepreneurial judgement of the brothers, which was by all accounts held in 
high regard. Francis Falconnet, writing to Barings bank in 1843, glowingly describes their 
operations in the following terms: 
“A young and very respectable house, with limited means, but conducted with much prudence, 
their principle business is importing manufactures on own account, & on a/c of friends, remit 
seldom but in Ex[change], they now and then ship produce against letters of credit.”374 
 As was typical of foreign merchants of the era, Richard Bannister Hughes married into an 
established local merchant family. In 1834, a few years after establishing his own merchant house, 
Richard married Adelina Rücker, daughter of the Hamburg merchant Conrado Rücker and Isabel 
Alvarez de Navia.375 While it does not appear that Richard Bannister Hughes had the kind of deep 
family business connections of other British merchants such as Samuel Lafone, his family was still a 
substantial resource for his entrepreneurship. As is clear from the name, the Hughes Brothers 
were a family partnership, apparently not inherited from any prior family firm in England, but built 
entirely in the River Plate by the entrepreneurial skills of the brothers themselves.  
While the life of Richard Hughes is difficult enough to piece together from the surviving 
fragments, his brothers Thomas and James are even further hidden from our historical view. Since 
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Thomas and James left no known descendants, and do not appear to have been landowners, they 
left few traces in the archives, and their lives are therefore largely unknown. What is certain is that 
they operated as Richard Hughes’s partners in trade; James was, for at least some time in the 
1840s, the head of the Montevideo branch, and Thomas was at Buenos Aires. From family letters, 
it is certain that at least one brother travelled back to Britain to the family home at 11 Elizabeth 
Street in Liverpool, although it is unclear which brother is writing.376 
The social circle of merchants in the River Plate was more cosmopolitan than segregated, 
and Hughes’s family connections were not atypical. His 1834 marriage to Adelina Rücker cemented 
a key alliance with one of the most experienced and influential German merchants in the city, 
Conrado Rücker. It also, through his mother-in-law, tied Hughes into the Navia family, from the old 
colonial Spanish elite. This included Carlos Navia, one of the founders of the Banco Comercial, and 
later the eponymous Banco Navia. 377 It also included Joaquina Navia who would, in 1843, become 
the wife of Thomas Tomkinson, another influential British merchant-entrepreneur. Hughes was 
thus an integral part of the nucleus of European merchants who became the vanguard of 
Uruguayan development in the 1850s and 1860s.  
One of the defining events in Richard Hughes’s career was his landmark voyage upriver to 
Paraguay, with the intention of assessing potential markets, selling a cargo at a substantial profit, 
and exploring possible opportunities. From July 1841 to February 1842, he led an expedition up 
the Río Paraná to Paraguay. His voyage also had the official imprimatur of the Foreign Office, 
which was willing to bless the journey as a potential method of re-establishing commercial and 
diplomatic contact with Paraguay. The inland country had, early in the Independence process, 
broken off entirely from the rest of the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. The dictator José 
Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia had pursued a course of near-total isolationism, maintaining 
Paraguayan autonomy, but also removing it from the flows of international commerce. Re-
establishing contact was thus seen as a potential windfall for British trade. 
Information about the true state of this potential market was scarce, but rumour and 
myth, built on a long European tradition of viewing Paraguay as a Jesuit paradise of great wealth 
and population, portrayed a major market cut off from the world by political choice, rather than 
poverty.378  However, lacking any regular communication, the only reliable method for an 
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entrepreneur to obtain the information necessary for either trade or investment was to travel 
there. Hughes was the first British merchant to take this step. Written by Richard Hughes himself, 
the logbook for the voyage is a classic example of a British travel account from the period, rich in 
geographical, historical and cultural detail, providing bits of local colour through vignettes and 
anecdotes. However picturesque, its most interesting feature is what it reveals about Hughes as an 
entrepreneur.  
What is evident is that his voyage to Paraguay was not only about reaching the destination 
and trading goods, a pure exercise in market-making, although it certainly served that purpose. It 
was also about accumulating information for potential investments in the riverine region. He 
would later put this information to use in developing his rural enterprises in the 1850s, although 
the focus of his activities would be along the Río Uruguay rather than the Paraná. This kind of 
entrepreneurial eye for opportunity can be seen in various comments recorded in the log. Early in 
the voyage, passing by some of the islands near the mouth of the river, Hughes comments that “I 
could not help imagining what excellent situations they would form for a young colony, with 
abundance of two great necessities, feed and water, & with a hundred navigable streams 
facilitating communication,” although the yearly flooding in the region would make that particular 
plan unworkable.379 Still, the comment reveals that even as early as 1841, Richard Hughes is clearly 
looking at the littoral zone of the River Plate not only from the market-oriented perspective of a 
travelling merchant, but also as a potential investor. 
Nevertheless, Hughes’s trip to Paraguay was a source of controversy; the issue of Rosas’s 
closing of the interior rivers and the scope of the potential for British trade with Paraguay were 
hotly debated in the polemics of the time, advocating both for and against British intervention. 
British partisans of the Colorado cause wrote glowingly) about the limitless Paraguayan market, 
making reference to an abundance of timber, and limitless cheap labour, among other advantages.  
General O’Brien, writing to the Foreign Office on behalf of the besieged government at 
Montevideo, wrote that the lands of Paraguay were “the richest and most fertile provinces in the 
world, by a near union of the two great rivers, the Amazons and the La Plata… [the trade is] 
second only in value, extent and importance to that of China.”380 These assertions, while totally 
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implausible from a modern perspective,381 would not necessarily have been rejected out of hand 
in London, where knowledge of Paraguay was scarce. 
Opponents of intervention, meanwhile, downplayed the importance of the Paraguayan 
market, and therefore inveighing against siding with Montevideo in the conflict with Buenos Aires. 
One anonymous pamphlet wrote that “There is no man, practically acquainted with the subject, 
who does not know that the idea of a foreign trade with the interior of the river Paraná is utterly 
chimerical, however much it may have been cried up for interested purposes,” and that the 
pursuit of such would yield only a “vain and worthless shadow.”382 In any case, as argued by 
pamphleteer Alfred Mallalieu, the problem would be solved anyway by allowing Paraguay to fall 
under the control of Argentina, making the trade internal to that country.383 
Neither of these sets of opinions quite matches what we know about the potential trade 
with Paraguay, as experienced directly by Hughes during his voyage. There was clearly business to 
be done in this region. Unbeknownst to Hughes or any other entrepreneur from further down the 
river, by the time he departed, the government of Paraguay had changed. The isolationist 
dictatorship had ended with the death of Francia in September 1840. While the new ruling junta 
led by Carlos Antonio López was not outward-oriented, it did mark a potential opening of the 
country from the extreme anti-foreign policy that had dominated Paraguay for thirty years. The 
timing of Hughes’s journey was thus fortuitous, at least from the perspective of Paraguayan policy, 
and he stood to make substantial profits from being the first mover in this newly opened market.  
Hughes not only sold his goods and returned with cargo to sell, but wanted to return upriver in 
1842 to fetch goods he had been unable to bring back on the first voyage; in this, he was blocked 
by Rosas, who had closed the rivers. However, this does not mean that there was a great deal of 
business to be done; Paraguay was a relatively poor region, whose inhabitants did not represent a 
large consumer market, an enormous source of desirable trade goods, nor an easily-accessible 
pool of cheap labour. What Paraguay did produce in abundance, timber and yerba mate, was 
mostly of regional interest, and did not represent a major British interest in keeping trade open. 
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Hughes complained of his mistreatment to the British Consul at Montevideo, John Pownall 
Dale, brother-in-law to Samuel Lafone, and a decided partisan of intervention. Dale, however, was 
unable to obtain redress from the Foreign Office, which was not at that point interested in 
entanglements in the River Plate. While Hughes clearly wanted either to receive his goods or 
obtain some compensation for them, the firm does not appear to have wanted this to become a 
polemical issue. When the Britannia, the British newspaper of Montevideo (and likely a 
propaganda vehicle for Lafone) published an anonymous letter complaining of how Richard 
Hughes had been tricked by Rosas, James Hughes replied that the author did not know anything 
about his brother’s affairs, and was in no position to discuss such things.384 Presumably, this was 
an attempt to maintain their house’s neutrality; Lafone and the partisans of intervention were, for 
fairly obvious reasons, targets of official scorn in Buenos Aires at the time.  
From all appearances, it both made him a substantial profit on the voyage itself, and gave 
him information that shaped his future investments. In the medium term, however, he was 
prevented from returning to Paraguay again by Juan Manuel de Rosas’s edict closing the rivers to 
foreign commerce. Thus, the voyage had little direct impact on the pattern of trade conducted by 
the Hughes Bros., which remained in the import/export trade focused at Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo. Nevertheless, a strategy should not be assessed on its consequences, but on a 
forward-looking evaluation of the contingent possibilities in the context of the time. The complex 
diplomatic, military and economic situation of the 1840s was not a predictable process, as 
evidenced by the failure of almost all parties involved to attain their end objectives. Adapting to 
these obstacles was, at least in part, a matter of exploring the available strategic options, including 
emergent possibilities resulting from political changes. Paraguay was one potential avenue for 
expanding the trade of Hughes Brothers. It could have been a profitable opportunity, contingent 
on the truth of various uncertain propositions: the current and potential prosperity of the 
Paraguayan trade, which was poorly understood; the free navigation of the rivers; the diplomatic 
stance of the British government; and the military outcomes of the various regional conflicts.  
In retrospect, we know that the Paraguay trade was neither large nor tremendously 
profitable, although certainly larger than its polemical critics suggested at the time. Without the 
advantages of hindsight, the strategy of exploration appears rational. By both figuratively and 
literally exploring the opportunity for trade with Paraguay, Richard Hughes positioned himself and 
his firm to exploit any emergent possibilities by using their informational advantage, and also to 
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reject those possibilities if they appeared unprofitable. The failure of the Paraguay mission did not 
mean an unsuccessful strategy, but rather an effective use of informational resources to evaluate 
risks and rewards in an environment of tremendous uncertainty. This type of geographical search 
for entrepreneurial opportunity was critical to development in the region. In an era where 
patterns of production and trade were still being established, entrepreneurial choice played a 
major role in determining the geographical patterns of business. Hughes’s example demonstrates 
this exploratory role, showing how merchants searched for opportunity, first to extend their trade, 
and later to expand their businesses along upstream and horizontal linkages. They became, at 
various times, landowners and rural industrialists, bankers and insurance agents, colony managers 
and government consultants, each of these roles drawing on expertise accumulated from their 
origins in merchant trade. 
By 1841, Hughes Brothers pursued a strategy of expanding into the rural produce market, 
increasing their volumes by dealing directly with large tanning firms in England.  Richard Hughes 
returned to England to try and parlay their voyage to Paraguay and existing trade into new and 
profitable opportunities by meeting directly with manufacturers. At Cork, Hughes met with 
William Hackett and Co., “one of the largest tanneries in that city.”385 Their clear aim was to 
exchange information with that firm, and to establish potential connections that would give them 
an entry into the hides trade; Hackett advised them that they could, with their “proper attention” 
they could ship 60,000 hides annually. Hughes explicitly saw their firm as pathbreaking, being “the 
first who have struck out in this new branch of trade” and that “we shall very probably obtain a 
name and character which will show the chief part of it into our hands.” He expected orders from 
Dublin, Cork, Bristol and Gloucester, and was eager to visit Manchester and Leeds to establish 
similar contacts.386  
This strategy appears to have been successful; in 1844, Falconnet writes that Hughes Bros. 
“have become one of the largest exporting Houses for salted hides & tallow on constituents’ 
account…” although he notes that he believes they cannot have accumulated much capital.387 This 
serves as an example of two of the major strategies pursued by merchant houses in the face of 
limited capital, and limited markets for imports: diversification into export businesses, and acting 
as intermediaries for manufacturers in Britain. No doubt, this success also partly explains the 
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rapidity with which Richard Hughes made the upstream transition into production. In the wake of 
the guerra grande, when land prices were depressed from the depletion of livestock and from the 
general devastation in the countryside, Hughes, along with many other British merchants, made 
large land purchases to expand into rural production.  Perhaps following up on the explorations 
made during his Paraguayan voyage, Hughes purchased land and established a saladero in the 
province of Corrientes, in 1855. The venture was short-lived, however, and was sold by April of 
1858.388 Thomas Whigham suggests that the plant did not prosper, whereas Stephen Bell 
hypothesizes that this was instead a matter of relocating capital, presumably to more profitable 
uses on Hughes’s estates and saladero in Paysandú. 389  
Whatever the fate of his investments in Corrientes, by the early 1860s, Hughes had clearly 
refocused his attention on his Uruguayan estate of La Paz. By the 1860s, the exploratory phase of 
his career had ended, and Hughes began a more specialized career, winding down the firm of 
Hughes Brothers, leaving his position at the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires, and becoming a 
leading estanciero in western Uruguay. In this role Hughes became a leading innovator in ranching, 
importing bloodstock, applying new technology, and participating in the early colonization of Fray 
Bentos. It was on his land, which he had earlier selected for its strategic river access, that the 
Liebig’s plant was built. He became the only English participant in the founding of the Club 
Nacional, an early rural lobby group, and was the first president of the larger Asociación Rural.390 
In Hughes’s career, we can see the value of a flexible, exploratory strategy, based on repeated re-
evaluations of the available opportunity set across a broad geographical area.  
During the Montevideo/Buenos Aires conflict of the 1840s, Hughes Brothers remained 
largely neutral, continuing to operate in both Buenos Aires and Montevideo.391 For all that the 
Hughes Brothers are known in the literature for innovative and exploratory activity, they do not 
seem to have had a reputation as risk-takers at the time. Quite the contrary, from a similar report 
written in 1844, Falconnet describes them as “three Brothers, all of whom are well suited to the 
trade and very cautious people…”  Hughes explored a wide range of possible opportunities, but 
invested tentatively and carefully, relying on accurate local knowledge to mitigate risks and 
preserve their apparently scarce capital.  
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The relative neutrality of Hughes Bros. is borne out by their peripheral role in the Sociedad 
Compradora de los Derechos de la Aduana, the group of financiers (or, less generously, 
speculators) responsible for bankrolling the Colorado side of the guerra grande in exchange for 
control over the customs house revenues. While the Hughes Bros. were involved in this group, as 
were nearly all foreign merchants operating in Montevideo, they do not appear to have made 
large loans, nor to have pursued the kind of lucrative government supply contracts obtained by 
such merchants as Esteban Antonini and Samuel Lafone. Their largest investment appears to have 
been a repurchase agreement, made along with the Scottish firm Anderson Macfarlane and Co., 
for seven plots of land on the Plaza Constitución. This contract was one of many similar deals 
made in 1845, guaranteed by the government, using valuable plots of land in the main town plaza, 
valued at 2/3 of their official worth, or 31,250 pesos, discounted at 18% annually, for a total 
payment of 25,625 pesos, representing a total return of almost 24%.392 The extraordinary rates of 
return combined with the security of an intentionally undervalued property must have induced 
the two firms to make the investment. While John Macfarlane of Anderson Macfarlane and Co. 
made a series of other deals with the government in Montevideo, it does not appear that the 
Hughes Bros. were major financiers of the Colorados.  
By 1849, Hughes had either made his peace with Rosas, or at least had an understandable 
belief that good relations with the dictator were going to be necessary for doing business in 
Buenos Aires. His signature appears on an obsequious letter, signed by nearly the entire British 
merchant community of that city, urging Rosas not to retire, and thanking him for his services in 
protecting their property.393 This letter must be understood in the proper context; the Rosas 
regime had always operated on the basis of such theatrics, reinforcing the dictator’s public image 
through kowtowing.  Rosas would threaten to retire every few years, only to be urged back into 
power by the nominal authorities. This was a symbolic act reconfirming his status as dictator, not 
an actual attempt to hand over power. The language of the letter therefore should be seen as a 
deliberate attempt to ingratiate and placate, rather than necessarily a direct indication of the 
opinion of the community.  
Some firms on the list had previously made loans to the government at Montevideo earlier 
in the decade, as seen with the Hughes Bros. above, when the fortunes of that faction appeared 
better, and when the community largely believed that British intervention would prevent Rosas 
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from taking the city. 1849 represented the nadir of the fortunes of the Colorado side in the guerra 
grande, with the British and French interventions unsuccessfully concluded. Thus, switching sides, 
or at least reconfirming loyalty to Rosas, would have been a strategic, risk-avoiding move for a 
merchant firm. Whatever reservations the British merchant community may have harboured, the 
majority were willing to accept the authority of Rosas in exchange for the protection of their 
property. The exceptions to this rule were those closely aligned with Samuel Lafone and who were 
deeply committed, both ideologically and financially, to the Colorado side of the war; the Hughes 
Brothers clearly pursued a more pragmatic strategy. 
Conclusion 
Merchant networks were webs of information and credit, comprising business partners 
and brothers, families and firms. In the era of the merchant house, before the rise of modern 
banking and investment, and in a peripheral country like Uruguay, the business of trade operated 
along social as well as economic lines. Employees were sought not from a large, functioning labour 
market, but from among brothers, sons, and in-laws. Marriages both cemented existing alliances 
between firms, and forged new ones. This was true both within the British community, and with 
other local and foreign groups. The case of Samuel Lafone provides an example of a merchant who 
succeeded by leveraging his social network, using brothers and managers as agents, and his 
family’s business connections in Britain as financiers and factors. In return, they benefitted from 
employment in, or dealings with, one of the largest commercial houses the emerging Uruguayan 
market, helping the family to advance socially and economically. The Jacksons provide a similar 
example for a non-family relationship with the influential Rathbone family, which provided 
education, information, commercial links, and social prestige that improved the Jacksons’ position 
in Uruguay across at least two generations. 
The opportunities presented by the development of the frontier economy, in introducing 
new products, in agricultural modernization, in building infrastructure, and in increasingly 
sophisticated trade intermediation, were contingent on solving the problem of reliable 
contracting, but there was no inherent reason these problems had to be solved by the state. 
Indeed, in Uruguay more than most countries, the state was hobbled by intensity of the 
competition between the political parties, and was not particularly credible as an enforcer of 
property rights. Merchants worked to solve the problems of contracting among themselves 
through a variety of strategies, including the development of extended networks of interlocked, 
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intermarried social connections. Merchants’ self-organized informal institutions often outstripped 
the state’s capacity for providing any useful legal framework. 
Internationally, merchant houses maintained an extensive correspondence with dozens of 
firms, including other merchants, producers, suppliers, financiers, conveying to their network 
crucial information about local affairs, prices of commodities, changing tastes, and the reputation 
of other houses. It was these networks that allowed houses to draw and remit each other’s bills. 
This functioned as a basic credit system, allowing the transfer of capital from Britain to Uruguay 
via merchant channels. This in turn allowed merchants to extend credit and make investments 
beyond what their own house could manage by itself. They gained the advantages of investing in 
capital-scarce Uruguay, while managing to draw their capital from their associated firms in Britain. 
The Anderson Macfarlane and Co. letter book shows how networks connected the various 
functions of trade, from production and finance to distribution and retailing. Without these 
networks, the trade between Uruguay and Britain would have no doubt been much less, and the 
British merchants of Montevideo would have been unable to succeed as entrepreneurs.
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Chapter 6: Crisis and Speculation 
Finance and state formation have a close and complex relationship. It is widely acknowledged that 
the creditworthiness of a state is tied intimately to the prevailing institutions. States with strong 
fiscal powers and broad tax bases can expand their revenue to meet their liabilities. The creation 
of such powers requires the creation of strong institutions, which, in turn, are the result of the 
political economy of state building. Interest groups organize into political factions and parties, 
which compete for control over the state. To gain voice in the political arena, and thus to shape 
future institutional change, requires financial resources, especially during phases of violent 
conflict. These needs create room for negotiation among creditors who want stable institutions to 
ensure the repayment of debts, speculators looking to capitalize on wartime opportunities, and 
the shifting coalitions of political and military actors seeking to establish control. Bargaining during 
wartime requires investors to weigh factors beyond ordinary risks and returns, such as ideological 
preference, political allegiance, and social entanglements. Unable to rely on a guarantee derived 
from contested sovereign power, investors must generally choose to back one side or the other, or 
to stay out of the market entirely. Contracts made with one faction could potentially be seen as a 
violation of neutrality, thereby endangering both present and future investments. Yet, these very 
risks, along with the shortened time horizons implied by a pressing conflict, can raise the price of 
capital and improve the terms for contracting, creating a powerful incentive to invest.  
In the context of Latin American states, formed out of the chaos of independence, and 
without strong fiscal systems, the question of control and finance is especially pertinent. 
Merchants and merchant firms play a critical role in providing credit, and thus, in shaping the 
outcome of political and military conflict.  The Uruguayan Civil War of 1839-51 (known as the 
guerra grande) offers an opportunity to examine this type of finance in its social, political and 
military context. The Sociedad Compradora de los Derechos de Aduana,- an international group of 
merchants, named for having purchased the rights to the customs house revenue of Montevideo, 
but who acted as a quasi-state bank during the conflict, controlled the finances of the city. The 
investments made by this organization were at times tremendously profitable, with returns 
doubling or even tripling capital invested, and at other times, were disastrous losses, each 
outcome reflecting the vagaries of the evolving diplomatic and military situation. This chapter 
examines the Sociedad Compradora, outlining the contracts between the Sociedad and the 
government, examining its composition and activities, and showing how the British merchants of 
Montevideo fit into Sociedad’s activities, both as investors seeking high returns, and active 
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lobbyists, entrepreneurially seeking to maximize their returns and minimize their risks by 
manipulating the diplomatic situation. 
Entrepreneurial judgement about opportunities is a matter of weighing the balance 
between risks and returns.  While any merchant trading in the volatile markets of the River Plate 
would not have been a stranger to substantial chances of loss balanced against high rates of 
return, the conditions of civil war presented a set of options which were lucrative, but also 
atypically risky. An ordinary government loan only required an assessment of some basic, well-
understood risks related to sovereign default: inflation risk, government solvency, and 
expropriation risk. More complex contracts to purchase sources of government revenues, 
privileges and property required much more reliable predictions about the future security of 
revenues and the value of property. It was one thing to predict whether or not a government 
could pay a fixed interest rate given its variable revenues; it was quite another to predict the 
quantity of the revenues themselves. The nature of this speculation was already a substantial test 
of entrepreneurial judgement.  
The complexity and variability of the contracts involved were only a small part of the 
overall challenge facing investors. What was far more important was the context of civil war, 
which threatened the legitimacy of any venture undertaken with either contesting party.  
Flexibility in adapting to the fluid economic, political, diplomatic and military situation was critical 
to success during this period. Most of all, it required a careful judgement about the future of the 
diplomatic and military situation; the defeat of a caudillo or the establishment of a blockade could, 
and frequently did, mean the difference between enormous returns on investment and ruin. This 
chapter analyses these contracts and their implications for the perceptions and actions of British 
merchants during the guerra grande. It shows how the contracts evolved as the situation changed, 
and why. It demonstrates how British merchants could and did apply what pressure they had to 
affect the diplomatic situation in their favour. It also points out a level of mutual support between 
them and the Colorado faction, when that became necessary to secure past contracts against 
repudiation risk.  
Literature and Background 
The most recent work on the topic of the Sociedad Compradora has been done through 
the State Building in Latin America project, under the direction of Juan Carlos Garavaglia. While 
the final products of this project have not yet been realized, some preliminary work has been 
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completed, notably a Master’s thesis by Mario Etchechury. This work examined the role of 
“permanent war” in the development of the Uruguayan fiscal state. It emphasized the previously 
side-lined importance of various government credit instruments as a functional paper currency, 
with all the accompanying effects on commerce and the government fiscal situation.  The classic 
interpretation of the period is by Eduardo Acevedo, with substantial insights and evidence into the 
workings of the economy at the time.394  Etchechury has reinvigorated the Acevedo thesis that the 
Sociedad acted as a quasi-state bank.395 Some work on an individual and family level has been 
done by Alba Mariani, detailing the lives and careers of various members of the Sociedad, 
including Samuel Lafone and Jaime Cibils y Puig.396397 The seminal studies of Jose Pedro Barrán398 
and Benjamín Nahum399 provide a foundation for understanding the overall period. For the role of 
the British in the conflict, Peter Winn has a detailed study of merchants and “informal empire” 
during the mid-19th century400 and David McLean provides a thorough archival analysis of Anglo-
French diplomacy and intervention in Uruguay.401 However, no substantial work yet exists 
examining the war from the perspective of British investors at a business level, as investors and 
entrepreneurs weighing their risks and returns. In this regard, this chapter contributes to our 
understanding of this period in Uruguayan history, and to the role of British merchants as 
financiers and speculators in Latin America in the mid-19th century. 
 The immediate conflict which necessitated the sale of customs revenue was the guerra 
grande, the civil war waged between the first two presidents of Uruguay, Manuel Oribe and 
Fructuoso Rivera. The factions that rallied behind the respective presidents became known for the 
colours they flew: white for Oribe’s Blancos, and red for Rivera’s Colorados. These factions 
consolidated into political allegiances: the Colorados were largely Europhile, urban-centric, and 
politically liberal, with sympathies towards Brazil; the Blancos had a rural orientation, opposed 
European intervention, and were allied with the Rosas regime. While they also shared many liberal 
doctrines, the Blancos were the more conservative of the two factions. Nevertheless, during this 
                                                          
394 Eduardo Acevedo, Notas y apuntes ; contribución al estudio de la historia económica y financiera de la 
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395 Mario Etchechury, “La fiscalidad de la “guerra permanente”: el Estado Oriental del Uruguay en la frontera 
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period, the conflict between the factions was less a question of ideology than of political 
allegiance to particular leaders and sub-factions within the broader parties, each with regional and 
international commitments and allies. The guerra grande was a struggle for control, more than a 
conflict over policy. 
 The division between the factions became sharper in 1843, when Oribe and his forces, 
having gained a decisive military advantage in the countryside, besieged Montevideo. Despite the 
defeat of Rivera’s main army, the foreign inhabitants of Montevideo organized into militias to 
defend the city. Cut off from trade, the economic lifeblood of any entrepôt, Montevideo and the 
Colorados behind its walls were left in a position of dwindling strength. Having been left without 
resources, but still holding a viable military position behind the defences, the Colorado 
government attempted to solve the most pressing problem for continuing the military struggle: 
revenue.  
 Import and export duties had been overwhelmingly the major source of income for the 
Uruguayan government, comprising 86% of real state income during the pre-war period of 1830-
39.402 While some other sources of revenue played a minor role, including the sale of government 
lands, and the rights to stamped paper, licencing, and various duties,403 there was no developed 
tax base to replace the customs house as the fiscal sustenance of the country. The customs 
revenue was therefore the last, best asset that could be mortgaged or sold to raise funds in 
wartime. The alienation of the customs duties was certainly an emergency measure, since by 
farming them, the government crippled its own major method of raising money. However, it did 
generate substantial short-term income. It also did not require an extension of state fiscal control, 
unlike most other plausible, direct-taxation alternatives. Attempts were made to raise revenue by 
other means, including property taxes and forced loans, but no alternative source of revenue 
came close to matching the customs house in this period. 
 When Oribe and his Argentine auxiliaries invaded Uruguay to retake his presidency, Britain 
and France attempted to mediate. Lord Mandeville, the British representative at Buenos Aires, 
                                                          
402 Real income being revenue generated through taxation, rather than cash inflows from the issue of new 
debt. Figures from Mario Etchechury, “La fiscalidad de la “guerra permanente”: el Estado Oriental del 
Uruguay en la frontera rioplatense, 1828-1852” cited in Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “Algunos aspectos 
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during the first years of the siege by British merchants, including Samuel Lafone, John Macfarlane, and John 
Gowland. 
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made a series of bold statements upon the incursion of Argentine troops into Uruguay, which, for 
many British merchants in Montevideo, amounted to a guarantee of protection.404 While 
Mandeville was replaced, and Britain did not react immediately, the Colorados continued to press 
Britain and France for assistance, sending diplomatic missions to Europe, such as that of Argentine 
exile Florencio Varela. They were to negotiate an anti-Rosas intervention, possibly with the 
agreement of establishing a protectorate of some kind that would guarantee the safety of 
Montevideo against its larger neighbours.  
Britain was initially wary, but Lord Aberdeen and Guizot, the French Foreign Minister, 
eventually decided that a joint intervention by Britain and France could put a quick, mediated end 
to hostilities. And so, in 1845, they sent a mission of William Gore Ouseley and Baron Deffaudis to 
negotiate with Rosas, Oribe, and the Colorados. Ouseley and Deffaudis, however, failed to resolve 
the conflict. Like Mandeville, they began to overstep the bounds of their instructions in support of 
the defenders of Montevideo. In this, they were supported by Commodore Brett Purvis, 
commander of the British fleet. Their presence reassured the British merchants of the city, and, 
along with Mandeville’s rash promises, may have contributed to the decision of the community to 
lend money to the government and to purchase its revenues. Although many British merchants 
had done so since the late 1830s, before any such promises were made, Ouseley nevertheless 
presented a (false) degree of commitment by Britain that likely encouraged greater investment. 
 As part of the attempted mediation of the conflict, the British and French sent a fleet of 
ships to blockade the harbour at Buenos Aires, which lasted from 1845 to 1849.405 The blockade 
was an attempt to resolve the conflict by forcing a withdrawal of the Argentine troops supporting 
Oribe, and enabling an internal resolution to the guerra grande. While the measure was intended 
to apply pressure to Rosas without directly committing Britain and France to a war with the 
Argentine Confederation, Ouseley, Deffaudis and Purvis used this force rather more aggressively 
than the Foreign Office was comfortable with, deploying troops and sending supplies to the 
defenders of Montevideo under the pretence of protecting British property and persons, and 
attempting to secure the River Paraná for trade by force.406 The blockade was also insufficient to 
cow Rosas, who drew his power primarily from his rural support, and was undeterred by the show 
of naval force. 
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 Alarmed by the over-extension of British force in the region, the Foreign Office took 
increasingly strong measures to bring the intervention to an end. A series of diplomats known to 
be more sympathetic to Oribe and Rosas were sent to negotiate an end to the blockade with the 
Argentine Confederation, including Thomas Samuel Hood, Henry Southern, and Lord Howden.  
Hood was a former consul from the 1820s, and an acquaintance of Oribe from that time. His 
contempt for the defence of Montevideo was manifest, writing that “Monte Video appears to be a 
perfect Pandemonium, party feelings and personal interests swallowing up all other 
considerations.” Ouseley, for his part, wrote to Palmerston of French accusations that Hood had 
“private interests [and] pecuniary arrangements … with certain merchants here and at Buenos 
Ayres, and with General Oribe…”407 which, though perhaps unfounded (a possibility Ouseley 
generously allowed), had led to distrust, and that Hood was a “furious partisan, not only of 
General Oribe, but against any other Government here [in Montevideo].”408 Unsurprisingly, he and 
Ouseley clashed, leading to the collapse of both diplomatic missions.  
When the Foreign Minister changed from Lord Aberdeen, who had begun the intervention 
and who was at least mildly sympathetic with its aims, to Lord Palmerston, who wanted only a 
quick resolution of the conflict without losing face, support for the intervention evaporated at the 
highest levels. Palmerston, siding with Hood and Howden, believed that the government in 
Montevideo had been suborned by foreign interests, and that the purpose of the blockade was 
almost exclusively to raise funds for the defence of Montevideo and a “company of private 
individuals to whom the Government have sold … the custom dues…”409 By 1848, Britain had 
concluded the surprisingly deferent Arana-Southern Treaty with Rosas, and withdrew its blockade. 
France kept up their intervention for longer, but without British support, and with the 
overwhelming disruption of the 1848 revolution at home, they too raised their blockade in 1849. 
This left Buenos Aires free to resume its naval operations against Montevideo. The French 
continued to provide a monthly subsidy to the Colorados, but withdrew its critical military support, 
leaving the plaza of Montevideo in a precarious military position for the remainder of the war. 
 The guerra grande ended in 1851, when an alliance was formed among Brazil, the 
Colorados, and Urquiza, governor of Entre Ríos and one of Rosas’s most powerful rivals. Brazil 
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moved troops into Uruguay. This new military configuration quickly overwhelmed the Blancos, 
whose Argentine auxiliaries switched sides along with Urquiza. Oribe surrendered without combat, 
and agreed to a peace, declaring that there would be neither victor nor vanquished.  The cost of 
this resolution was treaty highly advantageous to Brazil, creating a near-protectorate in Uruguay. 
The Baron de Mauá, the Brazilian banker sent late in the war to solve the Colorados’ mounting 
financial problems, became the single most important source of credit in Uruguay, partly 
displacing the Sociedad Compradora. The new post-war government of Uruguay was left with a 
hard won peace, but also with the long legacy of war debts and damages to settle with its various 
creditors: Brazil, France, and the merchants of the Sociedad. 
Composition of the Sociedad Compradora 
 Who were the shareholders in the Sociedad Compradora de los Derechos de Aduana? They 
were a group of merchants from the “alto comercio,” the elite of the Montevideo trade. They 
were primarily overseas merchants from a variety of nations. Investment in the customs revenues 
was reflective of the merchant community as a whole: diverse and cosmopolitan, but with a clear 
hierarchy showing relative importance. The nationality of the shareholders, as well as the 
distribution of shares owned, is given in an article published in The Times in 1847.410 Four hundred 
shares were divided among two hundred and twenty-two shareholders. The three largest investor 
groups were the French, Uruguayans, and the British, with 22%, 20% and 19% respectively of the 
total shareholding, with Spanish merchants next with 16%, and Germans with 9%. The relatively 
large share of Uruguayans among shareholders is no doubt a function of their nationality. For the 
British and French, their share in part this reflected the overall predominance in Uruguayan trade 
at this time. It may also point to the perceived the role their diplomatic agents played in arranging, 
and implicitly guaranteeing, the customs revenue contracts during the mission of Ouseley and 
Deffaudis.411 British shareholders held the largest number of shares on average, at 2.6, or 0.8 
shares more than the average shareholder of 1.8. Without a more specific distribution, it is 
impossible to know if this reflects the preponderance of particular large British shareholders such 
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as Lafone, Macfarlane, or Tomkinson, or whether it is merely a function of the relative wealth of 
British merchants when compared with their international peers. 
 What portion of British merchants, then, were shareholders in the customs house 
revenues? Of the shareholders, 29 are listed as being British. The total tally of British merchants 
and firms registered to trade at the customs house in Montevideo in 1844 was 28, drawn from a 
list compiled by the society of shareholders themselves.412 While there are likely some dropouts 
and entrants into the Montevideo market during two turbulent years of siege, the near equality of 
the numbers seems to suggest that holding at least one share was widespread, if not nearly 
universal, among British merchants.  
 The group of British merchants invested in the Sociedad Compradora centres around 
Samuel Fisher Lafone, one of the wealthiest merchants in Uruguay, and a strong anti-Rosas 
partisan. While the original source of his disagreement with the Argentine dictator is not clear, 
Lafone had several reasons for supporting the Colorados during the guerra grande. He had a high-
profile conflict with Rosas and the Federalist413 elite over the issue of his interfaith marriage to 
Maria Quevedo y Alsina, which was performed in secret without permission from religious or 
political authorities, or even from her father. Lafone had also fought publicly with a former 
partner, Thomas Armstrong, who was one of the major figures in the Buenos Aires merchant 
community.414 Lafone relocated to Montevideo by 1834, and by August of 1839, Lafone Barker and 
Co. was in liquidation, ending the Lafones’ involvement in Buenos Aires.415 Alexander returned to 
Britain to run the family merchant house, and to organize lobbying for British intervention.  
The Lafone group formed the core of opposition to Rosas among British merchants, and 
support for the Colorados. Many of those who also aligned themselves with the Colorados - 
including John S. Kemsley, George Hodgskin, Thomas Tomkinson, and Francis Hocquard - had close 
ties with Lafone. Kemsley and Hodgskin were partners with George Dyson Barker, Lafone’s former 
Liverpool partner.416 Tomkinson, Hocquard and Lafone had jointly obtained the meat marketing 
contract (abasto de carne) for 1842,417 and they appear to have worked together in their 
diplomatic appeals to the British government. Tomkinson and Lafone were especially close 
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socially, as evidenced not only by their joint activities, but also by the eventual marriage of their 
eldest children, Martha Lafone with Thomas Tomkinson, in 1864.418 He also had substantial 
diplomatic connections, being close friends with Commodore Purvis and William Gore Ouseley, 
who headed the British naval and diplomatic presence respectively, and his brother-in-law, John 
Pownall Dale, was acting consul in 1843.419  
The Contracts and Returns 
 The evolution of the contracts signed by the Sociedad Compradora with the government 
of the defence shows the changing estimation of the revenues for the Customs house, and also 
increasing adaptation to the risks involved. The merchants of Montevideo purchased the Customs 
revenue from 1844 until at least 1851, the end of the guerra grande. The defenders of 
Montevideo needed hard currency to pay for the organization of the defence of the city. This 
required considerable funds on short notice. The first contract, made in 1843 for the revenues of 
1844, was relatively optimistic, by comparison with later contracts. Half the customs house income 
was sold, for a total of $500,000, or approximately £85,000,420 divided into 500 shares of $1000.421 
The money was to be paid in instalments of $100,000 pesos to the government by the Sociedad 
Compradora and to the society by its shareholders over a similar period from August to March 
1844. The contract also contained an option clause to purchase the rights to the 1845 revenues, 
on the same terms. It seems clear, then, that this speculation was originally intended to turn a 
profit for 1844, and potentially beyond. The reality would be much more turbulent, but this does 
not appear to have been well-predicted, ex ante. The terms of the 1843 contract did not contain 
many of the risk-mitigating clauses that appeared in later contracts, notably lacking a minimum 
amount to be repaid in case of shortfall, or an interest rate to be charged in that case.  
Rather than only selling half the customs revenue after collection, the contract went a 
step further, farming out direct control over tax collection. The 50% of revenues still owned by the 
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government was not managed directly by the state, but rather paid by the Sociedad back to the 
treasury as part of the bargain, as appears in article one: “The Society composed of national and 
foreign shareholders purchases all the rights of import and export for the Customs of Montevideo 
from the Government, for the whole year of 1844, and gives in payment for them the sum of five 
hundred thousand pesos, one hundred thousand pesos paid each month; and furthermore, half 
the net revenue of the same customs rights…” In order to accomplish this, near-total control of 
the customs house was given over to the Sociedad. Article seven stipulates that that “the 
Commission of shareholders will intervene, directly and indirectly, in the administration of the 
customs and the customs guard, following the approval of this contract; and can put in both 
offices the employees that it judges necessary.”422  
The extraordinary powers granted to the Sociedad amounted to tax farming on an 
impressive scale. Control of nearly all government revenue was put in private hands in exchange 
for loans. Partly this reflected the bargaining power of the Sociedad; the international connections 
and private wealth of merchants allowed them to extend credit when other sources ran dry. It also 
reflected the strain on the capabilities of the government in Montevideo, which lacked a 
developed system of direct taxation, and was ill-equipped to carry out its administrative duties 
under the duress of siege. Tax farming had the advantage of offloading the costs and risks of 
administering funds into private hands, which allowed the government to focus on its pressing 
military and diplomatic commitments. This contract also served as a gateway to further 
opportunities. Article five of the contract stipulated that the directors of the Sociedad were to 
receive all contracts for the government’s requirements, up to $100,000 monthly, and article six 
stipulated a 1.5% commission on these purchases.423 This amounted to a monopoly on state 
purchases during wartime, including lucrative procurements and provisioning contracts for the 
garrison of Montevideo. 
The contract also restricted the applicability of previous debts, in the form of “billetes 
ministeriales,” government paper paid out to the holders of the government loans of April and 
June, 1842.424 Merchants had accumulated substantial amounts of this paper, and appear to have 
been eager to offload it. Even this first customs revenue contract appears to be a method of 
converting the paper money returns of previous loans into hard currency income. Articles eleven 
and twelve stipulate that bills from the original loans of 1842 will be accepted only if presented 
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and accepted within a fixed, though undefined, time frame. While Uruguay did not have a 
sovereign currency at the time, and, unlike Buenos Aires, did not enforce an inconvertible 
currency, government paper obligations circulating among the merchant community from 
previous loans functioned in much the same way. Since holding such paper constituted a 
substantial default risk, in the event of a military defeat or simply from the lack of funds, the 
power to use government paper to pay obligations and make further speculations was important. 
In effect, the merchants were trading one kind of risk, namely that the government would fail to 
honour its billetes ministeriales, for another, that the Customs revenue would be insufficient. 
 Initial returns on the 1844 rights were poor. The description given in The Times, in a piece  
favourable to the Colorado cause and to the Sociedad Compradora, was that the first contract was 
a “ruinous loss,” having earned only $194,626, recouping not quite 40% of the initial half-million 
investment.425  This prompted substantial revisions to the contract, when it came up for renewal 
for the years of 1845 and 1846. The price for the 1845 contract was reduced to $300,000, but the 
returns again came up short, at only $218,136, prompting a further reduction for the 1846 
contract to $200,000. An article was inserted into the contract declaring the loan was a “purely 
mercantile speculation,”426 an obvious (and futile) hedge against accusations that the merchants 
of the Sociedad had violated their neutrality, and also as security for their contracts in the case of 
a Blanco victory. The language of the option to buy future rights changed from merely establishing 
the option to purchase the 1846 rights for $500,000, to clarifying that the Sociedad could not be 
obligated to do so. An article was inserted insisting on the contract being “sacred and inviolable,” 
and another that no contract could supersede the Sociedad for repayment or in any way prejudice 
their rights.  
What may have seemed like a plausible venture in 1843 must have seemed like a 
substantial risk in 1844, as evidenced by the evolution of the price and the contract terms. There 
was, however, little choice in the matter, for merchants already heavily invested in the Colorado 
cause: “To extricate the Government from its financial difficulties, and the company from such a 
heavy loss, no remedy was left but mutual support.”427 Many merchants had made lucrative side 
deals with the government, purchasing lands and privileges, but these contracts might not be 
honoured in event of a Blanco victory, creating an incentive for the “mutual support” described 
above. The Sociedad was in a position where the Colorados were dependent on loans and other 
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revenue from the foreign merchants, but where the government also had the advantage, dubious 
though it may have seemed, of bargaining from necessity; without funds, the defence of the city 
would collapse, which would leave the merchants who had placed their money in speculative 
ventures in a difficult position. 
The prospects of the Sociedad Compradora continued to look bleak until 1846, the first full 
year of the Anglo-French blockade of Buenos Aires. When the situation changed, however, the 
results were dramatic.  The force of British and French warships temporarily redirected the flow of 
trade in the area, altering the balance between Montevideo and Buenos Aires in their competition 
for the interior trade. Exports from the interior of both countries, which might previously have 
been shipped at either port, were instead sent through the port of Montevideo. While Buenos 
Aires was not entirely cut off by the blockade, shipping was only allowed to proceed on the 
condition that it stop and pay duties at Montevideo beforehand. The increased customs revenue 
was a windfall for both the government and the Sociedad Compradora: $1,768,763 for 1846, and 
$2,965,493 for 1847. The returns from these particular years were nearly 200% on the purchase 
price, representing an enormous gain which more than evened out the substantial losses of the 
previous years.  
During the last years before the guerra grande, with both ports free of blockades (1836 
and 1837), Buenos Aires had shipped approximately 55% of the hides from the region, and 
Montevideo 45%, a substantial but not overwhelming advantage for Buenos Aires.428 During the 
years when Buenos Aires was blockaded, 1838-1840, and late 1845-1848, trade at Buenos Aires 
diminished considerably, to Montevideo’s benefit. For 1840, 1846 and 1847, Montevideo became 
the principal entrepôt of the region, commanding 94%, 73%, and 59% of the critical hides trade, 
their primary export commodity. 429 This situation was quite artificial, and trade at Montevideo 
crashed to very low levels following the withdrawal of European support, with the British fleet 
leaving the River Plate in 1848, and the French in 1849. Nevertheless, the blockade of Buenos 
Aires by the Anglo-French fleets was critical in the course of the war. This was not for its direct 
military consequences - of which the successful, but largely irrelevant, battle of Vuelta de Obligado 
was the only major confrontation involving the fleets - but for the impact it had on the fiscal 
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situation. The added customs revenue sustained the defence of Montevideo by providing a large, 
although temporary, source of income to the besieged state, and to the government’s creditors. 
The blockade also encouraged the further sale of customs rights, under slightly more 
generous terms predicated on the continuance of the blockade. The Sociedad, presumably 
enthused by the substantial returns of 1846, exercised their rights to extend the contract to 
include 1847-48, paying a full million pesos for half the two years’ revenue, plus $10,000 for the 
rights to the rest of the country’s ports. There was also an additional contract for another quarter 
of the revenues of 1848, for $300,000, with a minimum earnings of $500,000 in the event of a 
shortfall, covered by revenue for 1849, and a minimum of $600,000, provided the total revenue 
exceeded $2,000,000.430  
The speculations carried out by British merchants under the aegis of the Sociedad go 
further than purchasing the customs revenue. The Sociedad acted as a kind of organized 
government bank, not only in terms of providing finance, but also mediating the contracts 
between its members, whom held large quantities of government paper, and the state. As 
mentioned above, one of the articles of the initial contract stipulated that provisions needed by 
the government would be purchased through members of the Sociedad. Many contracts were 
offered as speculative ventures, increasing in size and frequency following the siege in 1843, and 
generally purchased by the same merchants who bought the customs revenue. The largest single 
on-going contract was for the provisioning of the garrison with food, which was filled by Italian 
merchant Esteban Antonini. Samuel Lafone contested this in court, indicating that conflict among 
the various members was hardly absent.431 
 Real estate was another potential source of revenue, and the state notoriously sold nearly 
all public lands and buildings to merchants, with British owners featuring prominently. The record 
of public (ejido) lands sold during this period shows a series of very large transactions.432 While 
data is unavailable for earlier than 1839, it appears very little was sold prior the beginning of the 
siege of Montevideo. Once the sale of lands had begun in force, many of the members of the 
Sociedad Compradora bought properties: John Gowland, Thomas Tomkinson (in his role as 
manager of Stanley Black and Co.), Francis Hocquard, and Samuel Lafone. Some of these contracts 
became infamous, such as the mortgage of the Cuartel de Dragones to Hocquard, and the sale of 
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the city block including the customs house itself, to Samuel and Alexander Lafone for $300,000,433 
along with dozens of smaller properties for lesser sums, including Punta del Este, and the Isla de 
Lobos, for which Lafone also obtained a lucrative sea wolf pelt concession. While it is difficult to 
establish total values, as some entries lack values, it is clear that many of these sales generated 
substantial revenue. Though Lafone’s purchase of $300,000 was exceptional, dozens of smaller 
purchases, from $1,000 to $25,000, were made by British merchants.  Many of these purchases 
were made with very small quantities of hard currency; when Francis Hocquard bought the Cuartel 
de Dragones, one of the larger purchases, he paid $24,500, but only $4,500 in government 
credits.434 These contracts could be used to recycle old government debts into tangible assets, or 
gain substantial returns on good securities. 
Some of these “sales” were in fact repurchase agreements, where government land was 
discounted by 1/3 of its official valuation, and with a stipulation that the government repurchase 
the land, as a high-security loan, rather than an outright purchase of land. While some merchants 
presumably took the land as collateral when the government, almost inevitably, failed to repay, 
some used them as high-interest loans. One such contract is even mentioned specifically in the 
contract for the 1847-48 revenues, by Anderson Macfarlane and Co., in conjunction with Hughes 
Brothers and Co., two of the mid-size British merchant houses in the city, for $36,875, which was 
accumulating 1.5% interest monthly until the government repurchased the land.435 The integration 
of these kinds of contracts into the Sociedad Compradora points to the ways in which they acted 
as a clearing house for all kinds of government loans and contracts during the period. Shares in the 
main customs contract served as an entry point into other agreements with the Colorado 
government. 
1849-51 was a difficult period for the defence of Montevideo. Under siege and without 
the protection of the British or French fleets, customs receipts dropped back down to the levels of 
1844 and 1845, nowhere near sufficient to cover military expenses.436 By 1849, the customs 
produced only $642,763, and in the years afterwards, much less, although exact figures are 
unknown. The defence was able to obtain French, and later Brazilian, monthly subsidies to finance 
the continuation of the war. However, their debts were large, and what few sources of revenue 
they commanded were mortgaged during the years of the blockade, in anticipation of future 
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revenues. The last years of the siege were characterized more by negotiation with Brazil over the 
possibility of intervention than negotiation with the already-committed merchants of the 
Sociedad, and while a new commission of government creditors, the Comision de Contribuyentes, 
was formed, the question facing the merchants by the end of the war was not how to speculate 
further, but how to recover their debts after the war, when so much was owed to so many parties. 
Neutrality versus Intervention 
The sale of the Customs revenue also indirectly committed the purchasers to the 
government cause. The success of the investment was dependent on increased trade, which was 
itself contingent on a favourable military situation. It was especially dependent on the status of 
the naval conflict, because a port blockade at Montevideo would diminish trade to almost nothing, 
whereas the various blockades of Buenos Aires redirected traffic, and increased trade, and thus 
customs revenue, far above normal levels. While most merchants could only influence the 
outcome through providing funding via loans and government contracts, British merchants could 
lobby their government to secure their investment with diplomatic and military support. 
British merchants used a variety of methods to lobby support for intervention. The 
Britannia was set up as an anti-Rosas newspaper, acting as a counterpart to the pro-Rosas British 
Packet from Buenos Aires.437 It purveyed opinion from a British-Montevidean perspective, 
favourable to the defenders of the city, and trumpeting the advantages of intervention. They 
wrote or commissioned pamphlets and letters, usually written anonymously, to sway public and 
parliamentary opinion. Samuel Lafone, for his part, sent his brother Alexander back to Liverpool to 
rally support for the Colorado cause, in the process closing down his Buenos Aires branch. “An 
English Merchant,” presumably a Sociedad member or a close ally, wrote to The Times, claiming 
that if Britain let Montevideo fall to Rosas, it would severely damage British “industry and 
enterprise” in the region to an extent the public “could not… be aware.”438 They rallied support 
among manufacturers and merchants in Liverpool through the Mexican and South American 
Association, who wrote that British trade in Montevideo was increasing, despite the raising of the 
blockade at Buenos Aires, that the cruelties of Rosas were well known, and that British interests 
                                                          
437 Britannia and Montevideo Reporter, 1842-43. 
438 The Times of London, Oct. 1, 1846, 8. 
172 
 
 
would be threatened by the taking of the city.439 Pamphlets were written in support of 
intervention, with claims that the entrepôt in Uruguay was essential to commerce. For instance:  
“… [the] Republic of Uruguay, governed as it has ever been since the date of its independence on 
the most liberal commercial principles, is the best of all checks on the commercial illiberality of the 
neighbouring countries, and is much too valuable to be sacrificed by the Government of any 
commercial nation…”440  
Baines, the writer of the pamphlet also claimed that Britain had essentially obligated itself to 
intervene, since Lord Mandeville had committed them to do so, and that he may have exceeded 
his authority was beside the point, since Britain’s reputation was at stake. 
The merchant community at Buenos Aires, whose interests mirrored those at Montevideo, 
fought back, offering a very different set of opinions.441 The British Packet, the main British 
newspaper in Buenos Aires, offered frequent denunciation of the speculators profiting from the 
siege in Montevideo.442 The Packet was particularly critical of the British intervention, which was 
seen as ruining the reputation of the British in the region, of violating neutrality, and of harming 
the interests of British merchants at Buenos Aires. Pamphlets were written from the anti-
intervention side as well. In one, Alfred Mallalieu argued that neutrality was the best course of 
action, since the defenders of Montevideo were disreputable and impoverished, that trade was 
harmed rather than helped by intervention, and that any perceived benefits in accessing interior 
markets such as Paraguay were overwhelmingly exaggerated.443 Neutrality would have been to the 
benefit of Buenos Aires and the merchants there, since peace with Rosas meant an end to the 
blockade, and a return to the commercial supremacy of that port. Given the fragility of the 
defence of Montevideo, this position meant de facto support for the Blancos, and was the position 
adopted by most supporters of Oribe, and of Rosas. 
                                                          
439 Letter from the Mexican and South American Association to the Earl of Aberdeen, Jan. 8, 1842. National 
Archives at Kew, FO 51/21. 
440 Thomas Baines, Observations on the Present State of the Affairs of the River Plate (1845) Hume Tracts, 
accessed via Jstor, http://www.jstor.org/stable/60206537. 
441 It is certainly not the case that merchants operated only in one city or the other. However, the 
polarization of the war meant that those houses which operated primarily in one city or the other, rather 
than being able to shift operations, had an incentive to support “their” side of the river. 
442 British Packet and Argentine News, 1840-48. 
443 Alfred Mallalieu, An Appeal on behalf of the British subjects residing in and connected with the River 
Plate: against any further violent intervention by the British and French governments in the affairs of that 
country. (1846) Hume Tracts, accessed via Jstor, http://www.jstor.org/stable/60204761 
173 
 
 
Investment in the Sociedad Compradora or other government revenues was not universal 
among British entrepreneurs, even those operating primarily in Montevideo. Some merchant firms 
took a decidedly non-interventionist stance, advocating for neutrality and securing their assets 
rather than venturing them in hazardous speculation. One of the oldest and most successful 
British merchants in the country, John Jackson, was particularly critical of the stance taken by his 
fellow merchants, and by the British emissaries sent to negotiate an end to the conflict. Jackson 
fought the implicitly pro-Colorado Foreign Office position during the early stages of the guerra 
grande, and welcomed the end of the intervention in 1848.  
The Times of November 25, 1844, contains a letter asking the British charge d’affaires, 
Adolphus Turner, to intervene against property taxes on foreign residents, signed by John Jackson 
and Co., Henry Sparks and Co., and Nicholson, Green and Co. Turner replied, with a distant 
formality, that the British government could neither prevent the tax, nor reimburse them, as “I 
[Turner] do not feel justified in authorizing you to resist the operation of a law which was passed 
with the usual formalities required by the constitution of the republic, and I cannot depart from 
the usual practice observed by Her Majesty’s diplomatic agents abroad, to give a guarantee with 
reference to possible future contingencies.” He also admonished them for making “statements 
which might be received as indicating a desire for the success of either of the contending parties.” 
There is some irony in this admonishment, as Jackson himself would accuse other merchants in 
the city of aiding the other side. Declaring one’s own neutrality, while declaring one’s opponents’ 
partisanship, was clearly a popular rhetorical strategy during the guerra grande, one that Jackson 
both used, and had used against him. 
In an 1847 letter to Sir Thomas Herbert, reproduced in The Times, he sharply criticized the 
previous British policy of intervention, and expressed his gratitude at the restoration of official 
British neutrality through the negotiations of Lord Howden, “thereby rendering our property and 
persons incomparably more secure in these countries.”444 Jackson, cannily, attributed the sale of 
government property and revenue to French meddling, and raised the spectre of direct 
occupation, claiming:  
“ It is well known that he [Count Walewski, French diplomat] assured certain parties here that the 
French Government will send out troops to support their [French] views; and as these parties have 
taken forcible possession of 3-4ths of the property, both public and private, and are also 
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contractors for the receipts of the Custom-house, Stamp-office, and Post-office, in Monte-Video, 
they will doubtless endeavour to sustain the present state of things for ever if possible, and thus to 
continue the destruction of life and property which during the last five years has been to an extent 
scarcely to be believed in a new country like this.” 445 
Unlike many other British merchants in the city, Jackson had not advanced loans to the Colorados.  
He was a close friend of Manuel Oribe, and also one of the few British merchants to have 
established extensive rural properties prior to the war. To what extent this stance represented 
economic interests against personal or political motives, is unknown. However, Jackson did pass 
these attitudes on to his son, who wrote that “Most of the Englishmen of note here [in Uruguay] 
have made their fortune in our revolutions, either buying confiscated or public properties or 
obtaining privileges from generally revolutionary & Illegal governments…”446 Even among some 
members of the British merchant community in Uruguay, wartime speculations were not thought 
of as purely mercantile decisions, but as controversial and politically loaded activities. 
Aftermath and Legacy 
 The guerra grande had a mixed impact among the British holders of government debts. 
Some, such as Samuel Lafone and Thomas Tomkinson, appear to have profited handsomely from 
the war, and re-emerge in the 1850s as predominant merchant-entrepreneurs in Uruguay and 
beyond, rapidly expanding the scope of their business. Those two merchants were integral in the 
development of the post-war credit institutions of Uruguay: they participated in the Junta de 
Crédito Público, tasked with organizing and retiring the debt, the Sociedad de Cambios, which 
organized rediscounting of commercial bills, and were founding members of its successor, the 
Banco Comercial, one of the oldest and most successful banks in Uruguay.447 Francis Hocquard was 
a founding director of the Banco Montevideano, another of the first banks in the city.448 The most 
infamous of the “speculators” seem to have at least survived the war with their fortunes intact, 
and while it is difficult without their papers to know more, they likely did very well from their 
investments. 
Others do not appear to have been so fortunate. John Macfarlane dissolved his company 
by 1851, having been unable to last out the war. Others, especially John Gowland, needed to 
suspend payments during the conflict, presumably having committed too large a share of their 
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capital to government loans.449 Still others found themselves fighting with both the Uruguayan and 
the British governments over the settlement of their outstanding loans for years following the end 
of the war. The Foreign Office received complaints from George Hodgskin, John Kemsley, William 
Jordan and James Nuttall, all claiming that they would not have advanced loans to the government 
of the defence, but for the guarantee of British diplomats, especially Ouseley who, along with 
Baron Deffaudis, signed and guaranteed the terms of the purchase of a quarter of the 1848 
customs revenues.450  
The British government was quite unwilling to take on any obligation, claiming that 
Ouseley may have guaranteed the terms of the contract, and that the British would ask for its 
enforcement, but that this did not commit the government to any repayment or guarantee of the 
contract itself.451 George Hodgskin carried on an extensive complaint about the failure to repay, 
and the British government’s breach of commitments he claimed Ouseley had made. He 
complained bitterly of the reduction of his interest; the British government had obtained some 
resettlement of the loans, but at 6%, which was not acceptable without either a British guarantee, 
or renewed control over the customs house.452 It appears, then, that not all the British speculators 
of the guerra grande managed to translate their investments into great wealth, although others 
appear to have done very well. The success of key insiders to the defence of Montevideo, such as 
Lafone and Tomkinson, seems to reflect having obtained real property following the guerra 
grande, in addition to their loans, whereas those who were mostly reliant on the repayment of 
loans in silver were left with a turbulent decade of negotiation though the consulates. 
Conclusion 
 The risks of wartime finance and investment with the government in Montevideo during 
the guerra grande were both an advantage and a disadvantage for merchant speculators. On the 
one hand, with the Colorado government in an uncertain fiscal position, and with the possibility of 
repudiation in the event of a Blanco victory, any money loaned in support of the defence of 
Montevideo had highly uncertain returns. On the other, the uncertainty and desperation of the 
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Colorado government made it possible for merchants to obtain otherwise unthinkable 
concessions, in access to public property and privileges, and especially government revenues. The 
variable income from import and export duties meant potentially extraordinary returns. This is 
evident during 1846 and 1847, when contracts negotiated in a time of deprivation paid its profits 
during a trade boom, induced by the intervention of Britain and France. Under peacetime 
circumstances, the diversion of trade by force would have been impossible, and the customs 
contracts much less potentially lucrative, although also much less risky. 
 War makes clear the problems with long-range contracting, especially with state entities, 
and this example allows some interesting observations with larger implications for 
entrepreneurship and speculation. If an entrepreneur must guess, ex ante, whether the 
counterparty in a contract will continue to possess either the legal authority or the resources to 
hold up their end of the bargain, this is a cost which must be taken into account. It becomes even 
more complicated if the contract itself may alter the likelihood of those events. In this case, the 
Colorados required money to pay and provision their troops, and without these resources, they 
would have been in no position to credibly promise privileges or mortgage revenues. With a loan, 
however, and especially with European support raised in part by merchant lobbying, they could 
commit much more credibly to contracts, since they were likely to remain in power, and solvent. 
For the entrepreneur, then, this required a judgement not only about the probability of events 
exogenous to their investment, but rather to think of their decision as an endogenous determinant 
of the enforceability of their own contracts. The complication of this situation was considerable, 
and given its wartime implications, it is unsurprising then that this type of investment was seen as 
risky or even immoral by other parties.  
Investment in the Sociedad Compradora not only changed the fiscal situation of the 
Colorados, and the investment portfolios of the merchants. It was the purchase of the customs 
house, more than any other privilege that cemented the support of a core group of British 
merchants for the Colorado cause. With ordinary loans, maintaining an image of neutrality was 
almost certainly the easiest course of action. It allowed for greater mobility between the ports, 
easier relations with elites of both conflicting parties, and in general, the Foreign Office could be 
counted on to support, though not guarantee, the repayment of ordinary debts. With their returns 
tied to the customs revenue, British merchants pursued a much bolder strategy of encouraging 
intervention and committing even more heavily to maintaining the defence of the city. This 
created a situation of mutual support between the investors in the Sociedad Compradora, and the 
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Colorados. The investors, seeking to maximize their revenue and protect themselves from losses, 
could be counted on to offer whatever assistance they could muster. For the British and French 
merchants of the city, that meant lobbying their governments for intervention; the Colorados, 
needing to sustain their cause, offered increasingly lucrative opportunities to the Sociedad and its 
members. The stakes of the war were high enough that short-term needs outweighed long-term 
considerations for both parties, though for the defence more than for the merchants. Investors 
might lose their capital, but the choice for elites caught on the losing side of a civil war would 
probably be between exile and execution.  
The role of British merchants in the conflict was significant, both as financiers, and as 
diplomatic links to Britain. They provided one plausible, although ultimately unsuccessful, 
resolution to the problems of the besieged Colorados: European intervention. The fate of the 
merchants of the Sociedad was variable. Some ended the war in a strong position due to the 
Anglo-French blockade and the properties and privileges they purchased were by and large 
honoured, but this was by no means a predictable outcome ex ante. The turbulent politics of the 
River Plate region took even its most seasoned veterans by surprise, in the morass of shifting 
alliances and sporadic violence. The possibility of a Foreign Office guarantee on investment no 
doubt increased the willingness of British merchants to commit to larger loans and more 
speculative contracts. However, having signed those contracts, they also had every incentive to 
encourage their government to intervene, and to remind them of their perceived obligations. They 
became much more than passive investors in government finance. The British merchants of 
Montevideo were active entrepreneurial agents in the field of war and diplomacy, using the 
powers at their disposal to defend their investments, and in the process, influenced the course of 
regional and state development on both sides of the River Plate. 
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Chapter 7: Rural Entrepreneurship 
The post-Independence economy of the River Plate was an emerging economy built on the 
extensive expansion of hide production. As the growth possibilities of cattle ranching were slowly 
exhausted, new capital-intensive methods were necessary to secure further growth. This chapter 
examines the rural entrepreneurship of British merchants as they shifted their investment from 
the ports into the countryside, becoming the vanguard of innovation in the livestock sector.  Their 
investments at the high value-added margin of landownership included the introduction of sheep 
raising as an alternative to cattle ranching, importing European bloodstock of both sheep and 
cattle to improve the breeding of local animals through experimental intermixing, wire fencing, 
machinery for meat processing, and attempts to introduce commercialized agriculture. They 
sought new markets for both new and old rural products, and used their social connections abroad 
to help overcome glutted markets and depressed prices. They sold not only hides to markets in the 
United Kingdom and France, but wool to northern Europe, jerked beef to Cuba, and Brazil, and 
explored the possibility of expanding markets for Uruguayan beef to Europe.  This change in 
products, production methods, and markets slowly transformed the Uruguayan economy from an 
entirely hides-driven economy of cattle ranches to a diversified pastoral producer, hosting Latin 
America’s first industrialized meat processing firm, Liebig’s Extract of Meat Co. This engagement 
with the rural economy forced merchant-estancieros to face the traditional problems with 
landownership: The organization of scarce labour, the maintenance of peace and order in the 
countryside, and the enforcement of property rights.  
There was substantial investment by British merchants in rural property during the 19th 
century, dating at least as far back as the 1820s, but reaching a new order of magnitude in the 
wake of the guerra grande.453 During the livestock boom of the 1850s and early 1860s, rural 
production expanded and diversified, notably into the wool trade, which would become critical in 
the subsequent decades in Uruguay as a major export commodity. This diversification and 
intensification went hand in hand with the incorporation of more sophisticated forms of finance, 
faster methods of communication, technological adaptation, and higher capital intensity in 
farming. Merchants increasingly integrated into the landowning classes both through investments, 
and by intermarriage. Many of the names associated with prominent merchant houses in the 
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1830s and 1840s, such as Lafone, Tomkinson, Jackson and Hughes, were also among the vanguard 
of estanciero class. This process was accelerated by the crash of land prices and the 
impoverishment of the old Uruguayan landowning elite in the wake of the guerra grande. The 
pattern of landownership in Uruguay was thus transformed into a foreign-dominated “new rural 
upper class,” a group of merchant-estancieros with interests both in the port and in the 
countryside.  
While the end of the guerra grande restored many of the conditions for economic growth 
in Uruguay, substantial obstacles remained. The war had drained the resources of the countryside, 
leaving widespread devastation.454 The once-abundant livestock were reduced to a fraction of 
their previous numbers. The neutral outcome of the war, with neither victors nor vanquished, and 
the terms of Brazilian intervention, meant that the government could not disown the ruinous 
debts incurred by the Colorado side. The impoverishment of the Uruguayan patriciado, from 
donations, requisitions, depletion of livestock, and property damage during nearly ten years of 
conflict was substantial. Many previously prosperous estancias were sold off by their Uruguayan 
owners, mostly out of desperation for funds. However, a process of destruction can also be an 
opportunity for entrepreneurial creation, as per Schumpeter’s famous formulation. The crash of 
land prices and eradication of previous cattle stock represented an opportunity for those with the 
capital to take advantage of the shortage of credit. Foreign, and especially British, merchants were 
at the forefront of those able to make economic use of the crash in land prices. The opportunity to 
profit by rebuilding the rural productive base along modernizing lines was tempting enough that 
many of the wealthiest merchants ventured a substantial amount of wealth to take advantage of 
it. 
Successful British merchants had substantial advantages in this process. The resolution of 
the conflict had left the British community in a position of advantage. The government in 
Montevideo was deeply indebted to the subscribers of various loans from the war, and the 1845 
loan from the British merchant community factored prominently. Selling former state land in the 
countryside was one of the primary ways in which the government could settle its debts, as well as 
a popular form of collateral, leading to creditors becoming landowners.  Many of the downstream 
elements of rural industry, including processing (saladeros), storage (barracas), shipping, trade 
and even marketing, were already in the hands of British merchants. Technology and expertise 
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from the capital-intensive economies of Europe could be more easily imported and applied by 
merchants because of their pre-existing network of contacts. At a regional level, the information 
transfer between the ports of South America, especially between Montevideo and Buenos Aires 
and along the littoral, allowed for more efficient experimentation and procurement of new 
ranching methods and technologies. From an institutional standpoint, the British community could 
also lean on the authority of their consul. During a time of widespread state disorganization, 
access to diplomatic levers of power could be a powerful tool to obtain contract enforcement. This 
was especially valuable for land titles of dubious provenance, which were purchased from local 
elites by foreign merchants as investments in the years following the guerra grande.455 
Foreignness was also used to claim extraterritoriality, a status that was especially useful in the 
borderlands between jurisdictions, where it could be used to both enforce and evade contracts.456 
Becoming a rural entrepreneur, however, was neither easy nor painless. Counterbalancing 
their substantial advantages were a series of obstacles that needed to be overcome, almost all 
deriving from the underdevelopment of the Uruguayan state in what was still essentially a frontier 
society. Contract enforcement was poor, forcing owners to rely on their trust networks to protect 
them from fraud, or else engage in long and costly litigation. Policing was virtually nonexistent, 
and in the rural areas, banditry and cattle theft were regular sources of loss. Disease and poor 
weather were especially problematic for foreigners unfamiliar with the South American climate, 
and for new breeds of livestock, which were often maladapted to local biological conditions. 
Labour was a perennial complaint for estancieros. The labour market was poor, characterized by 
high wages, terrible labour discipline, and a perpetual scarcity of both skilled and unskilled 
workers. Political upheaval was a constant worry. Armed conflict resulting from uprisings or 
revolutions could be ruinous, as competing caudillos plundered the countryside in order to feed 
their gaucho armies. Moreover, a change in the political landscape would mean a change in access 
to power, with various leaders and politicians rising and falling in influence. This could disrupt the 
existing networks of connections that merchants used to obtain government privileges. Uruguay in 
the 1850s was a lucrative site for investment, but also as a risky one. There was much that could 
go wrong, and a fortune could be easily lost. Given both the opportunities and the risks, being an 
entrepreneur at this time meant making canny use of the available advantages, while guarding as 
best as possible against the ever-present dangers.  
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Rural Modernization in Regional Context 
During the whole 19th century, the economy of the southern cone of Latin America was 
mostly rural. Large estates, known as estancias, represented both a major form of landholding, 
and the principal method of organizing export production. Many authors have examined the 
evolution of the estancia as an enterprise, and demonstrated its role in the economic 
development of the region.457 The old stereotype of a landscape dominated by enormous, low-
productivity, undiversified cattle estates can no longer be maintained.458 The general consensus is 
that, going back into the colonial period, the estancia had been a profit-making enterprise 
organized as a capitalist business, rather than a quasi-feudal social form of organization. Examining 
the estate of Clemente López Osornio, a landowner from Buenos Aires in the late colonial period, 
Samuel Amaral concluded that “cattle were produced for a sound profit in the context of 
uncertainty.”459 Labour, a high-priced factor of production everywhere in the River Plate, was 
conserved by selecting cattle ranching, an land-extensive and therefore labour conserving, as the 
basic method of putting land into production. Workers were not tied to particular estates, and 
many changed employers regularly, indicating a flexible rather than feudal market for labour.460 
Payments were made in cash, rather than in kind.461 He suggests that estate owners had an 
entrepreneurial mindset, incorporating skill in management along with commercial information, 
political connections, and other forms of entrepreneurial know-how.462  
Uruguay occupies an intermediate place in the hierarchy of land values in the region, 
between the more advanced Buenos Aires economy, and the less developed region of Río Grande 
do Sul in Brazil. The Banda Oriental was centrally located in the regional economy, but Buenos 
Aires and its immediate hinterland represented a large enough agglomeration of political and 
economic power to prevent Montevideo from establishing itself as the primary regional 
metropolis. Río Grande do Sul, meanwhile, had the advantages of integration with the Brazilian 
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polity, even if economically it was peripheral prior to the arrival of railways. In these three regions, 
access to markets, internal order, and institutional developments started from different points and 
changed at different rates, due to warfare, investment, technology, and politics. The logic of using 
cattle ranching as a method of extracting profits from abundant land and minimizing the costs of 
scarce labour is even clearer in Uruguay than in the province of Buenos Aires, which is reflected in 
its slower uptake of sheep raising, whereas the potential for agglomeration due to the efficiency of 
river transportation was higher than in Río Grande do Sul, as seen in the higher levels of rural 
industrialization. 
Extensive, unimproved cattle ranching continued for longer in Uruguay than in Buenos 
Aires. Cheaper land prices allowed for a greater specialization in tasajo, and later Liebig’s Extract 
of Meat, for export. Neither product required substantial improvements in livestock through 
selective breeding. The value of the thicker hides taken from unimproved local breeds, along 
withsaladero and meat extract production, meant that rural industrialization held back the 
development of crossbred cattle.463 The market for fresh meat for local consumption was smaller 
than the one in Buenos Aires, and Uruguayan producers remained even more focused on low-
value cattle product exports than their Argentine counterparts. Nevertheless, merchants still 
experimented with improving livestock, especially in sheep raising, where the demands of the 
international wool market for quality meant that crossbreeding was a potentially lucrative strategy 
for rural capital intensification.  
David Rock interprets relative Argentine and Uruguayan development in the context of 
state formation, suggesing that the influence of merchants in the political economy of Uruguay 
was a major hindrance to economic growth. He writes that “In Uruguay merchants became more 
powerful than landowners, and political parties became stronger than the military, thereby 
hindering state formation.”464 This may be true until the end of the 1840s, and indeed, this 
interpretation fits neatly with the argument in chapter six of this thesis, that there was 
considerable entanglement of foreign merchants in state finance during the guerra grande. It is 
clear that this had a large influence on government in the 1850s, with the resolution of fiscal 
problems taking priority over state building, leading to weak government. However, by the 1860s, 
the situation was changing, for reasons directly related to Rock’s argument, namely, that powerful 
merchants had become powerful landowners. While their influence had not waned, their interests 
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had shifted. Their investments in banking and state finance meant that they opposed inflationary 
paper money policies, a key distinction from an autonomous landowner class. Nevertheless, 
merchant-estancieros’ interests displayed exactly the sorts of urban-rural links that Rock finds 
critical in Argentine political economy. That they were largely creditors and owners rather than 
debtors changes their perspective on monetary policy, but does not suggest an urban-rural divide. 
This challenges the argument that the key distinction is between a debtor (landowner) class being 
the key members of the governing coalition, as in Argentina, and a creditor class (merchant 
bankers), as in Uruguay. Merchants had considerable interests in both spheres, and exerted their 
influence accordingly. 
Diversification and Upstream Investment 
Why did upstream investment from trade to production occur? One potential explanation 
is that diversification into ranching offered security against the inflationary risks of a paper 
currency economy by providing hard assets in the form of land and livestock.465 While hedging 
against risk is a classic explanation for diversification, this explanation is difficult to sustain for the 
Uruguayan case. Diversification patterns into landownership were similar, but inconvertible paper 
currency was not introduced until 1865, and then only for a brief period. While extraordinary 
quantities of devalued government debt were held by merchants, they were under no obligation 
to accept devalued debts at face value. Important transactions were carried out in metal currency, 
and their own bank, the Banco Comercial, typically held gold reserves beyond the total liability of 
their issued notes. Thus, foreign merchants could control their exposure to government paper, to 
a greater extent than the domestic merchants of Buenos Aires, who faced greater exposure to a 
more coercive system of inconvertible paper currency. 
The most convincing explanation for this phenomenon is that merchants invested because 
there was an opportunity, generated by the historical context, to buy lands with potentially high 
productive value at low prices when other actors had been bankrupted by war. As the richest and 
best-connected actors in the economy, merchants were the best positioned to exploit the 
opportunity. As Barrán declaimed, “What magnificent opportunities [following the war] for the 
Brazilian buyer from Río Grande do Sul and the European immigrant with capital!”466 While 
Uruguay was never a high-credit, high-land value economy in the 19th century, 1852 represents a 
major watershed, the bottom of a long crisis, when credit was most scarce, and therefore most 
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valuable. Local elites were left desperate for liquidity. Absent any banking system to provide 
emergency loans against their collateral, landowners were forced to liquidate their assets to their 
creditors, and to those who had the means to buy:  foreign merchants.467 It is in the wake of this 
disaster that many merchants chose to move heavily into rural investments. This accounts for one 
of the primary differences between the Uruguayan and Buenos Airean cases: in Uruguay, the 
dominance of foreigners in the rural economy was much higher than in Buenos Aires, where a 
local landed elite maintained control over large proportions of the countryside. In Uruguay, the 
patriciado became predominantly a political elite, having been forced to abandon much of its 
economic function.468  
 Barrán and Nahum, in the first volume of the Historia rural del Uruguay moderno, 
interpret the guerra grande of 1839-51 as a disaster for the Uruguayan economy. War damages 
were so great that the economy returned to the colonial level of primitive production. The rural 
areas of the country were left in a state of subsistence, depopulated of both livestock and 
inhabitants. All previous efforts at development and modernization were halted and reversed by 
over a decade. “… from the economic [angle], its destructive effects in the existence of livestock 
and in the saladero industry gave impulse to a reconstruction of the material life of the country 
that found itself almost at the limits of subsistence. There was deterioration towards primitive 
forms of exploitation which provided a clear image of how the Republic was before the process of 
modernization.”469 Barrán and Nahum see the 1850s as a return to what Dámaso Antonio 
Larrañaga dubbed the edad de cuero, the age of leather, when the value of cattle was driven by 
this most basic product.  
 As the rural economy was ruined by war, the Uruguayan patriciado was largely 
bankrupted. The widespread devastation to the herds of cattle, the flight of population from the 
rural areas, and the predation of armies and bandits devalued their most important assets, the 
estancias. Donations, both voluntary and forced, to support one side or another, bankrupted many 
influential families; a combination of patriotism and government impoverishment prevented them 
from recouping their losses after the war. By the early 1850s, land prices dropped to the 
staggeringly low level of 0.6 pesos per hectare.470 This reflected a whole series of adverse 
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conditions: decline in livestock, the lack of credit, population flight, and the weakness of state 
institutions. Heavily indebted, both privately and publicly, and dominated by Brazil, the old 
patriciado had little ability to recover their wealth, nor even hold on to their assets and await 
recovery. Desperate for credit, they sold assets to cover their debts at low prices. 
The ruin of the old class, however, was the making of a new one: the nueva clase alta 
rural. Foreign entrepreneurs moved in to fill the void, with their considerable advantages: the 
government was generally indebted to them; they could call upon diplomatic protection; and they 
had access to foreign capital stocks through their trade network. The result was a substantial 
transformation of ownership in the Uruguayan countryside. Merchant creditors purchased, or 
repossessed, substantial estates from former landowners, the most notorious case being the titles 
owned by the estate of Juan Lavalleja being purchased by Samuel Lafone.471 A decade after the 
end of the guerra grande, in 1863, the French diplomat Maillefer estimated that three-quarters of 
the real estate in Uruguay was owned by foreigners.472 Carlos Real de Azúa attributes this 
transformation to the crippling obligations of the government, in the form of unpaid loans, bought 
up by wealthy foreigners. Diplomatic pressure from the governments of France, Britain and Brazil 
forced the Uruguayan government to honour these commitments.  
However, even without considering diplomatic pressure, it is clear that foreign merchant 
houses were the predominant source of credit in Uruguay. In this business, the British were among 
the vanguard. Without a mortgage bank to assist in borrowing money against their property, 
Uruguayan landowners were dependent on the new upper class for loans. Interest rates for 
private loans were only available at rates generally ranging from 1% to 2% monthly, or 12% to 24% 
annually.473 One neighboring estanciero asked, through Hughes’s shepherd C.B. Austin, for a loan 
of 1000 patacones, drawn upon Hughes’s merchant house. He offered a rate of 2% monthly, with 
his land as collateral.474 The endurance of such rates, even with collateral, likely indicates both 
substantial opportunities for the investment of capital, and conversely, a credit market unable to 
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meet the demands of the growing economy. In these conditions, the merchants who could 
provide credit had substantial advantages in lower cost of credit. Some chose to remain 
exclusively as creditors, but others used that advantage to take ownership rather than extend 
credit. The following section examines these direct investments in landowning. 
Rural Entrepreneurship among British Merchants 
 In examining the role played by merchants as rural entrepreneurs, the question of scale 
arises on two sides. First, how many British merchants invested in this way? And second, how 
much of the total rural investment was theirs? Answering either of these questions in a rigorous 
way is almost certainly beyond the evidence at hand, requiring lists and values for ownership that 
either do not exist, or must be pieced together from fragmentary sources. However, it is possible 
to obtain a general sense at least of the magnitude of the answer to both questions.  
Uruguay had been the site of land investments by British merchants at least since the 
cisplatine period in the 1820s, and certainly during the early years of independence. Early 
entrepreneurs such as John Jackson developed sizeable estates in very much the same way as 
their later counterparts, using the returns and credit from their merchant houses to diversify into 
land. The “List of Rural Properties,” compiled in October 1864 for Consul Lettsom by four British 
merchant-estancieros, offers a large list of the owners of rural property, as well as their locations 
and the approximate size of their livestock herds and flocks.475 Merchants, including many of 
Uruguay’s most prominent, are among the names mentioned, including: Fair, MacColl,476 Hughes, 
MacEachen, Hodgskin, Drabble, Ricketts, Gale, Shaw, Lafone,477 Lowry, Nicholson, Green, Jones, 
and Wilson. This list is far from inclusive, showing neither second-generation merchant 
landowners from British families, notably Juan D. Jackson, nor the rare landowner whose focus 
was not livestock, such as Thomas Tomkinson.  Still, this list covers many of the largest merchant 
houses in the city, some of which are registered under the company name, such as Nicholson, 
Green & Co. or Ricketts and Gale, and others under their individual names. There are even hints at 
the future, company-driven pattern of investment, with two pastoral companies operating in 
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Paysandú, the Uruguay Pastoral Association of London, with 70,000 sheep and 6,000 cattle on the 
Bichadero estate, and the much smaller Liverpool Grazing Company at Cerro Chato.  Among the 
various names, representatives from many of the major commercial houses are mentioned.  
It seems fair to say, then, that rural investment was a popular activity among British 
merchants in Uruguay, at least as a sideline investment, and sometimes as a major direction for 
entrepreneurial activity. However, the guerra grande, by paralyzing industry in the countryside, 
diverting large amounts of scarce labour, and inflicting substantial losses in deterioration and 
theft, generally aborted these early experiments, returning them to the state of the pre-
independence period. It was in the 1850s and 1860s, as the guerra grande receded into history 
and relative prosperity returned to Uruguay, that the migrant-driven transformation of the 
economy towards intensive sheep ranching began again. Writers began publishing guides, 
extolling the virtues of the country as a potential location for migration and for investment. These 
give a detailed account of the situation faced by entrepreneurs, as these guides often described 
the potential of the land in light of what had been accomplished in the years prior. One such 
manual was written by John MacColl, a Scottish merchant in Montevideo, who worked as a 
partner in the house of Anderson Macfarlane and Co. His guide was published in 1861 at the 
behest of the Uruguayan government as propaganda to encourage the migration of British settlers 
to Uruguay. 
The descriptions contained in MacColl’s “Life in the River Plate” are naturally quite rosy, 
and tend to gloss over the political chaos that Uruguay had only recently emerged from, and into 
which it would soon enough descend again. Nevertheless, his book provides a first-hand account 
of the perceived prospects for rural investment from the perspective of a British merchant and 
landowner. He gives a glowing account of the various freedoms enjoyed in Uruguay under their 
liberal constitution, and picturesque descriptions of country and city life.478 More importantly for 
our purposes, MacColl provides calculated estimates for the returns on capital invested in a sheep 
estancia, based on his own experiences and those he observed. The use of these figures is not 
new. Barrán and Nahum provide similar, but not identical figures, citing Eduardo Acevedo, himself 
quoting from MacColl, 1861. The only important difference between their numbers and mine, 
taken directly from MacColl’s manual, is the price of land, which is given as $10,000 (£2,000) in 
MacColl, but only $8,000 (£1,600) in Barrán and Nahum. MacColl’s values are as follows479: 
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Table 1: Capital Outlay for a Sheep Raising Estancia 
3 suertes of land, at $10000 each 30,000 
15000 sheep at $3 each 45,000 
Homestead, outhouses, corrals and implements 2,000 
Seven puestos, or shepherd’s shanties, with 
chiqueros 
1,000 
Original Outlay 78,000 
Source: John MacColl, Life in the River Plate (London:  1862), 23-24. 
Thus for an estancia of three suertes, equal to 5962 hectares of land,  the capital outlay 
would have been 78,000 Uruguayan pesos, which at an exchange rate of six to one, would require 
an investment of £13,000480, or £15,000, according to MacColl. From this initial investment, he 
posits a return of 2500 arrobas of wool each year, selling for $5 per arroba, earning $10,000 
annually, or £1667. This alone would represent an almost 13% return annually on the initial 
investment, before considering any increase in the value of the land or the flock.481 Any increase 
on the value of the flock through the introduction of superior breeds, such as Rambouillet and 
other Merino sheep, would increase the value further. 
This breakdown exposes several notable features. First, all inputs are more or less trivial, 
except for land and livestock. This does not mean that the capital stock in things like ranch 
implements, fence posts and shearing shacks was unimportant. Quite the contrary, developing 
and maintaining these elements was a necessity of selective livestock breeding, and a major drain 
on already-scarce labour. 482 However, in terms of investment capital, the clear largest component 
was directed at livestock, followed closely by land. Labour was expensive on a per-unit basis, and 
was often scarce when most needed, but in general, ranching was not a labour intensive activity, 
and even a large estancia could be run with a comparably small team of peones.  Land was 
extraordinarily cheap, by international standards, but was therefore used extensively and in 
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compensation for other, scarcer factors, and thus still occupies a substantial share of the overall 
capital investment. 
One check on the reasonableness of MacColl’s figures is to compare it to other estimates 
from the time. Another guide to both Argentina and Uruguay was written by Wilfrid Latham, and 
published in 1866. He gives the following description of the state of economic opportunity in the 
region. “There is an unquestionable ‘Eldorado’ in the Rio de la Plata, but it is for the industrious, 
the intelligent, the practical, and the enterprising.”483 Published in 1866, he sees the era of easy 
fortunes earned on landownership alone as having ended with the 1850s. However, the potential 
for applied capital and labour was still high. “This industry [ranching] has simply passed through 
one stage of its progress and now enters upon another, requiring the employment of more capital 
and more intelligent industry to yield again what it has already yielded – viz.: large and 
accumulative profits.” This account, and ones like it, was an open call for entrepreneurship, to 
remake the local economy to the benefit of the industrious individual. 
Latham offers some calculations about the capital costs and potential returns for sheep 
raising. Although they are formulated on Buenos Aires prices, they give a sense of the relative 
values involved. His expenses for an estancia of one square league are calculated as follows: £3500 
to £4000 for land; 5,000 sheep for £1250; four huts to serve as stations, £100; corrals £60; rams 
£640; housing for rams, £150. The total investment, then, for a square league of land used for 
sheep, would be £6200, although he later recommends selecting the best of any flock of sheep, 
and selling the rest for their skin and grease, and other sundry investments, for a total of £6500 to 
£7000 per square league. Shepherds’ wages would account for £15 per month, whereas keeping 
the rams would cost £45 or £50, adding another £230 per year in operating costs. 484The separate 
cost of rams, the capital investment in the corrals, the employment of shepherds, and the 
suggestion to select the “best” sheep, are all indicative of Latham’s recommended selective 
breeding program, designed to improve the bloodlines of the livestock through intermixing with 
imported breeds, and in so doing, to multiply their value.   
In capital-starved Uruguay, this would have been a substantial sum to invest, but these 
sums were certainly not excessive for a moderately successful merchant in Uruguay. Even for 
migrants with little capital to invest, a sizeable flock could be built by renting land and starting 
small, letting the natural reproduction of the flock generate the remaining capital over the years. 
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Latham indicates that, within three years of the establishment of the estancia, it will be earning 
£2000 to £2500 in wool sales annually, itself already a 20% or greater annual return on capital. The 
stock, both remaining and sold, would total £14000, and the land and ‘plant’ of improvements 
would represent another £6500 to £7000.485 Even using the more conservative ends of his 
estimates, Latham’s numbers imply more than a tripling of capital invested over the course of 
three years, which is consistent with the extraordinary rates of return posited by MacColl. Sheep 
raising in the 1850s and 1860s was a lucrative business, and so long as land prices continued to 
increase, prices for wool remained stable, and the country was free from internal warfare, 
entrepreneurs could make substantial fortunes in the ranching business.  
Land Prices 
 The value of livestock reflects only one channel for returns on capital invested in land. The 
increase of the value of land itself is another, and during the post-war recovery, it was a solid 
investment.  As the country stabilized in the years following the guerra grande, the price of land 
increased dramatically, from an average of 0.60 pesos per hectare in the immediate postwar 
period, up to 2.09 pesos during 1857-61, representing an annual rate of return of 30%. Even when 
compared with Uruguayan interest rates from this period, often reaching as high as 2% monthly, 
land speculation was a major opportunity for growing wealth. While returns are not quite as 
spectacular when considering the entire period between the early 1850s until the early 1870s, the 
average annual growth returns for holding land during this period was 12.4% for the entirety of 
Uruguay, and 12.9% for the Littoral region.486  
Landholding alone therefore represented a substantial method of increasing wealth, 
provided the land was purchased during the crash years immediately following the guerra grande. 
This was clearly seen by British and other foreign entrepreneurs at the time. They scrambled to 
obtain land however they could, either through purchase, by denouncing “empty” lands, or by 
outright fraud, forging titles. A major crisis arose over what was seen as rampant speculation, 
especially by certain British merchants (Samuel Lafone is usually implicated here, along with many 
others). In 1858, the legislature passed a law banning the denouncing of lands, ending that 
method of obtaining land. This act confirmed the titles of the possessors, but it certainly did not 
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stop speculation in land, which continued to the point of generating a real estate bubble during 
the Paraguayan war, only to burst in 1868.487 
 However, no opportunity lasts forever, and by the mid-1860s, land prices were no longer 
increasing rapidly. Between the 1867-71 and the 1872-76 periods, land was only increasing in 
value at 5% per year, far less than the typical return on capital of 12-18%. This meant that pure 
land speculation was no longer a profitable business; if one wanted to make money in land, 
productive development was necessary. The explanation for this slowdown in the increase of land 
prices is difficult to explain only in terms of land scarcity. Between 1852 and 1860, numbers of 
both inhabitants and livestock exploded upwards, which should have increased both the relative 
scarcity and productivity of land, driving its price upwards. While data on exact headcounts of 
cattle are unreliable at best, the growth between these two years, according to the available data, 
was between a doubling in this period, with lower estimates, and tripling, with higher ones. Sheep 
follow a similar, but slightly faster, growth pattern.488 Population recovered more slowly than 
livestock, but only barely. Over the same period, the population grew from approximately 34,000 
to 58,000, a growth rate of almost 7% annually.489 This growth in population and livestock, 
combined with a slowdown in the increase in the value of land, leads us to a puzzle. Increasing 
these factors, ceteris paribus, should increase the relative value of land. Yet, land prices increased 
more and more slowly until the 1870s. By the 1860s, the opportunity to buy low during the crash 
following the guerra grande had run its course, and entrepreneurs had to either find other 
opportunities, or find some way to make the best of their existing investments. 
Management and Delegation 
Management was a critical factor in the operation of a merchant house, and especially in 
the process of economic diversification. No merchant, however ambitious or competent, could 
overcome the fundamental restriction of travel time. British merchants travelled around the 
various ports in the region, and even back to Europe on occasion. However, for many, Montevideo 
was their primary residence. It was there that the imports that were their staple business entered 
the country, and where the bulk of the export production left. Throughout the 19th century, the 
capital was seldom less than ten times the size of the next largest urban center, and accounted for 
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a fifth of the total population of the country.490 Montevideo was the seat of government, the 
social hub, and the only city of relevance in the Banda Oriental.491 There was little scope for a 
merchant to relocate on a permanent basis to the countryside, and although occasional visits were 
possible, direct and consistent personal monitoring was not. There was therefore a structural gap 
in the flow of information necessary to carry out business. 
The obvious method of overcoming the barrier of distance was to give broad powers to an 
agent. For the rural entrepreneur, this usually took the form of an estate manager, who could then 
act as the merchant’s agent in the countryside.492 The ability to draw upon the merchant house 
was the key power for a manager, since without the ability to speak for the house’s finances, few 
credible transactions could be made. However, such power was also very dangerous, since the 
ability to draw credit from a house could be used for personal, rather than estate, business – a 
classic case of the principal/agent problem, reinforced by the large distances involved and by the 
low security of property in the countryside. To mitigate these issues, estancieros kept in constant 
communication with their estate managers via correspondence, which provided both information 
flows and a degree of supervision.493  
The position of estate manager therefore required substantial trust.  In order to establish 
such trust, merchants used their contacts to find employees who could be relied upon. 
Recommendations from fellow merchants and family contacts were major sources of dependable 
employees in an environment where dependability was both rare and difficult to assess. Likely due 
to the necessity of binding them to their employers, managers were generally recruited from the 
English-speaking world, from Britain or North America. Richard B. Hughes employed Henry 
Kennedy, a Yankee, at his Rio Negro estancia, La Paz. The Jackson family, whose business dealings 
were largely inherited by Juan D. Jackson, used Pedro, Juan’s middle brother, to run the family 
sheep estancia.  When Samuel Lafone needed someone to manage his saladero, he called on John 
Pownall Dale, his brother in law from Liverpool, to emigrate. Later, Dale would also act as manager 
of Lafone’s holdings in the Falkland Islands. The advantages of this personalist system of 
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recruitment were a level of increased trust and comfort, and an automatic integration into the 
social network. Managers recruited from abroad would be free of local connections, with the 
exception of their connection to their employer, and thus would be less susceptible to the kind of 
principal/agent problem that ordinarily plagues such dealings. Uruguayans, generally trusted much 
less, were involved in the management of British estancias, but generally at the level of lower 
management, as capataces (foremen). 
We can see in this recruitment pattern the ground-level version of the theoretical 
predictions of Granovetter,494 in terms of using pre-existing social ties as recruitment tools, and of 
Casson and Della Giusta on the importance of making use of scarce trust resources in 
entrepreneurship.495 Strong ties, such as those shared between family or close friends, provided 
an obvious conduit for direct recruitment. Sons learned the family business, and eventually 
inherited estates and took over merchant firms; brothers and brothers-in-law were sent to 
operate estancias, or left behind to run the merchant house when the entrepreneurial brother left 
to pursue opportunities in the countryside. Weak ties, generated among acquaintances, co-
religionists, ethnic communities, or through references provided by stronger ties, also contributed 
by improving the speed and quality of the search process for dependable agents. Indeed, the very 
lack of a broad network of weak ties for new migrants may have provided an incentive for English-
speaking migrants to develop trust relations with more successful entrepreneurs with whom they 
shared national, linguistic and religious ties. The barriers created by culture, language, and religion 
meant that ties developed more slowly with the local population and other migrant communities, 
making it more costly, though certainly not impossible, to rely on them as agents and managers. 
Saladeros and Rural Industrialization 
 British merchants who purchased rural property formed a natural vanguard for 
technological advancement. Even before the guerra grande, some of the more successful 
merchants, including John Jackson and Samuel Lafone, had begun to diversify their businesses into 
the more progressive side of the rural economy, the saladero industry and sheep raising. The first 
major attempt by a British industrialist to modernize the traditional saladero was by Samuel 
Lafone, at his establishment La Teja. Described as a “colossus” in the industry, his model saladero 
introduced several important innovations. First, he established his facility in a non-traditional area. 
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Most saladeros had been located in the low land cost zone near the harbor at Buceo, on the 
southeast side of Montevideo. La Teja, by contrast, was located on the bay in the northwest, by 
the Cerro, the hill overlooking Montevideo. This location allowed for easy disposal of waste 
products into the bay, an improvement which allowed a larger scale of operations. As such, it 
became a new site for the saladero industry, and many other entrepreneurs followed Lafone’s 
lead in this location, including Thomas Tomkinson and Jaime Cibils.  
Figure 1: Saladero La Teja 
Source: Museo Histórico, Casa Lavalleja, Montevideo. 
Lafone also introduced capital-intensive machinery to save labour and improve quality for 
various tasks. These machines included steam cauldrons for rendering fats from meat, and a press 
to assist in the drying process. As Barrán and Nahum point out, the saladero was transformed, first 
by Lafone and later by other entrepreneurs, from being a proto-industrial adjunct of the estancia, 
into an economic force in its own right.496 While the saladero industry did not survive beyond the 
19th century, due to the loss of slave markets in Brazil and Cuba and to the advent of refrigeration, 
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it was not entirely an industrial dead end. It was a transitional stage between the edad de cuero, 
and the industrial processing of cattle.  
One can follow this transition in the career of Richard B. Hughes. Originally a merchant, 
operating up and down the Argentine littoral and even into Paraguay, by the 1850s he became 
involved in a colonization project along the river Uruguay, in the department of Rio Negro. The 
official name for this settlement was the nationalistic “Villa Independencia,” but it quickly became 
known by the colloquial title of “Fray Bentos.” Hughes was a member of a group of entrepreneurs 
looking to establish a colony in the region. The group were merchant-estancieros, each one from 
the nueva clase alta rural, or from one of the Uruguayan elite families who had established family 
connections with that group, including James (Santiago) Lowry, George Hodgskin, Joaquin 
Errazquin. As will be discussed extensively later in this chapter, Hughes was developing substantial 
investments in land and livestock. Looking to control the downstream elements of rural 
production, he established a modern saladero in the department of Rio Negro.  
This saladero would be notable in itself as an example of early industrial development 
along the Uruguayan littoral. However, it is for its future as the antecedent for the Liebig’s Extract 
of Meat Company plant at Fray Bentos that it is most famous. This plant, established in 1865, 
represented the first major globalized industry established in Uruguay. Drawing upon Uruguayan 
production and established on Uruguayan soil, it was nonetheless a profoundly international 
enterprise. It drew its essential technology and its scientific brand identity from the German 
chemist Justus von Liebig, a famous scientific entrepreneur who transformed his theoretical 
discoveries into marketable products. The capital and management, however, were British. 
 These improvements to the saladero did not fundamentally alter the pattern of 
Uruguayan production, based almost entirely in cattle ranching. It did, however, signal the 
eventual end of the edad de cuero, the age of leather. The proto-industrial saladero could extract 
a much greater value of final product from a cow than merely removing its hide. While dried and 
salted hides remained the core product of the industry, alongside the dried meat product tasajo, 
these staples were increasingly supported by other saleable by-products: bone and bone ash, 
horn, and fats. As these commodities had different uses and different markets from the traditional 
hides and tasajo, they also provided limited, but much-needed, diversification for the emerging 
Uruguayan economy. 
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Sheep and Wool 
The most substantial transformation enacted by foreign entrepreneurs in this period was 
the introduction of sheep as a high-capital, land intensive type of livestock. Sheep raising allowed 
landowners to increase productivity, and mitigate the economy’s monocultural dependence on 
cattle products. The scale of operations was also much smaller than in the extraordinarily 
extensive cattle estancias. Raising sheep was better suited to the emerging class of immigrant 
landowners of the middle and upper classes, either as a progressive adjunct to existing cattle 
estates, or as a method of transforming comparatively large stocks of capital and small stocks of 
land into a viable business. For the cattle-centric Uruguayan countryside, this new industry was 
transformative. Just after the end of the guerra grande, in 1852, there were more than twice as 
many cattle as sheep: 1,888,622 cattle against only 796,289 sheep. By 1872, while both stocks had 
grown enormously, the ratio had more than inverted, with almost three times as many sheep as 
cattle, 20,000,000 sheep against only 7,200,000 cattle.497 Imported bloodstock in the form of 
Merino and Rambouillet sheep increased the value of livestock, as they were both larger and their 
wool was more competitive in foreign markets.498  
British landowners owned a substantial share of both major types of livestock, but were 
especially influential in sheep raising. According to estimates given to Mr. Lettsom, the British 
Consul by several Uruguayan merchant-estancieros in 1864, there were 1,103,500 sheep and 
167,000 cattle owned by British ranchers.499 Peter Winn notes that these numbers are almost 
certainly lower than the correct figures, as they are missing the department of Salto, and do not 
include the estancias of Young or Jackson, both major estancieros.500  The method of dealing with 
unknown values for all livestock for seven various estates, and with unknown numbers of cattle for 
several others, is to simply ignore them in the total. Values are also reported only in multiples of 
one thousand, meaning that these are very much general estimations rather than reliable data. 
This means that these values substantially underestimate the number of sheep under British 
ownership in the countryside, and should be thought of only as an estimated lower bound. 
Flawed as they are, however, these figures do reveal a general picture about the level of 
British involvement in the livestock economy, as well as its regional dispersion. Totaling up the 
returns by region yields the following estimates for livestock by province: 
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Table 2: Sheep and Cattle Owned by British Estancieros in Uruguay, 1864 
Source: List of Rural Property, Oct. 8, 1864. FO 51/121, attached. 
As can be seen from the table, British landownership was not exclusively focused in one region, 
but neither was it uniformly distributed. All of the estancias counted are either directly around 
Montevideo, along the littoral, or towards the center of the country, with major clusters at Colonia 
and in Paysandú. No British estancias are reported for the Brazilian border departments of Cerro 
Largo and Tacuarembó. These were areas where Brazilian rather than European estancieros 
dominated the landscape. To the east of Montevideo, none are reported for Lavalleja. Only three 
small ranches are reported for Maldonado, all of which are located around the Laguna del Sauce, 
by the southern coast and near the British-dominated port of Punta del Este, owned by the Lafone 
family.  
This distribution of estates closely mirrors the distribution of British inhabitants of the 
country. According to the data from the census of 1860, there were 465 British inhabitants living in 
Uruguay outside of Montevideo, not counting those in Paysandú, where the data for foreign 
inhabitants was not disaggregated in the census.502 Assuming the average of the proportion of 
British inhabitants from neighbouring Soriano (listed by its capital of Mercedes above) as a lower 
bound, there were at least 58 British residents in Paysandú. Given the known concentration of 
British residents in Paysandú, and the above statistics on livestock ownership, it is likely that this is 
                                                          
501 The total for cattle is 1000 less than the listed total in the letter. I am unable to find the source of this 
error, and assume it is a miscalculation on the part of the writers. This has no effect on the analysis. 
502 Census data from Rial Roade, Estadisticas Historicas. 
State Sheep Cattle 
Durazno 103000 61200 
San Jose 152500 1500 
Florida 68600 2000 
Mercedes 153500 13000 
Paysandú 371000 58000 
Canelones 29500 3300 
Colonia 215000 25000 
Maldonado 8000 2000 
Montevideo 2400 - 
Totals501 1103500 166000 
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an underestimate. As a plausible upper bound, one could assume that British residents were 2% of 
the population of Paysandú, a proportion far higher than in any other area of Uruguay (the highest 
known proportion being Colonia with a proportion of 1.3%, and the country overall being 0.5%, 
excluding Paysandú.). That would yield 284 British inhabitants for that department and 749 for the 
entire countryside in 1860.  
In any case, the number of British residents reflects the pattern of livestock estancias quite 
closely. There is little reason to believe that British residents outside Montevideo were generally 
engaged in any business except for ranching and its sidelines, including saladero operation. In all 
of Maldonado, for instance, there are only six registered British inhabitants, despite the presence 
of three estancias and the port at Punta del Este. British landowners themselves were often 
absentees, directing their estates through letters and local managers rather than performing these 
tasks in person. Still, this is a remarkably sparse level of coverage, and reflects British 
entrepreneurs’ overall lack of interest in areas outside of the littoral. 
What is also notable is that, at least according to these estimates, the British did not in 
general maintain particularly large cattle estancias, relative to the total cattle in Uruguay. Going on 
these estimates and the countrywide estimates of John MacColl for the same year of 1861, and 
assuming a 20% annual growth rate, the British owned approximately 17% of the sheep in 
Uruguay, but only 1.2% of the cattle. 503 While these rough approximate figures do not bear the 
weight of extensive calculation, they still give a clear impression: British landowners owned 
livestock, and especially sheep, far in excess of their proportion of the population. If the British 
were half a percent of the inhabitants of Uruguay, then they owned about 2.5 times as many 
cattle and 34 times as many sheep as they would were livestock distributed equally. This 
discrepancy between dominance in sheep ownership and only moderately high cattle ownership 
follows from the more capital-intensive nature of sheep farming. Superior access to capital and 
credit was something British landowners had over other groups, and especially over Uruguayans, 
or Brazilians in the northern departments. These groups favoured extensive cattle ranching, 
directed at the saladero market to produce hides and tasajo.  
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The geographical distribution of British estancias also reflects the pattern which would 
yield maximum advantages for the British. Their high-capital, intensive methods of land use, 
heavily focused on sheep raising rather than cattle ranching, was best focused where transport 
costs were lowest, information was most easily obtainable, and where what little protection of 
property there was could be best exercised. In this period, this meant settling along the routes of 
water transport, or along the few good roads leading from Montevideo up into the interior, to the 
province of Durazno. Unlike cattle, sheep could not be driven to market or to a saladero easily, 
and instead, the use of carts or boats to transport the shorn wool and other produce was the 
norm. British merchants stand out as being particularly important in the modernization of 
Uruguayan rural production and the move away from extensive ranching of unimproved cattle. 
They were the first and most intensive in switching production to higher value-added products and 
increasing the capital intensification of land usage, which itself entailed the import of new 
bloodstock, the adoption of wire fencing, and agitation for superior property rights in the 
countryside. 
Labour Problems 
As an under-populated, quasi-frontier society, Uruguay was faced with persistent 
shortages in both skilled and unskilled labour. Intensive sheep ranching required more than just a 
fenced enclosure and breeding stock; it also required specialized labour, which was largely 
unavailable: “Good shepherds are not to be found & much inquired for.”504 This represented more 
than simply a lack of skilled labour. There were also serious problems with labour discipline. 
Without a deep labour market, and with ample opportunities for employees to abandon their 
employment for better opportunities, employers had little credible threat with which to keep their 
employees in check. These shortages made improvements in the quality of production through 
labour intensive methods prohibitively expensive. Better quality product would command higher 
prices in international markets. Improving quality meant both selective breeding in order to 
improve the livestock, and also the introduction of processes to wash and otherwise clean wool 
prior to export. However, even the most elementary refining processes required capital and labour 
which were too scarce for the processes to be viable. While trying to improve the quality of wool 
at his estancias John D. Jackson complained that “… it may be possible but rather difficult to wash 
[the wool] better, with such people as we are obliged to occupy…”505 
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Direct colonization by European immigrants was the preferred method of obtaining 
labour. As early as the 1830s, Samuel Lafone received government permission for a migration 
scheme to bring Spanish Basques over from Europe to colonize Uruguay.506 These Basque 
migrants, alongside other sheep-raising groups including the Irish, made ideal immigrants as they 
already possessed the skills necessary for pastoral work.507 Immigration was a priority for both 
government and entrepreneurs, since the underpopulated countryside was neither easy to govern 
nor conducive to economic exploitation. Immigration schemes could not bring enough labour to 
Uruguay to alleviate the overall shortage, despite persistent attempts in the form of colonization 
projects and recruitment schemes. Workers were scarce throughout this period, and recruiting 
skilled and disciplined labourers remained a major priority for estancieros. 
Without any single method of solving the immediate shortage of both skilled and unskilled 
labour, British entrepreneurs were forced to adapt. In this, they had one major advantage over 
Uruguayan landowners: an abundance of capital. Capital intensive methods could be more 
efficient in terms of manpower, and therefore compensate for the labour shortage. Samuel Lafone 
in particular is credited with saving labour through imported technology, buying enormous presses 
for drying meat at his saladero, La Teja. It is said he believed he would make back the money spent 
by savings on labour costs.508 However, increasing capital intensity was itself a process which 
required substantial skilled labour. 
Various methods were tried to solve this problem. Slavery was a possibility prior to the 
guerra grande, but by 1845, both sides of the civil war had outlawed slavery, although this was 
mostly to use the newly-freed slaves as recruits. While the number of slaves around Montevideo 
was not trivial, slavery was never a widespread institution in Uruguay in the way it was in Brazil. In 
any case was not a solution available to British entrepreneurs in the 1850s. One method of 
obtaining cheap labour from Europe was indenture. This method provided European workers, who 
were generally seen as more productive than locals, and easier to control. Henry Kennedy, the 
manager of Richard B. Hughes’s estancia at Arroyo Negro, wrote glowingly about the concept of 
obtaining indentured workers from England, as the locals were not to be trusted. “[V]ery much 
rejoiced am I that you have sent to England for apprentices, the feeling carried by being 
surrounded by persons whose interest in your service is in exact proportion to the amount of 
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deception they can with impunity practice upon you, is not agreeable.”509 Three Irish boys were 
brought over as indentures. Kennedy initially claimed that they were good boys, and ought to do 
well as workers. Indenture was not an easy life, however. His description of their conditions was 
bleak, writing that “the terms (of their indenture) are very hard for them. They cannot clothe 
themselves and pay for their working, the work here is very hard on pantaloons and they must 
give up all idea of wearing shoes, which I perceive is quite a trial to their tender feet,” but 
presumed they would get used to their condition, as “time and patience are wonderful masters to 
teach conformity with a good grace…”510 Beds too were lacking, and none were available in 
Paisandú, except at low qualities and high prices, 10 to 12 patacones for a bed made of grass. 
Needless to say, comfort for the indentured was not a priority. 
Harsh conditions and a wide open space were not conducive to loyalty. In the Uruguayan 
countryside, indentured servants were no easier to control than local labourers. As Kennedy 
learned to his dismay some days later, the indentured boys clearly had other plans for themselves, 
and ran away. “They one and all appear to belong to the very dregs of the worst class of people 
and from what I can find out the plan of running away appears to have been formed on the voyage 
out, or perhaps when they signed their indentures their intention was to stay with us only as long 
as it was convenient."511 Indenture posed many of the same problems as hiring local peones, the 
lack of credible disciplinary mechanisms, and the wide availability of alternative employment, and 
therefore could not solve the labour problems of rural entrepreneurs. 
 Richard Hughes’s estancia, considered a model for a modernizing rural enterprise, was 
initially crippled by the lack of labour for very basic tasks, including putting down and pulling up 
posts for fencing, and building corrals. Even the simplest tasks required more labour than was 
readily available. The seasonal work involved in raising livestock meant a constant drain on 
workers that could otherwise have been employed developing the estancia. Even servants for 
basic domestic tasks were scarce. Kennedy complained constantly to Hughes about the lack of a 
cook, or anyone to wash his clothes. He asked repeatedly to be sent an immigrant couple to 
perform these tasks, as he found himself unable to hire one due to the great demand for them. 
Even on this ‘model’ estancia, clothes went for months without cleaning. “We literally belong to 
the ‘great unwashed’,”512 wrote Kennedy, despairing of the luxuries that would have been 
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common even in Montevideo, but were scarce even in the best-developed sections of the 
countryside. 
Policing and Crime 
Rural entrepreneurs faced constant problems with robbery. In some cases, the police were 
powerless to stop the thefts; in others, they were active contributors. “The police are a set of 
authorized thieves,” wrote John D. Jackson, “… now with roberies [sic] of consideration & common 
occurrence (some of 2 & 300 sheep at a time)…”  Without the support of the government to police 
the countryside, mercenary security was the only available option. “We have sent an officer & six 
men with power to catch & punish people stealing sheep in the Estancia; these men we pay.” 513 
Appeals to the government were, in this period, without effect, for several reasons. “Our police 
grows worse daily; a representation was made to the government, by the people, of the evils 
resulting from this inefficiency of the Gefe Politico [political boss] I understand no attention has or 
will be paid to it,” wrote Kennedy, complaining bitterly of the government agents’ inability to 
police the countryside. Property was critically insecure, a situation which called for drastic reform.  
Upon the replacement of the previously mentioned Gefe Politico, Kennedy offers his 
approval of iron-fisted methods of imposing order on the countryside: “We are somewhat 
comforted by the arrival of a new Gefe Politico who is aware of the scandalous state of the police 
and is about to adopt measures which we most surely trust will give us some security,”514 and “Our 
new ‘Gefe Politico’ is taking active means, to free us from the cow-thieves and although he may 
exceed the strict limits of the law now and then I do not think he can well avoid it and strike a 
wholesome terror into such a set of vagrants as he has to deal with.”515 However, by the next year, 
these harsher methods had failed to bring peace to the countryside: “The efforts … to put down 
cattle stealing have been so far without any beneficial result some men have been taken up, and 
confessed this crime but so many obstructions are placed in the way of justice that I shall not be 
surprised if the criminals be again let loose upon us to be more daring than ever. We have lost 
more animals this year than during the same time last, and I fear this is a contribution we will 
always be forced to pay.”516 In such comments, one can see the impetus for the development of 
the Asociación Rural, to organize and lobby for the development of better policing, infrastructure, 
and property rights in the countryside, and the incentives to support military rule. 
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This fear of robbery was not only a loss that had to be absorbed out of profits. It also 
altered business decisions by shortening the time horizon, and reducing the value of livestock as 
capital. When a saladero began operating in the vicinity of Hughes’s estancia, Kennedy’s advice 
was conservative, to liquidate existing stocks if they can get a reasonable price. “I live in fear of 
robbers of every degree and think it well to secure what we have available.”517 The lack of a safe 
environment made carrying large stocks of cattle an inherently risky proposition. This was 
especially pertinent when breeding stock was imported from Europe or Buenos Aires. Local criollo 
cattle, valuable mostly for their hides, and whose meat was fit only for the saladero, represented a 
smaller risk than valuable European breeds. These offered a potential avenue for the 
advancement of productivity in the countryside, but only if they could be kept alive long enough to 
spread their genes through mixing (mestizaje) with the local animal populations. Before the 
introduction of wire fencing, first on Hughes’s estancia La Paz, and later mandatorily for all 
estancias, keeping such non-adapted pedigree animals was a difficult task.  They had to be healthy 
and safe from the dangers of robbery (official or otherwise), and also kept separate in order to 
avoid unwanted intermixing.  
 The needs of foreign entrepreneurs were not necessarily shared by the local community, 
however. The desired harsh punishments were not forthcoming, and foreign entrepreneurs’ 
interests were not taken as seriously in the countryside as in Montevideo.  The Uruguayan state, 
strained by debt and lacking in influence, could not intervene with enough strength to govern the 
countryside in a manner consistent with the expectations of foreign property owners. Kennedy 
notes that “… such is the demoralized state of the country that no proper steps are taken to stop it 
[cattle theft]; the community scarcely expresses any sympathy, and unless the government makes 
it a capital crime we will never be rid of this serious drawback to the interests of this country – 
there is nothing more difficult to obtain than the punishment of a cattle thief. The moment one is 
arrested the public makes every exertion to obtain the pardon of the culprit.”518  
While this is no doubt a heavily biased perspective, it highlights several important issues 
for British entrepreneurship in the countryside. First, the perception was that public sympathy in 
the countryside favored local Uruguayans over British landowners. Likely, they were seen as 
intruders and speculators. Second, it shows considerable impatience with the judicial institutions 
of the country, which were seen as slow, ineffective, and unable (or unwilling) to protect property 
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rights. And third, it shows the clear linkage, in the thinking of the new class of foreign 
entrepreneurs and managers, between the institutions governing the security of their property, 
and the prosperity of the nation as a whole.  
British Merchants and the Asociación Rural 
 The increasing capital and technological intensity of the investments involved in rural 
development increased the incentives for collective organization. There was substantial 
collaboration among landowners in sharing ideas, resolving conflicts, embarking on joint projects, 
and lobbying the government to defend their property rights. The social form of this collaboration 
began with clubs, and evolved into sophisticated industry lobby groups which considerable 
political influence in favour of landowners. In order to establish more intensive production in the 
countryside, the cycle of prosperity and violence had to be stopped. As they became landowners, 
merchants increasingly turned their attention to pressuring the state for solutions.  As the 
merchants of Montevideo developed into landowners, the character of their social organization 
began to reflect this new identity.  
Associations and clubs had always been a part of social life in the port.  From the late 
1850s onwards, however, they became the loci of organized lobby groups in favour of their new 
interests. The Club de Extranjeros, or foreigners’ club, was a society of overseas merchants that 
combined social with commercial functions, and contained representatives of all the major 
nationalities in trade. Key British merchants including Thomas Tomkinson acted as directors, 
reflecting their place in the increasingly integrated merchant community.519Soon, however, 
another society, the Club Nacional, was created in imitation that served as integrated spaces 
where elite Uruguayans and foreign merchants could participate on explicitly equal footing.520  The 
Club Nacional’s first directorship included names from the remaining Uruguayan merchant-
landowners from the patriciado, such as Aureliano Berro, Juan Ramón Gómez, and Vicente 
Vásquez, with Richard Hughes as president.521  
One function of the Club Nacional was to seek out new markets for tasajo in response to 
falling prices and limited, slave-oriented markets in Cuba and Brazil. British entrepreneurs whose 
fortunes were based on the sale of tasajo scrambled to find other markets, forming a transatlantic 
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committee to attempt to introduce the dried meat into English and Scottish markets. While this 
group is a remarkable case of network cooperation, both across firms in Uruguay and between the 
Uruguayan firms and their connections in Britain, the initiative was ultimately a failure; labour was 
too expensive in Uruguay to make use of superior curing and storing processes which might have 
made it palatable to European consumers. John D. Jackson, one of the estancieros involved in this 
effort, recounts several attempts to make this trade profitable. Using the Rathbones and their 
merchant empire as his point of entry, he had shipped a barrel of tasajo, as a sample. While the 
product itself did not stir the passions of the Liverpool consumer (Jackson held out hope for 
Glasgow), his problem was more fundamental: the cost of making barrels and packing the tasajo 
was itself higher than the value of the product, for “want of labourers.” 522 Various other solutions, 
such as shipping the meat, uncured, in brine in the bottom of the hold of a ship, were considered, 
but ultimately, the markets for tasajo remained the same as always: Cuba and Brazil, the slave 
economies. 
Without a viable option for expanding markets for traditional products, the only available 
option for continued growth was to develop new products and processes of rural production. At 
the forefront of this developmental project was the colony of Villa Independencia. This colony was 
developed by the merchant-estancieros Richard Hughes, Joaquín Errazquin (brother-in-law of John 
Jackson), George Hodgskin, and James Lowry, hoping to compete with Argentine production in the 
littoral. This project, along with a series of other experiments in crossbreeding, wire fencing, and 
industrial meat processing, would form the core of the technological progress in land usage 
throughout the 1860s. In 1856, Hughes returned to Uruguay in order to focus on developing his 
landowning interests on the La Paz estancia, immediately outside of Fray Bentos. In addition to his 
estate, Hughes owned and operated a saladero which later became the beginnings of the Liebig’s 
Extract of Meat Company.523  
 The Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, the journal disseminated in order to share 
information and voice opinions among landowners, was a vehicle for merchants to disseminate 
their views regarding necessary institutional reforms. Thomas Tomkinson wrote, in an article 
pertaining to the development of a postal system for Uruguay: 
 “If our existing institutions are not adequate to this objective [establishing a postal service], let us 
imitate those other countries that have made the first and best progress in this sense. Where was 
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the first mail established? In England. Where were the first and fastest stagecoaches? In England; 
and just as the establishment of these businesses in a country presupposes good roads, we should 
seek in England the ways that they have employed to obtain them.”524 
This passage shows not only the increasing preoccupation with infrastructure, transportation, and 
communication, but also the suggestion of importing and imitating British institutions. Articles on 
topics of rural innovation and technological development were a mainstay of the journal, and 
British merchant-estancieros wrote many of them. Tomkinson contributed treatises on 
commercial botany, including acacia and eucalyptus, the latter of which he is credited with 
introducing into the country.525 Hughes contributed articles about sheep raising, and about the 
growth of the Uruguayan population. Edward McEachen contributed articles on rural education, 
and on the London Wool Exhibition of 1880. The journal served as a way of disseminating 
information and conducting discussion, but also as a vehicle for organizing the landowning classes 
in their increasingly vocal lobbying for protection of property rights and maintenance of order in 
the countryside. 
The Return of Crisis Conditions: 1869-1875 
 The golden era for rural entrepreneurship began with the end of the guerra grande, in 
1851. It ended in 1869, for several concurrent reasons. First, the international context had 
changed. Prices of rural commodities had dropped enormously. Locally, Buenos Aires and the 
Argentine provinces, which had been mired in civil wars between city and countryside in this 
period, had re-emerged as major producers, and therefore, as competitors. Barrán and Nahum 
chart the price of a single head of cattle during the main years of economic recovery due to the 
increase of cattle herds, 1857-1862. In 1857, a head of cattle cost $20526, and in 1858, $18. By 
1862, these prices had fallen by nearly half, to under $10.527 Tasajo had fallen even further, from 
$6.50 and $7 per quintal in 1857 and 1858, to merely $2.25 by 1862. Thus, while the livestock 
population had doubled or tripled, its total value had not increased very much at all, especially 
insofar as it was to be sold to saladeros primarily for tasajo production.  
 Second, an epizootic528 of livestock disease tore through the existing stocks, first sheep in 
1869, and later cattle in 1874. Between 1869 and 1875, the number of sheep in Uruguay dropped 
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525 Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, 1874, 501-546. 
526 Prices in pesos fuertes. 
527 Barrán and Nahum, Historia rural, t.I/1, 125. 
528 An epizootic is the animal kingdom equivalent of an epidemic. 
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from over 16 million to only 8 or 9 million, a loss of nearly half the stock. Cattle had similarly fallen 
from almost 8 million down to only 5 million. Millot and Bertino describe this loss as an “enormous 
destruction of capital,” which would have been all the more devastating in a capital-scarce 
country, where as we have seen from the above estimates, the majority of tangible capital was in 
the form of livestock.529 
 Third, and certainly not least, the relative peace of the 1850s and early 1860s had been 
broken by a series of revolutions and insurgencies. In 1865, General Flores, a charismatic and 
influential Colorado general and onetime President, returned from Argentina at the head of an 
army, supported by Bartolomé Mitre, president of Argentina. Flores overthrew the Blanco 
government of Bernardo Berro, and allied Uruguay with Brazil and Argentina against Paraguay in 
the Paraguayan War. While Flores would eventually be assassinated,530 the dominance of his party 
continued under successive presidents, including Lorenzo Batlle. That government was in turn 
assaulted from 1870 to 1872 by Blanco leader Timoteo Aparicio, in what is known as the 
Revolution of the Lances. This insurgency almost overthrew the government, although it was 
saved at the last minute by reinforcements, and eventually managed to suppress the rebellion. 
During this period, the British consul was swamped with protests from estancieros and residents, 
who complained of depredations by troops on both sides, especially by the government army. 
Sheep and cattle would be killed to feed passing armies without asking permission, and with 
repayment to be made in promissory notes of dubious value. By the time of Flores’ revolution, the 
security of property that characterized the late 1850s and early 1860s had been crushed by 
recurrent waves of internecine violence. 
In the interpretation of Barrán and Nahum, this itself has an economic explanation: in the 
wake of the guerra grande, the depleted state of the productive base encouraged compromise 
rather than conflict, since the damages of warfare so clearly outweighed the potential benefits. 
However, as the economy recovered, and livestock was again plentiful, estancieros no longer had 
the same dire incentive to suppress warfare, and instead looked to the various political factions 
with an eye to their own grievances, not to mention potential gains. In this environment, 
depreciated cattle and sheep were of less importance than their relative position vis a vis the 
government. They were therefore more tolerant of losses, so long as this contributed to the 
                                                          
529 Millot and Bertino, Historia Economica, t. 2, 55. 
530 The story of the assassination of Flores and Berro on the same day, illustrates the extent of the 
internecine struggle in Uruguay during this period between the parties, as well as the marked inability of the 
state to control violence on the part of political factions. 
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success of their preferred political party, with associated institutional agenda and clientelistic 
network. While it downplays the destabilizing aspects of Brazilian and Argentine interference in 
Uruguayan political affairs, there must be at least some truth to this explanation. In an era where 
money was short and markets poor, armies had to subsist off the countryside, and estancias filled 
with livestock were both an encouragement to plunder and a means of sustaining an insurgency, 
or indeed a government army, as many British estancieros discovered through personal 
experience. Wars thus tended to come after times of prosperity, rather than times of dearth, 
when the most and most valuable property was vulnerable. 
This process led to an increasingly vocal political coalition in favour of a stronger central 
government, capable of maintaining order in the countryside, and ending the recurrent cycle of 
revolution and rebellion. The increasingly professionalized military, the progressive landowners of 
the Asociación Rural, and the merchants of Montevideo (these last two groups being in many 
cases composed of the same individuals and families) threw their support behind Colonel Lorenzo 
Latorre, the minister of war, who, on March 10, 1876, overthrew the civilian government and 
established a military dictatorship that would last until the 1890s.531 While this did not entirely 
foreclose the politico-military conflict between the parties, it established a new regime 
characterized by stronger institutions, foreign direct investment (notably, in building the railroad 
network), educational investment, and increased policing in the countryside. The intermittent 
conflict between the political parties that had both impeded rural development, and also provided 
lucrative opportunities for speculation on political and military outcomes, paused for nearly two 
decades. Having risen to predominance in the countryside during the years of conflict, the 
merchants of Montevideo increasingly prioritized security over ideology. In Latorre, they found a 
government able and willing to support their property rights, a goal which mattered more than the 
old conflicts between Blancos and Colorados, or between doctores and caudillos. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on the role of British merchants as estancieros from two broad 
perspectives. First, it examined the overall role and impact of the rural investments made by 
entrepreneurs, many of whom were key members of the Montevideo merchant community. 
Second, it gave an indication of the substantial potential for profit and growth in the sheep raising 
business, giving the motive to explain the movement into ranching in the post-guerra grande 
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period. Several types of sources, including immigration guides, early statistical manuals, census 
data, personal and business correspondence, have been examined to flesh out this story.  
The overall picture is of a vanguard group of entrepreneurs, facing substantial 
impediments to their activities in the form of institutional instability, shallow labour markets and 
unpredictable events such as wars and disease. Nevertheless, the British estancieros of Uruguay 
were quite successful, establishing themselves predominantly in the capital-intensive areas of 
rural production, sheep raising and cross-breeding of cattle, which in turn required a large degree 
of technical innovation, leading to wire fencing and the increasing industrialization of the saladero 
industry for processing large volumes of meat. The interaction between these estancieros and the 
Blanco and Colorado political factions was complex, but the political infighting that characterized 
the era was largely seen as an impediment to investment, as it was a source of appropriation of 
capital and a detriment to production and trade. Peace and prosperity brought its own problems, 
however, and British merchant-estancieros used their influence as best they could to expand their 
markets and stave off overproduction. In this, they were only partly successful.  
Nevertheless, in the large picture of the development of the Uruguayan rural sector from 
an extensive, hides-based system, to a more intensive, diversified and technologically 
sophisticated mode of production, the British merchants who expanded upstream into rural 
production played a vanguard role. Investment within the meat processing industry through the 
expansion and modernization of the saladero industry, as pioneered by Samuel Lafone, gave value 
to existing stocks of cattle beyond their hides. It also represented the beginnings of the process of 
rural industrialization, the application of an early version of the techniques of mass production to 
the exploitation of livestock. This process would later be followed by the introduction of the 
Liebig’s Extract of Meat plant, which had its origins in an entrepreneurial project of colonization 
and commercial ranching undertaken by British merchants such as Richard Hughes and John 
Jackson. The transition to sheep raising and the introduction of new bloodstock to crossbreed with 
local animals offered another route towards valorizing land through the application of capital. New 
products, including wool and higher-value meats, allowed for more intensive use of land, 
especially in zones with easy market access along the rivers. There was a clear entrepreneurial 
opportunity offered by the combination of low land prices and production methods that could be 
pushed towards the technological frontier, and it was in exploiting this opportunity for 
modernization that influence of British merchant-estancieros was the largest.  
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However, these changes also brought with them a host of requirements in terms of new 
technology, skilled labour, infrastructure such as wire fencing, and policing. Securing these 
changes became an increasingly important aspect of rural entrepreneurship, leading to the 
organization of groups such as the Club Nacional and the Asociación Rural in order to disseminate 
knowledge, organize collective action, and exert political influence. This increasing entanglement 
in the rural economy had consequences both for the interests of merchants as investors, and for 
the political economy of Uruguayan development. With the crises of the late 1860s and early 
1870s, the considerable influence of the merchant elite was brought to bear to solve the problems 
of rural chaos, leading to the rise of Lorenzo Latorre, militarism, and the first major experiment in 
Uruguayan state building. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the nature and influence of the British merchant community in Uruguay 
during the mid-19th century, through the lens of business history and political economy. This 
community consisted of entrepreneurial individuals who came together in networks comprising 
intermarried families and interlocking merchant partnerships to pursue a wide variety of business 
interests. In the process of doing so, they integrated with the local elite and with other merchant 
groups, gaining important political and economic connections, and developing regional expertise. 
This first served as a functional mechanism for enabling trade in a low-trust, institutionally difficult 
environment. However, as the economy developed, it allowed them to find and exploit 
opportunities for investment. It also positioned them to act as a bridge between the mid-19th 
century “pastoral and commercial” phase, dominated by foreign merchant houses whose financial 
intermediation put them at the centre of economic activity, to the late 19th century phase of 
British overseas investment, large-scale infrastructural development, and technological 
modernization. As the import/export house lost its central role with the deployment of the 
telegraph and the construction of the railway network, the influence of these early British 
merchants could still be seen in the directorships of banks and companies, in the most capital-
intensive rural estates, and in the social networks of the Uruguayan political and economic elite. 
 The primary role of merchants was an entrepreneurial one. The merchants examined as 
case studies in this thesis began in the lucrative hides and textiles trades. They expanded the 
market for British textiles and provided valuable raw materials for European leather 
manufacturers. Success in these fields led to the accumulation of capital, local social connections, 
and regional expertise. These resources were combined with their transatlantic networks, which 
provided lower cost of capital, privileged access to information, and diplomatic influence.  This 
combination led to entrepreneurship, as merchants expanded out of trade, and into services and 
upstream production. By the time an influential merchant like Samuel Lafone, Richard Hughes, or 
Thomas Tomkinson died in the 1870s, they had become broadly-based investors and innovators, 
acting across the entire economy, from sheep and cattle ranching, through meat processing, to 
banking, insurance, colonization, and infrastructure development.  
The major arguments in this thesis concern the contingent path taken by merchants acting 
as entrepreneurs.  It argues that, while merchants were inevitably going to play an important role 
in an export-driven economy, the particular roles filled by British merchants were the result of a 
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broad range of entrepreneurial activities taken in the context of a rapidly-changing environment. 
The reaction to particular situations had dynamic effects on the economic, political and social 
situation in Uruguay, which then fed back into the opportunity set faced by merchants. Decisions 
about government loans, tax farming, political support, landownership, capital investment, and 
even marriage shaped the interests of merchants, which in turn shaped their future decisions. 
Meanwhile, for Uruguayan and regional elites, alliances with merchants provided access to foreign 
capital and influence, which could then be applied to local conflicts, most notably in the case of 
the Colorados during the guerra grande.  
Contribution 
This thesis partly fills the gap in the literature on trade and development in mid-19th 
century Uruguay. In this, it follows in the strand of literature begun by Ferns and Platt, and 
developed by Reber, Winn, Mayo, Jones, and most recently, Llorca-Jaña in examining British trade 
in the southern cone of Latin America and the role it played both locally and internationally.532 It is 
the first study specifically to examine the role of British merchants in Uruguay. It is also one of the 
few works dealing with the mid-19th century, which has been examined by only a few scholars 
outside of Uruguay itself.533 It also contributes to the broader literature on the evolution of 
business in Latin America, in the vein of Dávila and Miller, Jones and Lluch, and Barbero and 
Jacob.534 It brings into clearer focus the distinctly Uruguayan context, linked to and similar to both 
Argentina and southern Brazil, but with distinct characteristics of its own, notably the distinctive 
entrepreneurial and social role of the merchants examined in this thesis.  
The chapters of this thesis have also has shed light on the role of British merchants in the 
development of the Uruguayan economy, during the “pastoral and commercial” period, 1830-75. 
They have illuminated a series of thematically and chronologically selected conjunctures 
throughout the period in which British merchants played a particularly notable role. Largely, this 
                                                          
532 Ferns, Britain and Argentina, Platt, Latin America and British Trade, Reber, British Mercantile Houses, 
Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpúrea, Mayo, British Merchants and Chilean Development, C. Jones, 
International Business, Llorca-Jaña, British Textile Trade.  
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histórico de la globalización en Argentina y Chile: empresas y empresarios (Buenos Aires: Editorial Temas, 
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influence was economic, with British merchants acting as entrepreneurial conduits for European 
products, capital, technology, immigrants, and institutions. However, in the perpetual upheaval of 
the political contests for control of the state between city and countryside, Blancos and Colorados, 
caudillos and doctores, Brazilian and Argentine interests,  merchants could not and did not remain 
neutral bystanders. They reacted to the local situation, taking advantage of opportunities provided 
by the struggle for political power. They were also agents of change themselves. In the 1840s, 
their lobbying efforts and connections with local British and French diplomats altered the course 
of the guerra grande, likely extending it by several years, and plausibly contributing to the 
downfall of Rosas and the federalist system in Argentina.   
Part of the contribution made by this thesis is in the variety of sources brought to light, 
both published and archival, several of which were previously unexamined or underused. The 
background information provided in chapter four, and elaborated in appendix three, brings 
together the various strands of data on both the composition and volume of trade with Uruguay, 
which have previously only been examined separately. Much of this information is available only 
from quasi-primary statistical sources, such as the apuntes estadisticos of Andrés Lamas, and the 
early statistical work of Adolfo Vaillant.535 The sources used for chapter five, concerning the social 
networks of merchants, are a combination of new and unexamined material, such as the letter 
book of Anderson Macfarlane and Co. from the National Archives at Kew, and underused 
collections, including the Hughes papers (both from the Hughes family and the archivo general de 
la nación in Montevideo), and the Jackson correspondence in the Rathbone papers at the 
University of Liverpool. The ability to combine newly digitized genealogical material, made 
available at ancestry.co.uk, with more traditional secondary sources such as biographical 
dictionaries and regional family histories,536 has made possible a more thorough mapping of the 
social relationships of merchants on both sides of the Atlantic.537 The analysis of the Sociedad 
Compradora and the interactions between merchants and the state during the guerra grande 
draws upon archival material from both Uruguay and the United Kingdom. Documents uncovered 
during this research provide the basis for the analysis of chapter six, along with information drawn 
from press accounts and diplomatic correspondence. Chapter seven makes use of previously 
unused and underused correspondence concerning the management of rural estates in Uruguay, 
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as well as drawing extensively from contemporary pamphlets to establish the contemporary 
perceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities in the rural sector.  
Firms, Organization, and Networks 
 The evidence presented in chapters five, six and seven sheds new light on how Uruguayan 
firm structure fits into the larger evolution of business forms. The period of this thesis begins with 
a time of horizontally and vertically disaggregated merchant firms, often comprised of an 
individual merchant or two-person partnership, connected by formal or informal links to a 
network of other merchant houses, producers, suppliers, shippers, and merchant banks. These 
small, flexible firms reflected the characteristics of the market they operated in. Conditions were 
volatile, and little could be taken for granted, from large-scale global factors such as war and 
peace, technological developments, and international diplomacy, to more local factors of tastes 
and preferences, market prices, and political stability. The information necessary to deal with this 
uncertainty was dispersed, difficult to transmit, and largely implicit. Some aspects of these 
difficulties have been explored in this thesis, through both internal and external correspondence, 
showing how firms managed information, both at transatlantic distance, in the case of Anderson 
Macfarlane and Co., and between Montevideo and the Uruguayan hinterland, in the case of 
Richard Hughes and his estate manager Henry Kennedy. 
Social links were an essential part of how merchants organized their business, and 
especially, how they adapted to local circumstances. Coming to the River Plate from the 
industrialized north of Britain, merchants were well-positioned to pursue economic opportunities. 
Not all merchant firms in the River Plate were branches of existing houses, and not all merchants 
arrived with access to substantial fortunes. Many firms were founded during the process of 
individual exploration of new markets, often by merchants with only limited initial access to funds. 
However, their origins nevertheless gave them the cultural connection to established trade 
networks that provided entrepreneurial advantages. Clusters of interlinked firms on both sides of 
the River Plate, and on both sides of the Atlantic, made possible the integrated transactions 
necessary to maintain not only the exchange of hides for textiles, but also the web of credit that 
was the single most important advantage available to foreign merchants over their local 
competitors. Meanwhile, intermarriage with well-connected families within the patriciado and 
other regional elites provided political clout and local expertise in landownership. These links have 
been explored through several case studies, including: John Jackson and the Errazquin family while 
maintaining his high-prestige links with the Rathbones of Liverpool; Thomas Tomkinson marrying 
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into the Navia clan; and Samuel Lafone, whose controversial marriage into the Quevedo-Alsina 
family provided him with valuable contacts, but also made him a deeply controversial figure 
involved in the outbreak and progression of the guerra grande.  
While this thesis has not explored the transition to the age of foreign direct investment in 
detail, there are nevertheless insights that can be drawn from chapters six and seven on the 
gradual emergence of larger forms of collective business organization in Uruguay. The mercantile 
networks of merchants functioned as one method of exploiting larger business opportunities 
without having to formally organize into integrated firms. As the nature of opportunities changed 
with the development of the economy, larger firms began forming along the lines traced out by 
the links of the social networks. Nevertheless, contingency plays a role in this process as well. The 
first joint stock company in Uruguay, the Sociedad Compradora de los Derechos de Aduana, was 
created not for ranching, meat processing, banking, or infrastructure, but for tax farming. Its 
existence depended on the necessities, and opportunities, presented by the guerra grande. At the 
conclusion of the war, the accumulation of both government debt and land ownership in the 
hands of those merchants who had been creditors of the government shaped the emergence of 
post-guerra grande firms, especially in the banking sector: the Banco Comercial, Banco Navia, and 
Banco Montevideano were all established primarily by Sociedad merchants. Other early joint stock 
projects, including the Liebig’s Extract of Meat plant at Fray Bentos, and the first railway in 
Uruguay, the Ferrocarril Central de Uruguay, were created by the same networks of merchants, 
although in both cases they rapidly passed into the hands of foreign investors.  
Entrepreneurship and Historical Contingency 
In understanding the strategic behaviour of merchants, the dynamic context is critical. 
Entrepreneurship has an effect on both the actor, by changing their future interests, and on the 
surrounding environment, and these processes fed back in to one another. Uruguay provides a 
useful case for examining this feedback, as the influence of merchant-entrepreneurs on the small 
and little-developed state was large enough to be historically visible. The 19th century were years 
of chaos, but also of transformation. Accounts from the period consistently emphasize both the 
possibilities for economic growth, and the ever-changing military and political dynamics which 
hindered the potential of the region, and with which any entrepreneurial agent had to contend. 
The economy and society of the Uruguayan republic went through profound changes from its 
independence until 1875. Production in the country transformed from a single-export focus with 
almost no industrialized production, to being at the (regional) forefront of mechanized, export-
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oriented meat and livestock production, with the Liebig’s Extract of Meat plant being the 
outstanding example. The countryside had been brought into productive use, however marginal. 
Rural Uruguay had been divided up into extensive cattle ranches in the hinterland, and more 
capital-intensive wire-fenced sheep ranches closer to the coast and rivers. Finance had evolved 
from being entirely merchant-centred, to an unstable, but nevertheless tangible banking system 
supporting a sovereign Uruguayan currency. The population of the country doubled, and the 
population composition changed from a small, Spanish late-colonial mix of Basque, Catalan and 
Galician migrants, with a substantial minority of slaves, to being a mix of French, Spanish and 
Italians, who emigratedin the mid-19th century. Institutionally, the state remained weakly 
developed and almost exclusively reliant on customs revenues. There was, however, evidence of 
nascent state development by the 1860s, with the professionalization of the army, and by 1875, 
state building had begun in earnest under Latorre.   
 This transformation suggests a parallel, mutually reinforcing development of the careers 
of these vanguard entrepreneurs, and the development of the Uruguayan economy itself. 
Opportunities created by circumstance were exploited by merchants to earn entrepreneurial 
rents. Their investments redirected resources towards new and more productive sectors, and 
increasingly linked the production of the rural hinterland with the urban economy of Montevideo, 
and with global markets through a process of exploration and innovation. These changes then led 
to further potential opportunities in interlinked sectors, which merchant-entrepreneurs were best 
positioned to exploit due to their regional expertise. Their importance, in terms of resources, 
political clout, and the scope of their activities increased over the period. This influence began to 
decline only after the undercutting of the fundamental source of their power, the exclusive 
combination of international connections and local knowledge.  The introduction of the telegraph, 
mass migration, and large-scale international investment, alongside the development of the 
Uruguayan state as a countervailing force, ended the era of merchant economic dominance. By 
the 1870s, however, merchant had not only shaped the evolution of the economy for half a 
century, but had also evolved alongside it, participating in the same transformative process as the 
Uruguayan economy.  
The Role of Merchants in State Formation 
 The entrepreneurship of merchants also contributed to the political economy of the 
Uruguayan state. The case of Uruguay provides an interesting contrast to the typical models of 
state development, and merchants play a critical role, as evidenced in chapters six and seven. As 
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frontier economy with a rural production base dependent on largely unimproved land, the 
government in Montevideo drew its fiscal resources from the customs house, orienting policy 
towards alternative means of attracting trade, and putting merchants in a powerful position as the 
source of government revenue. Merchants, able to draw funds from overseas at a time when 
domestic sources of savings and credit were practically non-existent, were in a powerful position 
to exploit opportunities in financing the state. The availability of this merchant finance made 
possible modes of conflict that would otherwise have been constrained by the lack of resources. 
The guerra grande, and to a lesser extent, the internal conflicts of the 1830s and 1860s, were 
funded by merchant credit, including through tax farming, as examined in chapter six.  
Uruguay provides a case of early globalization, as a small, export-oriented frontier 
economy tied closely to European producers as well as both European and colonial markets. The 
tight integration with Europe, the cosmopolitan community of foreign merchants, and its position 
as a regional entrepôt place Uruguay firmly within the larger 19th century framework of 
globalization. This integration and Europeanization distinguishes it from less integrated areas in 
Rio Grande do Sul, Paraguay, and northern Argentina. Merchants were the conduits for 
technological improvement, capital intensification, firm organization, and financial innovation in 
Uruguay, in a way that was less true for areas where the landowning elite were local.538 
On the other hand, its small size, persistent internal conflicts, and vulnerability in the face 
of other regional powers kept the country from developing at the same pace as Buenos Aires. The 
thesis of David Rock, that the dominance of merchants in Uruguay relative to Argentina generated 
a weak state incapable of overcoming inter-party conflict, seems difficult to reconcile with the 
either the vanguard role of merchants in entrepreneurship, or their persistent support for strong 
property rights institutions in the rural sector in the 1850s and beyond, as shown in chapter 
seven.539  Whatever held back Uruguay from achieving the levels of state development attained in 
on the other side of the River Plate, it does not seem to have been primarily the influence of 
merchants, British or otherwise.  
The most likely culprit for late state development remains the one, suggested by countless 
observers at the time, that it was constant internal and regional warfare that prevented Uruguay 
from developing stronger state institutions. The consolidation of power by an Uruguayan political 
faction would always be made difficult by the regional alliances forged by their opponents: Oribe 
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could not build a state in the 1830s, because Rivera had the support of the Brazilians and the 
French; Rivera could not build a state in the 1840s, because Oribe had the support of Rosas; Berro 
could not build a state in the 1860s because Flores had the support of Brazil and Argentina, and so 
on.  Neither in Brazil nor Argentina did the central government have internal control over regional 
elites or popular forces, which made shifting alliances and cross-border rebellions a constant 
factor. The existence of sophisticated and wealthy merchants changed the possibilities of military 
and political conflict, since they provided support in exchange for privileges, as shown in chapter 
six. Nevertheless, merchants were only one group of actors, whose interests conflicted not only 
with other groups, but frequently with each other.  
This thesis also presents evidence for a slightly different role for merchants than suggested 
by Lopez-Alves, who posits that the disentanglement of merchant-estancieros from politics led to 
a political economy dominated by less entrepreneurial landowners. The thesis diverges from this 
hypothesis on two levels.540 First, as show in chapter five, there was extensive intermarriage 
between the foreign merchants who made progressive investments in the rural sector and the old 
rural elite. It is difficult to imagine these interconnections through marriage as having no effect on 
the integration of the interests of progressive landowners into the government of the country. Nor 
is it the case that merchant-entrepreneurs stood aloof from the system, or only showed support 
for the most intellectual, ineffectual principista parties. As shown in chapter six, some British 
merchants agitated for both formal and informal intervention in support of their interests. While a 
lack of archival material prevents us from quantifying any gains or losses, it seems clear that many 
merchants profited handsomely from war, through loans, tax farming, and provisioning. The 
complexity of the wars and interventions of the guerra grande involved substantial risk. The fate of 
the two warring parties was unclear, and tied to a web of regional and international factors. The 
merchants of Montevideo used their influence to push events in favourable directions, but the 
shifting mix of success and failure highlights how contingent the results were on the vagaries of 
diplomacy, politics and war.  
At least for an influential sub-section of the merchant community, they did not remain 
aloof from political entanglement, but rather were active participants in the ongoing political 
struggles. The eventual triumph of the Colorado party was, to a large extent, the product of the 
combination of the funds provided by merchants to sustain the conflict, and the Anglo-French 
intervention, arranged and prolonged by the lobbying efforts of Samuel Lafone and his allies. 
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There was a divide within the British merchant community itself between the politically active 
Lafone group, who opposed Rosas, Oribe and the Blancos, and those who either sought a neutral 
position, or who actively opposed the Colorados.  While this intervention did not prove decisive in 
ending the conflict, its absence would almost certainly have led to an early Blanco victory, rather 
than an impoverishing nine-year siege. Merchants mattered, both for their ideological orientation, 
and for exercise of entrepreneurial judgement during wartime.  
 The overall result of the entrepreneurship of merchants during the mid-19th century was 
the development of a small, cosmopolitan country with notably different political economy 
characteristics than its neighbours in Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, and Rio Grande do Sul. Local elites, 
having fought themselves into poverty, had a less prominent role in the process of rural 
development, and concentrated their attentions on the political contest for control. Their 
replacements as the predominant landowners, the nueva clase alta rural were, to a large extent, 
the same pluriactive entrepreneurs who had dominated trade in the 1830s, who had provided 
finance for the guerra grande in the 1840s, and who formed the core of the nascent banking 
sector in the 1850s. The establishment of a broad economic elite composed of foreign merchants, 
of whom the British were a small but tremendously influential subset, created a wealthy base of 
support for the first major state-building project, under Lorenzo Latorre. In this, they became a 
powerful force for modernization and development, through entrepreneurial initiatives including 
colonization schemes, the mechanization of cattle processing, banking, and a host of 
infrastructural projects.  
While it is hazardous to reason counterfactually, it seems likely that this would have 
changed the political economy of development in Uruguay. Powerful, highly indebted, local 
landowning elites were critical to the trajectory of politics in Argentina, and their relative absence 
in Uruguay is an important difference between the countries. Such an outcome may also have had 
larger regional implications, both for the balance of power between Brazil and Argentina, as well 
as the internal Argentine question of Federalism versus Unitarianism. The shift into landownership 
by influential merchants in the wake of the guerra grande slowly changed their interests. Whereas 
from the 1810s until the end of the 1840s, merchants could interact as traders and creditors, 
playing off the political parties as necessary, while remaining largely indifferent to the state of 
affairs in the countryside, by the 1850s, they had investments, and therefore interests, in ensuring 
rural stability. Their self-organization into lobby groups to promote rural modernization and shift 
the position of government towards improving the infrastructure and policing in the interior led 
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within a decade to the rise of Lorenzo Latorre and the first serious state-building project in the 
Banda Oriental.  
That the merchants of Montevideo were also to a large extent the great landowners 
perhaps explains why Uruguay remained committed to a metallic currency standard, despite 
Argentine commitment to inconvertible paper currency, and repeated inflations in Brazil. It was 
not only in Uruguay’s interest as an entrepôt to maintain stable prices to facilitate trade, but it was 
also in the interest of many landowners, as they were in many influential cases the same 
merchants who were the government’s creditors. None of this is to suggest that the Uruguayan 
fiscal system did not suffer from the similar or worse problems as the neighbouring states. The 
debts accumulated during and following the guerra grande were obviously unpayable. This led to 
an unusual case of a runaway government debt, in practical default, but without a bona fide 
sovereign currency. When these debts were finally resolved in the late 1850s, it was not by the 
action of the state, but by the combination of the Brazilian banker Mauá and the coalition of 
merchant-estancieros who formed the Banco Comercial. These groups jointly maintained the 
commitment to metallic currency through private means, separate from the state, and distinct 
from the Argentine or Brazilian cases.541 
Different cases show different paths based on the contingencies of personality and 
judgement. The case of Samuel Lafone provides one path through the turbulent period mid-
century, characterized by the use of extreme political partisanship, social entanglement, and 
diplomatic connections to support a broad and high-risk portfolio of entrepreneurial ventures. By 
contrast, the case of John Jackson exemplifies how a different set of entrepreneurial choices 
concerning the timing of investment and the relative importance of landownership, credit, and 
merchant trade, led (or at least incentivised) him and his descendants into political and social 
alignment with the Blanco faction. Other British merchants, including Hughes and Tomkinson, 
picked a more moderate path, making carefully timed moves into different fields of investment on 
the basis of accumulating information about the changing situation, and adapting appropriately. 
Not all were successful; the examples of George Hodgskin and Daniel Gowland show how easy it 
was to misjudge the political, military, and diplomatic situation, and be forced into default or ruin. 
                                                          
541 While this thesis does not explore in depth the currency issues of the late 1860s and beyond, Mauá 
pursued a highly leveraged, inflationary banking policy, which eventually forced the Uruguayan government 
to suspend convertibility following the spread of the Overend Gurney crisis to Uruguay in 1867-68. The 
Banco Comercial, by contrast, maintained convertibility throughout, even going so far as to defy the 
government in order to redeem their obligations in gold. Barrán, Apogeo y crisis, 138-140. 
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Neither the bankruptcy of the old patriciado, nor the transition of merchants into 
landownership was inevitable. It was instead the result of a complex set of judgements made 
about political and economic conditions during a time of great uncertainty. Had merchants chosen 
to remain on the sidelines of the regional conflicts of the late 1830s, the path of local and regional 
history might have followed another course.  If the merchants of Montevideo had decided, as 
many did, that reconciliation with Buenos Aires was more fundamental to their commercial 
interests, or had supported the Blancos rather than the Colorados, the complex web of 
contingencies, alliances, and interests might have led to any number of possibilities for the 
country and for the region. Nevertheless, it is clear that influence of British merchants in Uruguay 
was a major shaping factor in the Uruguayan path of development during the transition from 
independence to the first globalization. 
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Appendix 1: Lists 
Table 3: British merchants appearing on the List of Approved Merchants, Sociedad Compradora de 
los Derechos de la Aduana, 1844 
Samuel Lafone  Edward Gowland  
Stanley Black and Co.  Tayleur and Co.  
Rodger Bros.  Brownell Stegmann and Co.  
Carlisle Smith and Co.  J. S. Kemsley  
J. Nuttall  G. Hodgskin  
Robert Niblett  Dickson and Co.  
Shaw Brothers  Briscoe Stewart and Co.  
Parlane McLean and Co.  McKinnon  
Rennie McFarlane and Co.  Daniel Cash  
Hughes Brothers  Edward McEachen  
Bradshaw Wanklyn and Co.  Bertram Le Breton and Delisle  
Henry Sparks  Francis Hocquard  
Nicholson Green and Co.  Anderson McFarlane and Co.  
Jackson and Co.  Smith Bros.  
Sourcce:  April 10, 1844, Carpeta 13, Caja 1632, Ministerio de Hacienda, Archivo General de la 
Nación. Source:  
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Table 4: Anderson Macfarlane and Co.: List of Correspondents  
Location  Correspondents  
Glasgow  48  
Greenock  3  
Dundee  1  
Kirkaldy  1  
Dunfernline  1  
Kilmarnock  1  
London  10  
Liverpool  7  
Manchester  3  
Halifax  2  
Bury  1  
Falmouth  1  
Belfast  2  
Bayonne  1  
Antwerp  1  
Buenos Aires  7  
Gualeguay  1  
Montevideo  9  
Buceo  2  
Río grande  2  
Río de Janeiro  1  
Porto Alegre  1  
Total  106  
Source: Anderson Macfarlane Letter book, 1846-1850. Foreign Office 508-1, National Archives, 
Kew. 
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Appendix 2: Family Networks 
Figure 3: Lafone Family Network: Siblings of Samuel Fisher Lafone 
  
Legend:  
Yellow: Merchants or manufacturers in Britain 
Red: Merchants or estancieros in the River Plate 
 
Sources for appendices 3-5: Jose Fernandez Saldaña, Diccionario Uruguayo de 
biografías (Montevideo: Amerindia, 1945); Augusto Schulkin, Historia de Paysandú : 
diccionario biográfico,3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Von Roosen, 1958); Maxine 
Hanon, Diccionario de británicos en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 2005; Ricardo 
Goldaracena, El libro de los linajes, t. 1-6 (Montevideo: Arca, 2001); Genealogical 
records retrieved from ancestry.co.uk. 
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Figure 4: Lafone Family Network: Samuel Lafone’s Connections in the River Plate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Legend:  
Red: First or second generation British 
Blue: Uruguayan or Argentine elites 
Green: Other foreign elites 
Sources for appendices 3-5: Jose Fernandez Saldaña, Diccionario Uruguayo de biografías 
(Montevideo: Amerindia, 1945); Augusto Schulkin, Historia de Paysandú : diccionario 
biográfico,3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Von Roosen, 1958); Maxine Hanon, Diccionario de 
británicos en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 2005; Ricardo Goldaracena, El libro de los linajes, 
t. 1-6 (Montevideo: Arca, 2001); Genealogical records retrieved from ancestry.co.uk. 
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Figure 5: Family Network of John Jackson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Legend:  
Red: First or second generation British 
Blue: Uruguayan or Argentine elites 
Green: Other foreign elites 
Sources for appendices 3-5: Jose Fernandez Saldaña, Diccionario Uruguayo de 
biografías (Montevideo: Amerindia, 1945); Augusto Schulkin, Historia de Paysandú: 
diccionario biográfico,3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Von Roosen, 1958); Maxine 
Hanon, Diccionario de británicos en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 2005; Ricardo 
Goldaracena, El libro de los linajes, t. 1-6 (Montevideo: Arca, 2001); Genealogical 
records retrieved from ancestry.co.uk. 
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Appendix 3: Tables and Figures 
Table 5: Population of Uruguay 
Year Uruguay Montevideo 
1829 74000 9000 
1835 128000 12000 
1840 200000 42000 
1843  31000 
1852 132000 34000 
1860 221000 45000 
Source: Millot and Bertino, Historia Económica, t.1, 85. Table I-D-1. 
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Table 6: Rural Exports and Prices, 1829-62 
Year Cattle 
Hides 
Hides 
Price 
Horse 
Hides 
Horse 
Hides 
Price 
Wool 
(arrobas) 
Wool 
Price 
Tasajo 
(quintal) 
Tasajo 
Price 
Fats Fats 
Price 
1829 312613 5 to 6 128105    32732 5   
1830 294714 " 222521    101479 4 1279  
1831  " 182678      1303  
1832  "       5650  
1833  "   25000 1.37   6565  
1834  "     180950 5 12877  
1835 420513 " 52000  29000  180950 5 18497  
1836 513401 " 37000  34000  306354  23568  
1837 617382 " 24000  39000  338126  38304  
1838  "       83674  
1839  "       89480  
1840 1258345 4 45177 2.25 87000 3 673000 2.75 259284 1.94 
1841 1191897 4 52800 2.25 80000 3 603000 2.58 209103 1.87 
1842 1141045 4 65824 2.25 92000 3 368000 2.75 118965 1.87 
1853 891000  311000  150457    159425  
1854 571000 7.2 227000  37614    146887  
1855 484000  190000  37440  200000  157335  
1856 479000 9.5 148000  56770 1.75 231000 6.5 381628  
1857 630000 12.25 189000  79234 2.25 301000 6.5 206966  
1858 566000 8 to 
8.5 
115000  91598 1.87 283000    
1859      3.75 305000 5.75   
1860       413000 4.25   
1861       392000 3   
1862 1139000 4 to 5 129000 2 407488 5 741000 2.25 748280 2.3 
Source Millot and Bertino, Historia Económica, t.1, 131. Table III-A-2. Prices and values in pesos. 
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Table 7: Import tariff rates, 1829-61 
Source: Millot and Bertino, Historia Económica, t.1, 210. Table III-F-2. Note: rates are applied ad 
valorem, which makes the above table difficult to interpret without a corresponding series of 
official values. 
 
 
  
Import 
Goods 
1829 1831 1833 1837 1838-
39 
1840 1853 1854 1856 1859 1861 
Machines, 
books, 
printing 
presses, 
hides, fats, 
etc… 
No 
tariff 
          
General Tax 15 18 18 19 25 35 24 20 15 17 17 
Wood 5 6 6 6 12 22 7.2 5 3 5 7 
Steel, iron, 
coal, iron 
products 
5 6 6 6 12 22 7.2 5 5 7 7 
Silks, 
pocketwatc
hes, etc. 
5 6 6 10 16 26 18 10 7 9 7 
Consumabl
es, 
woodworki
ng, leaf 
tobacco, 
etc. 
20 23 23 24 24       
Footwear, 
clothing 
25 30 30 31.5 37.5 47.5 36 30 20 22 24 
Furniture, 
doors, 
plowshares, 
maize, 
black 
tobacco 
25 30 30 31.5 37.5 47.5 36 30 30 32 24 
Wines, 
liquors, 
candles 
25 30 30 31.5 37.5 47.5 42 35 25 27 24 
Cigars, 
playing 
cards, 
salted 
meats 
25 30 30 25 41 51 32 35 35 37 24 
Wheat Sliding 
scale 
Plus 
3% 
Plus  
3% 
31.5 31.5 31.5 36 30 30 30 2 pesos/ 
fanega 
Flour Sliding 
Scale 
mas 
10% 
Sliding 
Scale 
35 Sliding 
scale 
Sliding 
Scale 
42 35 Sliding 
scale 
Sliding 
scale 
Sliding 
scale 
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Table 8: Balance of Trade, 1829-42 (pesos fuertes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Balance of Trade, 1829-42 (pesos Fuertes)
 
Source: Lamas, Apuntes estadisticos, 79-84. 
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Year Imports Exports Total Balance 
1829 2651067 2077276 4728343 -573791 
1830 2672516 2399264 5071780 -273252 
1831 2200733 1413112 3613845 -787621 
1832 2450670 1920714 4371384 -529956 
1833 3090737 2280701 5371438 -810036 
1834 2987203 2685975 5673178 -301228 
1835 3097774 2764540 5862314 -333234 
1836 3597437 3443949 7041386 -153488 
1837 4497373 4100000 8597373 -397373 
1838 7652792 5601583 13254375 -2051209 
1839 11799320 6203000 18002320 -5596320 
1840 11070960 7830845 18901805 -3240115 
1841 9042232 6910210 15952442 -2132022 
1842 9234696 7301764 16536460 -1932932 
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Table 9: Imports, 1830-35 (pesos fuertes)  
 1830 1831 1835 
England 486415 512881 946312 
Brazil 718624 723034 726290 
France 271529 165771 353763 
Prov. Argentina 238563 237287 275881 
North America 498562 201655 333881 
Mediterranean  369826  348195 
Spain  213232  
Genoa  61059  
Gibraltar  55841  
Bremen 510  16805 
Cabo Verde 29364  8370 
Chile 4050   
Patagones 4296   
Havana 36875 8404 3127 
Trieste 11268   
Isla de Granada 2634   
Valparaiso   28539 
Lisbon   4350 
Hamburg   38000 
Santa Teresa   14261 
Various  21569  
Total 2672516 2200733 3097774 
Source: Lamas, Apuntes estadisticos, 79-80.  
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Table 10: Exports, 1830-42 (pesos fuertes)  
Destination 1830 1834 1836 1840 1842 
England 656186 1026955 951423 2113780 2357566 
North America 305039 449468 295829 457647 436304 
France 259259 429182 464430 800394 1224871 
Brazil 407004 329583 825440 1513758 921984 
Havana 127565 183669 319481 1150462 616887 
Mediterranean 387535    27010 
Spain  94114 236673 623662 780344 
Genoa  44062 30252 201514 349451 
Gibraltar    29211  
Antwerp 251476 102204 313909 723842 317626 
Granada 1800     
Borbon 3400    22991 
Chile     5811 
Valparaiso  1950  5364  
St. Helena  24788    
Trinidad   3740   
Mauricio   2772   
Amsterdam    116658  
Bremen    63416  
Altona    29737 14920 
West Indes     14400 
Quebec     4950 
Canary Islands     5310 
Hamburg     62337 
Portugal     2201 
European Ports     136801 
Various    1400  
Total 2399264 2685975 3443949 7830845 7301764 
Source: Lamas, Apuntes estadisticos, 82-4. 
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Table 11: Wheat Production, 1855-72 
Year Wheat 
Production 
(thousand 
fanegas) 
Wheat 
export 
Wheat 
consumption 
Price 
(pesos per 
fanega) 
Value 
(pesos) 
1855 200 20 180 8.8 1760 
1856 250 25 225 6.2 1550 
1857 300 30 270 5.4 1620 
1858 350 30 320 4 1400 
1859 380 35 345 3.6 1368 
1860 390 40 350 4.4 1716 
1861 120 10 110 9.2 1104 
1862 400 50 350 5.4 2160 
1863 420 40 380 5.6 2352 
1864 450 30 420 5.8 2610 
1865 480 20 460 5.6 2688 
1866 490 25 465 5.2 2548 
1867 500 80 420 6 3000 
1868 520 70 450 6.5 3380 
1869 350 35 315 5.5 1925 
1870 600 30 570 4.8 2880 
1871 500 20 480 4.8 2400 
1872 800 30 770 4.8 3840 
Source: Vaillant, Exposición de Viena, 1873, 165. 
 
234 
 
 
 
Table 12: Maize production, 1855-72 
Year Maize production 
(thousand 
fanegas) 
Maize export Maize 
consumption 
Price 
(pesos per 
fanega) 
Value 
(pesos) 
1855 100 20 80 4.4 440 
1856 125 25 100 2.8 350 
1857 130 30 100 3.6 468 
1858 140 35 105 4.4 616 
1859 150 40 110 4.4 660 
1860 155 30 125 1.8 279 
1861 160 35 125 2 320 
1862 135 30 105 2.4 324 
1863 140 20 120 4 560 
1864 150 20 130 2.8 420 
1865 180 10 170 3 540 
1866 190 5 185 2.2 418 
1867 150 5 145 5 750 
1868 190 40 150 4.8 912 
1869 200 0 200 3.2 640 
1870 205 0 205 4 820 
1871 210 0 210 3.8 798 
1872 150 0 150 4.2 630 
Source: Vaillant, Exposición de Viena, 1873, 165.
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Table 13: Balance of Trade by Destination, 1869 (Market value, “valores de plaza,” Uruguayan 
Pesos) 
Destination Imports Exports Total Balance 
England 5508016 1558715 7066731 -3949301 
France 6470187 8501264 14971451 2031077 
Belgium 694961 3129168 3824129 2434207 
US 1361192 2175322 3536514 814130 
Brazil 1718758 3142108 4860866 1423350 
Spain/Cuba 2037304 487802 2525106 -1549502 
Italy 780532 170614 951146 -609918 
Argentina 444312 0 444312 -444312 
Germany 1684451 0 1684451 -1684451 
Chile 888018 24272 912290 -863746 
Holland 544728 0 544728 -544728 
India 52912 0 52912 -52912 
Portugal 111307 0 111307 -111307 
Others 1968 114000 115968 112032 
Total 22298646 19303265 41601911 -2995381 
Source: Vaillant, Exposición de Viena, 1873, 34-5. Figures for Brazil do not include overland traffic 
of livestock. 
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Table 14: Export Composition, 1869 
Item Unit Quantity Value (Uruguayan 
pesos) 
Wool, unwashed kg 29034240 6933328 
Wool, washed kg 298000 69832 
Wool, cerda kg 573820 315600 
Cow hides, dry hides 637774 2284768 
Cow hides, salted hides 499981 2890271 
Calf hides, dry hides 41121 63412 
Calf hides, salted hides 5120 10538 
Horse hides, dry hides 9602 11516 
Horse hides, salted hides 24414 44828 
Sea wolf hides hides   
Sheep hides kg 5497024 937870 
Ostrich feathers kg 9200 26400 
Fats kg 7499000 1158436 
Tasajo (dried beef) kg 32425944 1311430 
Neatsfoot oil kg 211680 43000 
Meat extract  400000 
Goat hides kg 57000 44420 
Calf leather kg 29130 5630 
Horns and hooves  26881 
Bone and ash tons 57825 92767 
Rags  1120 
Mules and horses 9243 114000 
Various products  17220 
   16803267 
Cattle on the hoof, to Brazil 200000 2500000 
Total   19303267 
Source: Vaillant, Exposición de Viena, 1873, 39. 
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Table 15: Tasajo Exports from the River Plate (in quintales, 100 lbs.) 
Year To 
Brazil 
From 
Uruguay 
Uru. 
Share 
To 
Havana 
From 
Uruguay 
Uruguay 
Share 
England Total Uru. 
Share 
1860 495186   623457    1118643  
1861 528285   429874    958159  
1862 596992   651145    1248137  
1863 656448   701805   18250 1376503  
1864 580246   752385   56330 1388961  
1865 750910   758300   4000 1513210  
1866 828600   704000    1532600  
1867 830700 517100 0.62 746000 330100 0.44  1576700 0.54 
1868 555900 388900 0.70 941700 414600 0.44  1497600 0.54 
1869 813900 461200 0.57 693700 266400 0.38  1507600 0.48 
1870 897700 531600 0.59 861270 330500 0.38  1758970 0.49 
1871 786700 410800 0.52 620300 308100 0.50  1407000 0.51 
1872 843200 445400 0.53 696600 320200 0.46  1539800 0.50 
Source: Vaillant, Exposición de Viena, 1873, 179-180. 
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Table 16: Buenos Aires and Montevideo hides exports, 1815-82 
Year Buenos 
Aires 
cattle 
hides 
Montevideo 
cattle hides 
Mtvd 
share 
Year Buenos 
Aires 
cattle 
hides 
Montevideo 
cattle hides 
Mtvd 
share 
1815 850242 169200 0.17 1856 1214772 479000 0.28 
1816 691321 196444 0.22 1857 1409301 630000 0.31 
1817 798599 39115 0.05 1858 1372625 566000 0.29 
1818 728539 60803 0.08 1859 1508902   
1819 519991 19650 0.04 1860 1613130   
1820 469138   1861 1438350   
1821    1862 155129 1139000 0.88 
1822 590372   1863  1406000  
1823    1864    
1824    1865 2034000   
1825 655255   1866 1980000   
1826    1867 2399000 1155000 0.32 
1827    1868 2355000 871000 0.27 
1828    1869 2928000 1136000 0.28 
1829 854799 312613 0.27 1870 2712000 1087000 0.29 
1830 965556 294754 0.23 1871 2433000 1277000 0.34 
1831    1872 3240000 1227000 0.27 
1832    1873 2671000 1166000 0.30 
1833    1874 3106000 1152000 0.27 
1834    1875 2883000 934000 0.24 
1835 534213 420513 0.44 1876 2325000   
1836 622702 513401 0.45 1877 2488000 1114000 0.31 
1837 823635 617382 0.43 1878 2239000 1209000 0.35 
1838 355993   1879 2337000 1390000 0.37 
1839 8501   1880 2791000 1777000 0.39 
1840 83779 1258345 0.94 1881 2192000 2142000 0.49 
1841 2340638 1191897 0.34 1882 1945000 1674000 0.46 
1842 1399471 1141054 0.45     
1843 2054715       
1844 1786351       
1845 1942297       
1846 436739 1185440 0.73     
1847 1545307 2229806 0.59     
1848 1384790 860060 0.38     
1849 2961342 67856 0.02     
1850 2424251 17695 0.01     
1851 2601140 64822 0.02     
1852 1976173 458863 0.19     
1853 1199935 765000 0.39     
1854 759968 571000 0.43     
1855 1300081 484000 0.27     
Source: Schmit and Rosal, Política Comercial, 115-117. 
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Table 17: Tasajo exports, Buenos Aires and Montevideo (in quintales, 100lbs.) 
Year Buenos Aires BA% Montevideo Mtvd% Total 
1829 164818 0.82 35732 0.18 200550 
1830 261284 0.72 101479 0.28 362763 
1831      
1832      
1833      
1834   180950   
1835 119017 0.40 180950 0.60 299967 
1836 150579 0.33 306354 0.67 456933 
1837 178877 0.35 338126 0.65 517003 
1838 165304     
1839 6670     
1840 8630 0.01 673362 0.99 681992 
1841 217671 0.27 603052 0.73 820723 
1842 133795 0.27 367715 0.73 501510 
1843 182940     
1844 328182     
1845 274330     
1846 21298    21298 
1847 225481 0.56 176717 0.44 402198 
1848 314352 0.95 16963 0.05 331315 
1849 559969 1.00 2273 0.00 562242 
1850 390731    390731 
1851 431873     
1852 521975     
1853 335165     
1854 157998     
1855   200000   
1856   231000   
1857   301000   
1858   283000   
1859   305000   
1860   413000   
1861   392000   
1862   741000   
1863   911957   
1864      
1865 772587     
1866 497674     
1867 695217 0.45 847000 0.55 1542217 
1868 603783 0.43 802000 0.57 1405783 
1869 824022 0.54 704891 0.46 1528913 
1870 841957 0.60 558652 0.40 1400609 
1871 700826 0.55 562804 0.45 1263630 
1872 905630 0.55 742543 0.45 1648174 
1873 669848 0.46 795174 0.54 1465022 
1874 552935 0.41 780239 0.59 1333174 
1875 740174 0.60 490261 0.40 1230435 
1876 642239     
1877 841717 0.63 494022 0.37 1335739 
1878 729978 0.50 716630 0.5 1446609 
1879 702391 0.58 509761 0.42 1212152 
1880 567587 0.44 718978 0.56 1286565 
1881 486935 0.45 605478 0.55 1092413 
1882 586891 0.44 739696 0.56 1326587 
Source: Schmit and Rosal, Política Comercial, 115-117.
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Table 18: Wool exports, Buenos Aires and Montevideo, 1829-82 (arrobas) 
Year Buenos Aires Montevideo Year Buenos Aires Montevideo 
1829 30334  1860 1410535  
1830 6921  1861 2041845  
1831   1862 2346970 407488 
1832  25000 1863  521739 
1833   1864   
1834   1865 4776174  
1835 130308 29000 1866 4699478  
1836 132580 34000 1867 5514870 1477478 
1837 164706 39000 1868 6106957 1646609 
1838 166796  1869 6300087 1663652 
1839 25038  1870 5713391 1090870 
1840 3818 86724 1871 6223043 1356870 
1841 304872 79740 1872 8037043 1413565 
1842 124696 92068 1873 7281130 1393478 
1843 172635  1874 6974522 1473652 
1844 139215  1875 7889043 793652 
1845 172509  1876 7786609  
1846 65197 110635 1877 8464696 1490870 
1847 317102 317126 1878 7121217 1470609 
1848 507300 153947 1879 8009739 1557217 
1849 934780 1649 1880 8479826 1631739 
1850 739550 1494 1881 9109304 1581043 
1851 769090  1882 9660435 1846522 
1852 724268     
1853 808999 150457    
1854 485380 37614    
1855 1005358 37440    
1856 1126095 56770    
1857 1313353 79234    
1858 1259269 91598    
1859 1591823     
Source: Schmit and Rosal, Política Comercial, 115-117. 
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Figure 7: Tasajo exports, Montevideo, 1829-82
 
Figure 8: Hides exports, Montevideo, 1815-82
 
Figure 9: Wool exports, Montevideo, 1829-82
 
Source: Schmit and Rosal, Política Comercial, 115-117. 
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Table 19: British Exports to Montevideo, 1846-79 (in British Pounds)(2 pages) 
  
Year Total Cottons Linens Silks Wool 
manuf. 
Apparel, Slops, 
& Haberdashery 
1846 153,478 76,888 8,182 1,254 36,891 4,450 
1847 334,082 226,377 24,309 2,826 48,166 4,544 
1848 156,758 70,044 7,944 835 48,491 3,669 
1849 36,665 19,162 2,570 1,432 6,915 1,348 
1850 60,480 26,054 1,787 2,798 6,892 3,908 
1851 218,078 87,989 11,331 2,833 69,656 8,497 
1852 615,453 297,978 34,407 12,412 162,618 16,106 
1853 529,883 264,442 8,252 6,631 165,799 14,529 
1854 462,210 213,753 21,427 5,826 101,344 32,153 
1855 294,938 121,945 10,344 2,732 71,625 12,046 
1856 391,323 188,454 14,656 7,150 87,410 10,175 
1857 515,902 237,314 13,602 9,897 140,162 11,697 
1858 522,670 213,760 22,606 5,034 118,956 32,319 
1859 693,622 314,734 26,731 7,912 154,029 42,308 
1860 922,732 457,467 26,328 11,665 195,157 46,174 
1861 581,638 225,770 13,714 6,112 129,929 29,232 
1862 453,790 210,211 18,872 5,697 65,136 18,775 
1863 534,973 184,003 45,100 5,183 91,439 28,896 
1864 993,951 520,533 76,543 12,568 110,541 44,469 
1865 812,861 313,488 52,006 13,406 128,728 47,631 
1866 1,392,803 597,983 74,920 16,655 203,262 66,895 
1867 1,452,508 496,048 82,897 9,972 199,744 91,738 
1868 930,422 266,181 35,964 7,274 123,542 68,726 
1869 1,078,938 303,134 36,299 1,891 101,632 48,639 
1870 806,405 245,341 20,616 2,709 75,541 23,611 
1871 1,044,797 470,209 23,214 3,051 93,533 41,291 
1872 1,817,783 610,983 40,382 8,555 208,691 96,519 
1873 1,762,042 376,751 42,586 6,604 171,444 102,796 
1874 1,224,038 271,906 22,481 3,319 82,516 59,044 
1875 713,830 219,176 11,264 1,107 62,745 41,169 
1876 1,006,307 473,352 24,475 2,289 97,119 33,776 
1877 1,077,780 470,209 37,110 2,801 151,671 32,566 
1878 997,866 402,515 19,505 2,139 168,623 29,121 
1879 922,625 375,760 17,580 1,148 142,320 23,560 
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Year Hardware 
& Cutlery 
Iron and 
Steel 
Coal, Cinders 
& Culm 
Machinery All others 
1846 4,349 4,242 3,281 167 13,774 
1847 4,337 5,607 1,957 120 15,839 
1848 4,815 3,746 2,786 145 14,283 
1849 976 1,066 874 0 2,322 
1850 2,321 1,999 2,564 384 11,773 
1851 7,745 4,297 3,044 165 22,521 
1852 31,698 13,887 1,876 233 44,238 
1853 27,918 10,581 4,391 831 26,509 
1854 31,594 13,732 4,410 1,080 36,891 
1855 27,602 13,853 5,259 87 29,445 
1856 20,384 22,407 5,982 2,003 32,702 
1857 24,100 17,756 9,205 2,002 50,167 
1858 25,558 19,950 21,120 2,123 61,244 
1859 33,227 26,555 11,625 4,092 72,409 
1860 44,394 28,092 12,884 5,615 94,956 
1861 43,868 25,560 20,205 3,583 83,665 
1862 23,079 37,081 16,484 2,472 55,983 
1863 30,391 30,927 24,746 6,018 88,270 
1864 40,066 38,329 24,140 7,033 119,729 
1865 51,388 37,737 37,882 8,267 122,328 
1866 55,818 90,199 70,412 12,369 204,290 
1867 76,109 135,686 75,535 12,993 271,786 
1868 58,594 91,189 105,711 16,798 156,443 
1869 76,116 163,528 94,024 16,842 236,833 
1870 49,933 123,295 70,741 26,666 167,952 
1871 54,997 103,398 66,116 10,200 178,788 
1872 93,348 282,307 122,724 40,167 314,107 
1873 73,982 428,268 118,397 87,269 353,945 
1874 58,464 260,994 175,636 50,328 239,350 
1875 32,705 116,749 94,551 13,455 120,909 
1876 24,427 113,246 74,687 26,743 136,193 
1877 20,810 119,410 78,728 16,383 148,092 
1878 32,869 95,433 70,891 22,008 154,762 
1879 30,410 129,865 62,033 12,744 127,205 
Source: Disaggregated data for Uruguay courtesy of Manuel Llorca-Jaña, from: The British Textile 
Trade in South America in the Nineteenth Century, 2012. 
 
  
244 
 
 
Appendix 4, Figure 10: Pictures of the British Community in Uruguay (part 1) 
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Figure 11: Pictures of the British Community in Uruguay (part 2) 
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Figure 12: Pictures of the British Community in Uruguay (part 3) 
 
Source: Anales No. 124. Note that not all figures depicted are from the 1830-75 period. Courtesy 
of Juan Oribe Stemmer.  
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